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Preface
THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM demands a description of 
how the mental and physical parts of the world go together to 
make up the whole. The problem was solved around 1927 by 
Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead. The solution 
involves a change in our conception of the so-called “material 
world.” Ancient animistic views ascribed lifelike, personal 
characteristics to the forces of nature. Science has promoted a 
contrary view, in which the world consists entirely of geometrical 
fields and particles, devoid of feeling. The solution to the mind-
body problem reconciles the genuine content of scientific 
knowledge with the essential nature of mind — its subjective 
feeling and its wealth of sensory qualities. The new understanding 
reverts in large part to the pre-scientific intuition of nature. Every 
quantum event of physics is an instance of subjective feeling — an 
“occasion of experience.” When one such occasion influences 
another, a causal relation is exemplified. The scientific method 
discovers patterns of succession due to this causal relation, and 
scientific knowledge pertains exclusively to such patterns.
An elaboration of the foregoing provides a coherent 
understanding of the relation of mind and body-- in particular, 
the relation of the human mind and brain. At the same time, 
the method of science is clarified, as well as the nature of the 
information obtained by that method. I will document the 
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solution as provided by Whitehead and Russell. Their writings 
provide the several points of understanding needed to correct 
the prevalent misconception of the physical world. I will lift 
from their writings just those ideas that are crucial for making 
clear the relation between mental and physical entities.
The problem and its solution are laid bare in the opening 
synopsis. The rest of the book serves to make the meaning of the 
synopsis unmistakable. No special preparation in philosophy or 
science is required.
The reward of gaining a more coherent view of the world 
goes beyond the immediate puzzle-solving pleasure. Matters of 
religion and one’s place in the universe are recast in the light of 
more adequate fundamental concepts.
ix
Synopsis by Chapter
1. The Presence of Sensory Qualities.  An essential 
aspect of mind is the presence of qualitative sensory 
characteristics, such as colors, which provide 
recognizable feeling and experience. The restricted 
notion of mind as feeling is called “sentience.” The 
recognizable sense qualities, known by immediate 
acquaintance, allow us to describe the variety of our 
directly felt experience. Such description, known as 
“phenomenology,” is independent of, and prerequisite 
for, knowledge acquired through the methods of 
physical science.
2. The Absence of Qualities in Physics.  Science has 
refined our notion of bodies such that the human 
brain and body are sub-systems of a few fundamental 
forces that account for the entire universe. These forces 
are defined purely in terms of mathematical quantity 
and structure. Qualitative sensory characteristics are 
absent in the finished theory. Bodies, particles, and 
fields are extended in space and exist for specific 
periods of time, without phenomenological qualities 
and without the sentience that depends upon such 
qualities.
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3. The Mind-Body Problem.  Science culminates in 
a theory of particles and forces that excludes the 
qualities of sentient experience. That being the case, 
sentient qualities and sentient experience, which seem 
at the outset to be an integral part of nature, are instead 
relegated to a parallel existence beyond scientific 
explanation. This radical dissociation casts doubt on 
our basic concepts of “mental” and “physical,” and this 
is the mind-body problem.
4. Relations and Structure.  Relations account for 
whatever order and structure are to be found in any 
realm of investigation. Relations and structure are 
among the phenomena presented to our sentient 
minds. Relations and structure form the basis of 
mathematics, and together with causal assumptions, 
the basis of physics.
5. Space-time as Causal Structure.  Special Relativity 
eliminates instantaneous spatial relations in favor of 
time-ordering causal relations. Causal relations are 
definable without recourse to geometric notions. Time 
order, for physics, is relative position in a causal chain 
of events. Two events not ordered by a causal chain 
are called “contemporaries.” Spatial order is defined 
for contemporaries by the convergence of their 
respective causal chains at common causal ancestors 
and descendants.
6. The Physical Location of Mental Events.  Mental 
events have physical location by the same criterion as 
physical events, strictly by the theory of their causes 
and effects. Mental events are between their causes 
and effects, and this causal positioning is the complete 
criterion and meaning of their physical location, as it 
is for events in general, mental or non-mental.
xi
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7. Scientific Knowledge Characterized.  Physical 
science constructs a causal model of the world for 
better predicting the patterns of qualities witnessed 
in human mental experience. The scientist has no 
privileged capacity to escape the confines of his mind 
to investigate the physical world directly. A predictive 
model is framed, tested, and refined solely based on 
phenomena witnessed in mental events. Scientific 
knowledge resides entirely in such models.
8. The Solution.  Science delivers only the bare causal 
pattern of events. Among these events are sentient 
occasions of human perception, which provide science 
with its observational data. When the remaining 
events required for the causal pattern are considered 
sentient occasions also, a coherent view of the world 
is obtained.
1Introduction — Minds 
and Bodies
“Mind” and “body” are basic notions we have of things that exist 
for specific periods of time in the actual world. Together they 
account for the stuff of everyday reality.
When you die, your brainwaves stop. When your 
brainwaves stop, you are pronounced dead. Your body may be 
kept alive, but only in a vegetative state. It is apparent that, in 
some sense, your brainwave activity is your mental experience. It 
is the invariable accompaniment to your conscious existence. A 
shift to lower frequency signals a condition of deep sleep, while 
alpha frequencies characterize periods of waking and dreaming. 
This correspondence seems natural under the assumption that 
some component of brain activity, and human mental experience, 
are one and the same thing.
We hit a snag in this easygoing identity, however. It is 
contradictory to assert that two things are identical to one another 
if they differ intrinsically from one another. The sensory qualities 
that characterize our mental experience are, on the scientific 
account, no part of the physical world — a situation prevailing 
since the time of Newton. This prevents the identification of any 
recognizable feature of our mental experience with any feature of 
the physical world. Our sentient minds and our physical bodies 
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are consigned to parallel worlds, related only by an unexplained 
coincidence in time. This dissociation between mind and body 
is repugnant to anyone who fully grasps it, which drives some 
to attribute the harmony of mind and body to the unknowable 
power of a deity. That strikes others as a premature surrender 
of rationality — that mind-body difficulties are more likely due 
to our own mistaken assumptions. Prominent assaults on the 
problem treat one or the other of “mind” and “body” as a mistaken 
or confused notion, but none of these has proved convincing. The 
average person believes in the reality of both mind and body 
and does not suppose that philosophy has made any great strides 
beyond common sense in explaining their relationship, though 
perhaps science has.
Nearly everyone though, has entertained the problem in 
some form. When a tree falls in the forest and there’s no one 
there to hear it, is there a sound? Could a computer become 
conscious? Could personal awareness survive the death of the 
body? These inquiries come to a common impasse at the classical 
mind-body problem.
...
If a tree falls in the forest, and there’s no one there to hear 
it, is there a sound? If “sound” is taken to mean a qualitative 
phenomenon characterizing mental experience, then no, there is 
no sound. If “sound” is taken to mean the mechanical vibrations 
of air, then yes, there is sound. So, by removing a major ambiguity 
of the word “sound,” we can put the question to rest and go about 
our business.
We can settle a similar issue by distinguishing two 
meanings of the word “color.” If sunlight filters through the 
leaves in the Amazon jungle, and there’s no one there to see it, 
is there color? One finds that each of the five senses gives rise to 
a vocabulary for qualitative, recognizable features of reality. The 
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words of these vocabularies invariably have alternative meanings 
that derive from the scientific view of the world. In this view, the 
systematic causes of our various sensory experiences are depicted, 
ultimately in terms of quantity and mathematical structure, as for 
instance, pressure waves, electromagnetic waves, and frequencies 
and pathways of nerve impulses. There is a consistency and 
completeness in the mature framework of modern science, 
expressed in terms of numbers, variables, and equations. In that 
description of the universe, none of the qualitative properties 
of human perceptual experience are ascribed to the forest. The 
scientific forest is one of quantitative energy transactions, to 
which science ascribes no qualities.
Apparently, we can make short work of sorting out the 
ambiguities of the whole class of words that arise from sensory 
experience, not just “color” and “sound.” We can answer the 
whole question of what is present in the forest (energy fields), 
and what is not present in the forest (the felt qualities of sensory 
experience) when no one is there to witness the events. The 
questions lead to a straightforward resolution.
But suppose there is someone present to hear the falling 
tree. Then surely there is sound in every sense of the word. But 
the scientific description of the situation remains in principle 
unchanged. The human brain and body are no exception to the 
mathematically expressed theories of physics. They’re made of the 
same stuff. No new fundamental fields of force are introduced. 
The observer’s perceptions, verbal reports, and entire physical 
existence are accounted for by mathematical complexities in the 
energy fields. To account for the qualitative sound heard in the 
forest, we must recognize something in addition to the observer’s 
brain and body. We must recognize the qualities themselves, as 
given in our sentient experience. In short, we must recognize 
the observer’s mind. Only then do we have a forest that includes 
sound in every sense of the word.
...
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A person has a mind, and a person has a body. How deep 
does the distinction go? Is it possible for your mind, your “stream 
of consciousness,” to survive the death of your body and brain? 
Can we conceive of such a disembodied stream of consciousness 
existing in time, consisting of nothing more than its own 
thoughts and feelings? As for physical bodies, we all believe 
that they can exist independently of our minds. And we shall 
pursue the working scientific assumption that the human body, 
like any body, consists entirely of electromagnetic, nuclear, and 
gravitational energies. If the human mind can be conceived, in 
terms peculiar to it, sufficiently complete to count as something 
existing in time, and if the same holds true for a physical body, 
then we should say the distinction between mind and body goes 
very deep.
If, on the other hand, supplied with nothing but the 
fundamental notions of physics, we can conceive of the stream of 
consciousness solely in terms of electromagnetic processes in the 
brain, then the distinction between mind and body does not go 
very deep. The human mind is especially bound up, as a matter of 
empirical finding, with certain electromagnetic activities of the 
brain. If the notion of “the mind” could be broken down into the 
fundamental notions of physics and supplanted by them, then the 
mind would be eliminated as a kind of existence distinct from 
the body. The mind would be just some component of physical 
energy. In this case, mind and body present no incoherence, and 
there is no mind-body problem.
Our aim in the first three chapters is to examine the essential 
characteristics of minds and bodies, as ordinarily conceived, 
which have made the relationship between them a genuine 
mystery, the core problem of philosophy through the ages.
5References
All quotations and page number references are  
from HK, AM, or AI.
HK: Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits 
by Bertrand Russell
Copyright 1948 by Bertrand Russell
A Clarion Book
Published by Simon and Schuster
Rockefeller Center, 630 Fifth Avenue, NY, NY 10020
Third paperback printing, 1967
Printed by Murray Printing Co., Forge Village, Mass.
AM: The Analysis of Matter by Bertrand Russell
Copyright 1954 by Dover Publications, Inc.
(republication of the original 1927 work)
Dover Publications, Inc.
180 Varick Street, New York, N.Y. 10014
AI: Adventures of Ideas by Alfred North Whitehead
Copyright 1933 by The Macmillan Company
Copyright renewed 1961 by Evelyn Whitehead
Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., Toronto, Ontario
First Free Press Paperback Edition 1967
6QED The Strange Theory of Light and Matter 
by Richard P. Feynman
Copyright 1985 by Richard P. Feynman
Published by Princeton University Press
41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540
7CHAPTER 1
The Presence of Sensory Qualities
An essential aspect of mind is the presence of qualitative sensory 
characteristics, such as colors, which provide recognizable feeling 
and experience. The restricted notion of mind as feeling is called 
“sentience.” The recognizable sense qualities, known by immediate 
acquaintance, allow us to describe the variety of our directly 
felt experience. Such description, known as “phenomenology,” is 
independent of, and prerequisite for, knowledge acquired through the 
methods of physical science.
An Unsettling Dream
You wake up to the sound of the alarm clock. You get 
up, get dressed, and eat breakfast. Leaving the house, you pick 
the newspaper off the doorstep and get into your car. You turn 
the ignition key… and suddenly you are in bed waking to the 
sound of the alarm. Sure enough, you’re under the covers and the 
alarm is ringing. It’s fresh in your memory that you just dreamed 
of waking up and heading off to work. You turn off the alarm 
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and contemplate the oddity of the dream. You get dressed for 
work and eat some breakfast. On your way out, you pick the 
newspaper off the doorstep. You climb into your car. You turn the 
ignition key and the car starts. You recall that your dream had 
ended when you turned the ignition key. On the way to work, 
you’re waiting at a stoplight. Just as it turns green… the alarm 
rings. You’re back in bed, staring at the ringing alarm. You grab it 
and throw it against the wall. What if you’re still dreaming? This 
latest wake-up seems real enough, but no more real than the last 
one. What if you’re not yet awake? You’re not quite sure.
You get out of bed, feeling shaky. What if you’ve gone 
insane? You light a cigarette and make some coffee. You phone 
a friend, confessing to an “anxiety attack.” Your neighbor is 
reassuring-- he’ll be right over. While waiting for him, you 
make some frantic observations around the house. You examine 
yourself in the mirror. You turn on the TV to check what’s being 
broadcast against the TV guide. Everything checks out. By the 
time your friend arrives, you’re embarrassed to have called him. 
A dream, or a series of dreams, has merely confused you. Your 
neighbor listens to your account of the dream. He tells you that 
such an experience would upset anyone. He offers to drive you 
to work. You hesitate but accept. By the time you get to the 
office, the old confidence is back. You sit down at your desk, 
and the phone rings. No, it’s the alarm. You’re back in bed, just 
waking up…
I heard that story in a philosophy class from Professor 
Keith Gunderson. The story illustrates something about 
dreams, something about waking life, and what these two have 
in common.
Regarding dreams, we may say that they can present us 
with such sights, sounds, tactile impressions, and apparent 
interactions with other people as to constitute a full-blown but 
illusory experience, which usually fades rapidly upon waking up.
Regarding waking life, it can be concluded that confidence 
in the trusty world of waking life rests entirely upon consistency 
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checks. These checks generally secure a practical certainty before 
doubts even arise. However, to grasp the intent of the story is to 
understand that these consistency checks guarantee something 
less than logical certainty.
And what then do dreams and waking life have in common? 
They both involve a range of sense impressions and qualitative 
states of mind. Let us call such a state of mind, with its range of 
sense impressions, whether it falls into the context of a dream or 
into the context of waking life, a human “sensorium.” You have 
a sensorium when you are dreaming, and you have a sensorium 
when you are awake.
We shall use the word “sensorium” to refer to a mind, insofar 
as a mind consists of sense, sentience, or feeling. Although one 
discriminates a qualitative variety of feelings within a given 
moment, “sensorium” conveys the fact that the elements of this 
variety form a unified whole. A sensorium, over time, is a “stream 
of consciousness.” I’m merely labeling something that everyone 
has — something ever-present and taken for granted. Having 
adopted the peculiar word for the ordinary thing, we can, when 
we like, avoid more general-purpose terms that have taken on 
multiple uses and ambiguities.
Why not just use the word “mind” and be done with it? 
After all, it’s the mind-body problem we are presenting here. 
For one thing, mind includes unconscious processes, the theory 
of which is both contentious and tangential to our core subject. 
We will proceed without unnecessary difficulties by restricting 
our focus to mind as sentient awareness. With this restriction, to 
exist mentally — to have a mind — is to be sentient, to feel.
Mind also involves intelligence. Along that line, one can 
consider “smart machines,” and the “mentality” that might 
consequently be ascribed to computers. We will find the core of 
our problem in the consideration of simple “raw feeling,” without 
exploring the difficulties of higher versus lower mentality.
Finally, mind is the domain of motivation or purpose, as 
opposed to the mechanistic causation of physical science. We 
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don’t need to grapple with that distinction either, in order to 
present the paradoxical coexistence of a sensorium and a 
brain. Once that difficulty is laid bare, we will proceed with its 
resolution. We will then have course to a natural explanation for 
the purposeful nature of mind, and the role of such purpose in 
the physics of cause-and-effect. 
In this chapter we are just trying to whittle our attention 
down to a person’s mental existence as a sensorium, characterized 
entirely in terms of feeling or sentient awareness. This restriction, 
let us note, does not reduce our field of study to scant nothing, 
since the sensorium includes the feeling of self-awareness, which 
is generally revered as an intractable mystery when the topic of 
discussion is “consciousness and the brain.”
...
“Phenomenology” is the descriptive characterization of one’s 
immediate experience, without venturing beyond what is 
directly presented. The attitude is taken that appearances are 
worthy of examination for what they are in themselves. They are 
not just indicators of a wider realm beyond the field of sentient 
awareness. Phenomenology describes what is openly disclosed in 
sentient experience, surveying a qualitative realm of features and 
patterns. Phenomenology is the study of the sensorium.
Think about what redness is, in itself — that is, without 
regard to the theoretical entities of physics involved in its 
causation, such as electromagnetic energy, its absorption and 
reflection at various surfaces, and subsequent excitations in the 
eye and brain. The quality red has no description in terms of mass, 
charge, frequency, or motion. You’re left with redness itself to 
contemplate. Focus your attention upon redness as an essence. It 
is both irreducibly simple and strongly identifiable. This essential 
nature of redness is apparent to your mind when you focus your 
attention upon redness as the unmediated sensory quality that 
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it is. This is redness as a “phenomenon.” When you adopt the 
phenomenological attitude toward the directly given features 
of experience, there occurs a temporary suspension of interest 
in the wider physical realm believed to underlie the surface of 
appearances. This wider realm, which is the usual focus of daily 
living, is said to be “bracketed out” of consideration when you 
adopt the phenomenological attitude.
As a simple, recognizable characteristic, presented directly 
and repeatedly to awareness, redness can be termed an “object” 
of awareness in a general sense. Let us call the act of awareness, 
within which redness makes its appearance, a “sentient 
experience.” The act of awareness, and its objects, require one 
another. To exist as a sentient being is to have specific qualitative 
feelings. Without some characterizing phenomenon, there is no 
experience, and sentient mind does not exist. Sensory qualities 
are the very medium of mental experience.
When any feeling occurs there is sentient experience, and 
the phenomena that present themselves in that experience form 
a whole. A moment of sentient experience can be considered a 
basic type of temporal existence for the purpose of describing the 
actual world. Sentient experience, and the phenomena presented 
within it, are investigated in the discipline of phenomenology. 
This discipline uses an introspective method that is not dependent 
on the method, or the results, of modern science.
...
Let’s take a time-out. What are we trying to accomplish here? 
There may be some readers for whom this is too obvious, and 
others for whom no meaning is accruing whatsoever. It may help 
to explain that in philosophy, where common sense categories 
of existence are subjected to uncommon standards of logical 
rigor, the realm of the mental, which I am trying to define in this 
chapter for the purpose of subsequent discussion, is questioned 
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or denied by many philosophers. Common sense notions about 
mind are re-construed in such a way as to allow for the practical 
usefulness of mental terminology while restricting the ultimate 
description of reality to the terminology of physics. This involves 
the denial of sensory qualities, sentience itself, and anything 
purely mental. Contemporary physics is promoted to a complete 
theory of all that there is. The mind-body difficulty is solved by 
the removal or replacement of all things mental.
In 1970 I’d had some college-level background in science, 
but no courses in philosophy. Someone gave me a copy of 
Whitehead’s Science and the Modern World, which showed me 
that redness is something in itself. Here is Whitehead again, in 
Adventures of Ideas.
Gaze at a patch of red. In itself as an object, and apart from other 
factors of concern, this patch of red, as the mere object of that 
present act of perception, is silent as to the past or the future. 
How it originates, how it will vanish, whether indeed there was 
a past, and whether there will be a future, are not disclosed by 
its own nature. No material for the interpretation of sensa is 
provided by the sensa themselves, as they stand starkly, barely, 
present and immediate. We do interpret them, but no thanks 
for the feat is due to them. (AI, 180)
Yet redness is not included in the concepts of physics. I had 
somehow acquired, without being aware of it, an outlook 
dominated by physics, which overlooked the realm of sensory 
qualities. These qualities had taken on a subliminal role in my 
awareness, as mere cues to more substantial objects. I was suddenly 
struck by the immaterial nature of the color red as though by a 
paranormal experience. This disruption of my complacent view 
of the world might never have occurred if I had not happened 
upon Science and the Modern World. Philosophers who promote 
a view that denies the existence of mental phenomena can 
have more success than one might suppose. Modern culture is 
imbued with respect for the superiority of the scientific view of 
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the world. A person today can acquire a physicalistic view of the 
world without even knowing it.
Someone involved in the visual arts, whose stock-in-trade 
is visual form and color and their impact on the human mind, is 
apt to find the present chapter too obvious for words. The same 
reader may puzzle at the physicalist view of the world presented 
in Chapter 2, although that will be equally rudimentary. Each 
of the first two chapters covers something simple, fundamental, 
and extremely general. And therein lies the difficulty.
How many people have you met who have wrestled with 
the mind-body problem? None, perhaps? Literate society in the 
time of Newton and Descartes were aware of the problem, but it 
went unsolved for too many centuries. To shield ourselves from 
a humiliating lack of progress, we now look over, under, around, 
and through the mind-body distinction, without looking at it. 
Our view of the world is bifurcated, like the vision of a fish whose 
two eyes see nothing in common. We must force our isolated 
intuitions of mental and physical, however incongruous, into a 
mutual encounter, as Descartes did so well several centuries ago. 
We will then be in position to follow Russell and Whitehead to 
the solution.
One might expect academic philosophy to herald the 
solution as its greatest achievement and a new beginning, but 
that has not happened. Academic philosophy today is not 
generally aware of any solution. Attempts to “explain away” 
mental entities still garner much interest. But we will take the 
existence of mental entities as a simple fact and shall find no need 
to sweep them under the carpet. This chapter is nothing but an 
ostensive definition of sensory qualities — that is, an assignment 
of terms like “redness” to denote identifiable qualities involved in 
sensory experience. This may not seem like much of a basis for 
establishing the existence of mind, but it will suffice, together 
with the next chapter, to present the mind-body problem.
We continue then with our aim of drawing attention to 
the realm of phenomena, appealing to the deliverances of the 
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reader’s own senses. We adduce the body of literature classified 
as “phenomenology” as having that same endeavor, with a 
wealth of descriptive results to show for it. We will go beyond 
examples of utterly simple phenomena, such as redness, to 
facts of modest complexity — facts situated entirely within the 
province of phenomenology. To the mere naming of qualities we 
shall add statements of fact, which are only verifiable within the 
phenomenal field of awareness. The purpose is merely to fortify 
the belief that sensory qualities and the patterns they exhibit, 
ephemeral though they may seem in comparison to physical 
bodies, are not mere nothing. 
...
Let us now consider, as an example of a purely phenomenological 
fact, one specific way in which colors are related to one 
another — namely, that a sufficiently complete set of hues forms 
a “hue circle.” I want to make it clear that this fact is itself a 
phenomenon, established entirely through phenomenological 
means.
When different colors are seen simultaneously, their 
similarity or dissimilarity can be judged, and furthermore, the 
degree of similarity can be judged. If many colors are presented 
in many arrangements in the visual field, certain smooth 
arrangements exist such that any two neighboring colors are very 
similar. A hue circle of colored patches is one such arrangement. 
The progression of hues around the circle is in rainbow order, 
except that red and violet, at the two ends of the rainbow 
spectrum, are joined by magenta hues missing from the rainbow 
to complete a circle. Among individual colors in the hue circle, 
primaries can be chosen such that any two of the primaries 
are as dissimilar from each other as color hues can be, and any 
other hue can be described by its degree of similarity to the 
neighboring primaries on either side of it in the hue circle. Red, 
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yellow, green, and blue form such a set of primaries, the listing 
obeying their order in the hue circle. There are reddish yellows, 
yellowish greens, greenish blues, and blue-ish reds, but there is 
no such thing as a reddish green, or a yellowish blue. These are 
facts inherent in the hue circle itself, having entirely to do with 
the intrinsic nature of color.
It is also a phenomenological fact that the totality of 
colors, when a geometric analogy is employed, forms an irregular 
3-dimensional shape known as “the color solid.” When “just 
noticeable differences” are used to arrange colors geometrically, 
an oblong 3-dimensional form results. A dark-to-light series of 
gray tones running through this color solid serves as a linear 
axis which supplies the gray at the “hub” of any cross-section 
containing a hue circle. Hue, saturation, and lightness are three 
inherent dimensions of color, coordinated by the scale of gray 
tones as one reference axis. When black and white, at the ends 
of the gray scale, are included as phenomenological primaries 
along with red, green, yellow, and blue, any given color can be 
described by its degree of similarity to each of the six primaries.
The foregoing facts are innate to the realm of color. They 
are not trivial to formulate. A certain amount of mathematical 
intuition and study of colors is needed. But science as we know 
it has nothing to contribute to the study. Rather, the facts are 
founded without scientific assumptions. They are “givens” to 
which scientific theory must conform, if science should decide to 
take an interest. These facts could be established and understood 
by a perfectly pre-scientific culture. It is knowledge ascertainable 
only by direct acquaintance with colors.
When we consider sound qualities, we do not find a ring-like 
structure that is a direct counterpart to the hue circle of the 
color realm. The dimension of pitch, which orders tones by 
higher and lower, forms a linear series. There are octaves which 
form natural cycles in the series of pitch, and other recognizable 
intervals that relate pitches. Loudness and tonality add further 
dimensions. Recall a favorite tune. In its musical essence, it is a 
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phenomenological pattern of various pitches of sensed duration, 
loudness, tonality and tempo.
Taste and smell sensations admit to some ordering on 
an intensity scale, but otherwise their qualitative variations are 
not susceptible to analysis into dimensions. If they exhibit a 
messy variety of qualities not amenable to categorization, they 
are nevertheless something, and help to sustain sentience in the 
event of deprivation of other senses.
Sensations of touch include a site of location within or upon 
a person’s body image. This body-as-felt — the phenomenological 
body — is a structure of touch and kinesthetic sensations, and 
includes, for example, the limb that the physical body lacks in a 
case of “phantom limb” phenomenon.
When taken in combination, the various senses produce 
further complexities of variety and pattern in the sensorium. 
In fact, they provide a sufficiently rich totality to be commonly 
mistaken for the physical environment beyond the human head. 
(That this is a mistake is taken up at the outset of the next 
chapter.) In the case of waking life, the mistake does no apparent 
harm, a useful correspondence obtaining between the display of 
sensory qualities and the state of physical surroundings. In the 
case of dreams, the motor system of the body is disengaged, which 
prevents physical acting out. The confusions of hallucination, on 
the other hand, are dangerous, because a person’s bodily actions 
are apt to be severely misdirected by a play of appearances in 
the sensorium that bears little correspondence to the physical 
environment.
...
Consider the notion of “virtual reality” as depicted in many 
science fiction movies. In the film The Matrix, the hero, along 
with most of humanity, is deluded in the belief that his sensory 
experiences constitute veridical perceptions of the world outside 
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his head when in fact they do not. An alien race (of “sentient 
programs”) is fiendishly manipulating nerve impulses in the 
hero’s brain. The contraption which wires his brain into a 
computer-generated virtual reality is replicated on a mass scale 
to do the same for the whole human race. Unknown to this 
hapless lot, their physical bodies lie in vitro in life-support pods. 
This setup allows a coordinated deception of the entire human 
society, so that each person’s virtual reality is coordinated with 
others, including a convincing “feed” of sensations that suggest 
a familiar physical environment. Today’s theater-going public 
has no difficulty in following the story line that moves back 
and forth between the virtual world and the real world, thanks 
to proven techniques of cinema. The same cuts and techniques 
work well to convey, from a first-person point of view, a character 
experiencing memories, dreams, or hallucinations. No magic is 
required from the celluloid beyond its basic trick of reproducing 
sounds and images.
The science fiction premise of The Matrix is neatly in accord 
with brain science, differing only in respect to state-of-the-art 
limitations. Normal veridical perception also involves a qualitative 
virtual reality occurring in our heads, but presumably without 
any villainous piracy of our nerve signals. A wide external reality 
is judiciously represented in each of our waking virtual realities, 
fulfilling our beliefs that we act and communicate meaningfully 
in a common social world. We understand the premise of The 
Matrix without difficulty, by intuitive appeal to the sensorium 
as the common element in dreaming, hallucination, and waking 
life. This sensorium exists whenever and wherever sentient 
experience of any form occurs. The sensorium is implicit in our 
understanding of virtual reality.
To synthesize virtual reality, helmets and wires are used to 
intervene in the communication between a person’s sensorium 
and the rest of the world. That involves the scientific account of 
perception, covered in the next chapter.
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...
Now let’s expand the sensorium beyond the five senses. What of 
the feeling of mental anxiety? What of the feeling that you know 
something? What of the feeling that you doubt something? What 
of the feeling of harboring intentions, and engaging in their 
fulfillment? These are recognizable feelings that are perhaps not 
reducible to the qualities of the five senses, even when taken in 
combination. We shall include them in the sensorium as further 
phenomenological constituents of sentient experience.
Whitehead recognizes feeling that supplements the five 
senses, which he calls “non-sensuous perception.” As an example, 
he describes a very short-term type of memory which is an 
intimate feature of experience.
Non-Sensuous Perception. — … In human experience, the 
most compelling example of non-sensuous perception is our 
knowledge of our own immediate past. I am not referring to our 
memories of a day past, or of an hour past, or of a minute past. 
Such memories are blurred and confused by the intervening 
occasions of our personal existence. But our immediate past is 
constituted by that occasion, or by that group of fused occasions, 
which enters into experience devoid of any perceptible medium 
intervening between it and the present immediate fact. Roughly 
speaking, it is that portion of our past lying between a tenth of 
a second and half a second ago. It is gone, and yet it is here. It is 
our indubitable self, the foundation of our present existence. Yet 
the present occasion while claiming self-identity, while sharing 
the very nature of the bygone occasion in all its living activities, 
nevertheless is engaged in modifying it, in adjusting it to other 
influences, in completing it with other values, in deflecting it to 
other purposes. The present moment is constituted by the influx 
of the other into that self-identity which is the continued life of 
the immediate past within the immediacy of the present. (AI, 
181)
A person’s feeling of “now” is designated at the end of the quote 
as “the immediacy of the present.” It is difficult or impossible 
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to pin down a precise “present moment” of experience, but 
Whitehead succeeds admirably in describing the experience of 
temporal flux pervading the present moment. This felt passage 
of time cuts across the divisions of the various senses, uniting 
them into a common temporal stream. The ordering of one’s 
experiences into a serial “stream of consciousness” is implicit in 
the sensed relation of before-and-after. 
Equipped with the sense of time, we can classify various 
activities of mind as phenomenologically given. Mental life 
includes thinking, remembering, deciding, intending and all such 
mental acts and activities. The feelings involved are less vivid 
perhaps, than color qualities presented in the visual field, but we 
would impoverish our account of the sensorium if we fastened 
only upon qualities that differentiate the five senses. Indeed, as 
Russell says, “What we directly experience might be all that 
exists, if we did not have reason to believe that our sensations 
have external causes. …” (HK 311). Russell denotes by “what 
we directly experience” that which phenomenology is intent 
on describing, and what we are here calling “the sensorium.” 
Phenomenology, as a discipline, shades off smoothly into human 
experience in general, which is taken up entirely with the direct 
witnessing of phenomena, but not generally with the aim of 
disciplined, systematic description. I have stated, somewhat 
defensively, that phenomena are not “mere nothing.” A more 
aggressive proponent might claim that phenomenological 
experience is all that exists. Physics, as we shall consider in 
the next chapter, tends to the competing claim that its own 
mathematically characterized world is all that exists. The mind-
body problem could be called “the phenomenology-physics 
problem.” The solution to the problem must adjudicate these 
competing claims over all that exists.
Neither Russell nor Whitehead relies on the prominent 
phenomenologists of their time. Russell and Whitehead do 
their own phenomenology, borrowing from older traditions. 
Some phenomenologists have analyzed a sentient experience as 
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a mental act which intends its objects. Whitehead’s occasions of 
experience, and the objects given to them, are at least roughly 
equivalent to mental acts and their intended objects. Russell 
sometimes speaks of the “I-Now” of experience as an irreducible 
entity which binds various phenomena into the unity of a mental 
event. Again, this seems roughly consistent with mental acts and 
their objects. Regardless of disputes within phenomenology over 
how, or whether, the unity of a mental occasion is to be analyzed 
into subject and object, I submit that phenomenology, as the 
descriptive analysis of sentient mind, exists alongside physical 
science as a peer in the basic categories of human knowledge.
There was a philosophical paper titled “What is it Like to 
Be a Bat?” The title alone prompts a person to imagine a bat’s 
experience, borrowing initially from the sense of what it is like 
to be a person, but anticipating a major adjustment for the bat’s 
sonar sense. In any case, most people would assume that it is like 
something to be a bat, or, in other words, that bats have feelings. 
Most people assume that their pets have feelings — that they 
sometimes feel pain for instance. Pain is a phenomenological 
quality par excellence, and as such, a component of sentient 
mind. Common sense supposes that pain is felt by the higher 
mammals at least. In the present context, the ascription of 
sentient mind to these higher mammals implies nothing beyond 
what common sense already believes. We are just making further 
use of “sentient mind” to make its meaning clear. In that spirit, 
our pets are sentient, and phenomenology, although a strictly 
human activity, discloses the sort of thing that human beings 
routinely generalize to animals as well.
When pressed to draw the line, common sense supposes 
that sentience comes into being with the biological evolution 
of life at some minimal stage of complexity. Before that, apart 
from a possible Creator, the world is thought to be the interplay 
of blind forces devoid of feeling. That these physical forces, by 
arriving at a suitable configuration, can conjure sentience into 
being, is a magical tenet in the blind spot of common sense. 
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Setting aside the question of how sentient qualities could be 
produced by physical forces, let us agree with common sense 
that nature somehow endows human beings and various animals 
with phenomenological feeling.
...
This concludes my attempt to define “sentience,” or “sentient 
mind,” and the qualitative phenomena that comprise it. If you can 
readily make conceptual reference to some feature of your own 
sentient experience, such as a favorite color, a familiar tune, or 
the feeling of the present moment, the purpose of this chapter is 
fulfilled. You can frame for consideration a definite phenomenon 
revealed to sentient awareness, uncontaminated by any scientific 
doctrines regarding the physical composition of the world.
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CHAPTER 2
The Absence of Qualities in Physics
Science has refined our notion of bodies such that the human body 
and brain are subsystems of a few fundamental forces that account 
for the entire universe. These forces are defined purely in terms 
of mathematical quantity and structure. Qualitative sensory 
characteristics are absent in the finished theory. Bodies, particles 
and fields are extended in space, and exist for specific periods of time, 
without phenomenological qualities, and without the sentience that 
depends upon such qualities.
Science has established that an observer has no direct perception 
of the world outside his own head. The observer can no more 
extend his direct perception beyond this range, than he can 
return backward in time. Events outside the head are indirectly 
perceived from within the brain due to mediating events such 
as nerve impulses, which elapse in a sequence of measurable 
time intervals. When you detect an event outside your head, a 
series of events has transmitted some effect to you. The duration 
of the mediating events imposes a separation in time between 
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the external event detected and the subsequent detecting event 
that occurs in the head. The meaning of the term “indirect” as 
applied here to perception refers to cases in which causal chains 
of distinct events intervene, in the scientific account, between 
the initiating external event and the subsequent “percept,” or 
perceiving event, inside the head.
The fact is that you cannot “get outside your own head” to 
perceive directly what anything outside your head is like, given 
the scientific basics of human perception. But this requires you 
to abandon a gut-level belief to the contrary. We all start out 
interpreting the deliverances of our senses as a direct revelation 
of what the world beyond our bodies is like. We assume that 
we have a direct and open portal on the world. In this we are 
instinctively and confidently wrong. To take a specific example, 
the scientific conception of the world attributes no color at all to 
the world outside the human head. Electromagnetic entities and 
events, defined purely in terms of quantity and spatial-temporal 
location, connect with more entities and events of the same kind 
within the human head. Only then, when terms describing human 
mental experiences are abruptly introduced, does real color enter 
the description. We persist in thinking that colors are properties 
of physical objects, and located in the space extended beyond us, 
where we reckon the physical objects to be. But science has no 
use for the idea that the color red travels from an apple, through 
space, to our eyes. The description of the traveling influence in 
this case is already complete in terms of the quantitative theory 
of electromagnetic radiation, which does not employ qualitative 
color, and finds no room for it in its explanation. 
Physics has refined its laws with ever better predictive 
results, to the point where the defined entities obeying these 
laws are never directly perceived in the sentient experience of 
a human observer. In that regard, all the entities dealt with in 
modern physics, including tables, chairs and human bodies, are 
strictly theoretical constructions, defined entirely by systematic 
conjecture. Physical bodies are not phenomena. The coordinated 
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visual images and touch sensations that make up our experience 
of tables and chairs should not be mistaken for the physical 
objects themselves. Physical bodies consist of quarks and the 
like, supposed by science to be without any sensual features that 
would allow them into phenomenal experience. We need to ask 
what legitimately remains, if anything, of the presumption that 
we know what physical bodies are like.
Historically, physicists started from naïve realism, that is to say, 
from the belief that external objects are exactly as they seem. 
On the basis of this assumption, they developed a theory which 
made matter something quite unlike what we perceive. Thus 
their conclusion contradicted their premise, though no one 
except a few philosophers noticed this. (HK, 197)
Let’s trace the development of the scientific notion of matter, in a 
fanciful account, to see how the earlier notion is contradicted at a 
later stage. We picture Galileo dropping two objects, a heavy one 
and a light one, off a tower, to settle a bet. The odds are favoring 
the heavy object to fall faster. But the two objects fall side by 
side, and land at the same time, the heavy object merely raising 
more dust. The experiment is repeated, and the time taken for 
objects to fall from various heights is measured more carefully. 
Eventually a formula is distilled which gives a single fixed rate of 
acceleration for any falling object, regardless of its weight.
At this point the customary notion of matter, and the 
scientific one, have not diverged. Matter is directly perceivable 
in its color, its shape, its trajectories, its resistance to being lifted 
or pushed around, and its hardness. Clocks, rulers, and scales, 
devised of this same stuff, are employed in discovering general 
laws of motion in direct observation experiments. Although the 
coloration of bodies has nothing to do with their motions, it 
makes them visible, which helps in observing the experiments.
The visibility of matter also helps Kepler, with the aid 
of a telescope, to observe the elliptical orbits of planets about 
the sun. He finds that a planet’s arc sweeps out equal areas of 
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an ellipse in equal time intervals. Newton finds a remarkably 
general hypothesis to explain this. Using Descartes’ “Cartesian 
coordinates” to express geometry with algebraic formulas, and 
his own invented calculus, Newton accounts for falling bodies, 
the collision behavior of bodies, and the orbits of planets, all 
in a few simple formulas with units of mass, space, and time. 
Color is not among the primary variables and has no share in 
the explanatory power of science at this stage. It has an implicit 
role in the observation and verification of the theory, but color is 
not integrated into the new framework of science. It receives no 
benefit of explanation.
Electric and magnetic effects proved not to be reducible to 
Newton’s laws of mass, space, and time. A new primary variable, 
“charge,” must be added to Newton’s three. Maxwell’s equations 
of electromagnetism give the laws governing this new variable. It 
then becomes apparent that light, the presumed carrier of color 
from material bodies to the eye, is nothing else than a narrow 
band of frequencies in the spectrum of electromagnetic waves. 
The behavior of radiation in this band, first at the surface of a 
material body, then in transit through space, and finally at the 
eye, specifies the role of light in visual perception, using space, 
time, mass, and charge combined into formulas. Qualitative color 
is still not among the variables. The points of space, the moments 
of time, the quantities of mass and charge, are all without color. 
Color is no part of them, and they are no part of color. Colors are 
no longer considered to be within, or at the surface of, a material 
body. Nor is color any part of the propagating wave energy. 
Colors only arise as effects in the brain of an observer subsequent 
to the bombardment of the retinae by electromagnetic radiation. 
The retinae and brain, no exceptions to physics, also consist 
of colorless matter. Color, in the scientific picture, has lost its 
mooring in the physical world altogether. Color has no definite 
location in physical space. It is only in the mind.
To reiterate, material bodies are scientifically understood 
as having no color, and are thereby distinguished from the 
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colored forms that appear in human visual experience. Colored 
patches are not located at the surfaces of material bodies. On 
the contrary, they are delayed effects in a causal sequence, 
“downstream” from the radiation events which emanate from 
distant colorless surfaces. But then, physics makes no new theory 
for what goes on inside the head versus what goes on outside. 
Colorless physical causes in the brain produce more colorless 
physical effects. It is left for the mind to host a private “colorized 
screening” of the world, while the eyes and brain engage in the 
colorless energy transactions specified by the laws of physics.
Everything that we believe ourselves to know about the physical 
world depends entirely upon the assumption that there are causal 
laws. Sensations, and what we optimistically call “perceptions,” 
are events in us. We do not actually see physical objects, any 
more than we hear electromagnetic waves when we listen to the 
wireless. … (HK 311)
A change is consolidated in the scientific picture of nature by 
the time Newton and Maxwell have formulated their laws. 
“Nature” acquires its scientific definition in terms of its “primary 
properties,” while the sensory qualities involved in mental 
experience are termed “secondary.” And what are the primary 
properties, which now have the honor of defining the physical 
world? The primary properties are purely quantitative values 
assigned to space and time coordinates. The world is the full 
specification of these geometrically ordered quantities. The laws 
specify how one spatial configuration follows another in time. 
This is the stark scientific account.
...
How are we to frame an accurate concept of the universe 
in terms of its primary characteristics without recourse to the 
sensory qualities, which have already proven to be so misleading? 
For this, we need to distinguish “physical space” from the intrinsic 
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geometric aspects of our visual, auditory, and kineasthetic 
experiences. After all, having acquired basic motor skills, it is 
the presupposition of everyday life that physical space exists 
all around us, regardless of the intermittent activation of our 
sensory fields. Therefore, physical space need not be considered a 
phenomenological entity at all. It may be considered an objective 
expanse of a geometric nature, shorn of sensory qualities and 
privileged perspectives.  It furnishes the positions and directions 
of physical quantities. It bears only the mathematical character 
required for the formulation of the laws of physics.
If physics should require that spatial dimensions be 
added to the three that we have intuitively mastered, or that 
space be curved to better formulate the physical laws, our 
imaginations may be challenged, but we do not thereby despair 
of understanding science. Our familiarity with physical space, 
at the scale of our everyday activities, remains our basis for 
understanding what physical science is about. Science is about 
space and what’s in it. We’re not unduly alarmed to find that the 
physicists, at the scale of the very large and the very small, are 
tampering with the technical details of space and time. When 
confronted with something like “string theory,” we take it to be 
some convoluted geometric conception, requiring a frightful 
mathematical imagination, but in principle, amounting to an 
elaboration of the three-dimensional space that is second nature 
to us all. Our understanding of science rests upon the intuition 
of physical space, and it seems impossible to doubt that we know 
what physical space is.
While it is widely held that modern physics has “dissolved 
matter,” it is not so widely thought to have “dismantled space.” 
We shall defer that line of inquiry in order not to disturb, at this 
point, the reader’s basic intuition of “the physical world.” This 
is the one artifice, from my point of view, needed to stage the 
mind-body problem as a problem, before explaining the solution. 
This is not for aesthetic effect. The first mental act, when one sets 
out to think about the natural world, is to call up an image of 
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physical space, perhaps with something in it. Until that germinal 
intuition is shown to lead to paradox, a person simply will not 
call into doubt the basic premise from which all subsequent 
understanding of the natural world takes its departure. The 
solution to the mind-body problem will remain psychologically 
out-of-reach. That is why I suggest coming to grips with the 
problem before trying to understand the solution.
...
We are considering the notion of “physical,” about which science 
claims the authoritative expertise. When Newton condensed 
the workings of the universe into a few deterministic laws of 
mechanics, the metaphysical view called “materialism” gained 
stature. This view held that Newton’s conception of the material 
world provided a complete general description of all that exists. 
The mainstream of philosophy never accepted this, believing that 
some sort of mental or spiritual existence was left unaccounted 
for in the theory of matter and its motions. It can be said, however, 
that materialism served as the virtual blueprint for scientific 
progress for centuries to come. Materialism had to be drastically 
revised, not to accommodate the defenders of mind, but to deal 
with objections from science itself. Materialism, as the blueprint 
for scientific progress, led to its own drastic qualification. If it 
were to survive in a form compatible with science, it would have 
to do so without the notion of a substance called “matter.”
Let us consider the “dematerialization of matter” in modern 
physics. This might be thought to solve the problem of mind-
and-matter by disposing of matter. The notion of an inert particle 
of matter, which is without feeling of any sort, yet exists by virtue 
of its mass and location in space, is not a difficult one for most 
people. Rather, it is so un-difficult that it is nearly impossible to 
abandon. Nevertheless, particulate matter has been abandoned 
by science, since it does not bear scrutiny at the quantum level. 
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Tables and chairs still exist of course, but they do not consist of 
particulate matter, having given way to the probability waves of 
quantum mechanics. The notion of a particle of matter requires 
that it have a stable and instantaneous location in space, which 
was found to be incompatible with quantum theory. The latter 
theory has proved to be indispensable to physics, and so the 
notion of particulate matter has been discarded.
Since the inert particle of matter has been re-imagined 
by physics as a somewhat livelier packet of energy, it becomes 
possible to speculate that physical energy is somehow mental 
activity. But that remains an idle fancy so long as physical energy 
is simply conceived as that which is contained in physical space, 
while physical space is simply conceived as that which contains 
physical energy. With this pair of interlocked concepts at the 
core of our understanding, the physical world seems to be a 
geometric expanse of distributed stuff that requires no infusion 
of mental features to fortify its existence.
So long as we’re satisfied that something in the theory of 
physics, such as a “force field,” occupies the space where tables and 
chairs are believed to exist, the abolition of matter as such does 
little to change our beliefs about the physical world. We learn in 
the early grades that a material body is mostly empty space, the 
atoms being something like miniature planetary systems. That 
prepares us for the higher grades, where we find that occupied 
space contains not miniature planets, but immaterial quantum 
events. As the facts unfold, we rely increasingly upon the notion 
of physical space itself, while the notion of what physical space 
contains becomes less intuitive.
Today the “stuff ” of physical science is quarks, gluons, 
leptons and so on. Quarks, for example, are posited in several 
paired types in order to build up a systematic model of the 
world from proposed elemental entities. The “building up” 
is accomplished in the theory by various transformations, 
combinations and calculations. These mathematical operations 
represent the co-dependencies and interactions of the elemental 
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entities. The entities at the base of the construction are simply 
posited by conjecture — they are given arbitrary names to 
establish by fiat their bare logical distinction as individuals. In 
the same manner, they are further classified into posited types 
according to how they are supposed to form, in relation to other 
individuals, combinations of greater complexity. The constructing 
process must eventually arrive at assemblies that represent 
observable entities, so that the theory is capable of empirical 
confirmation. When a new construction is proposed, it must 
confront any rival theories. The new theory generally predicts, 
somewhere in its details, novel observations not predictable by 
rival theories. If the novel predictions are born out, the new 
theory gains acceptance. To win acceptance, a new theory must 
not only encompass the already established findings of science, 
it must also break new ground. In this manner, Relativity and 
Quantum Theory have replaced Newton’s theory of mechanics, 
dispensing with Newton’s ideas of time, space, matter, and fully 
deterministic laws.
How has the notion of “the physical world” changed as a 
result of modern physics? In important ways, the contemporary 
outlook remains the same as in Newton’s time. As was the case with 
Newtonian theory, modern science confines its characterization 
of the physical world to mathematical descriptions. In hindsight, 
the essential role of conjecture in any theory of the physical 
world is now commonly acknowledged, since belief in “matter” 
could only have been wrong if it had been a conjecture in the 
first place. However, the belief that matter was devoid of feeling, 
or sentience, has carried over intact to the current conception of 
energy. Energy is now the insentient stuff that displaces matter 
as the occupant of space and time. This rough assessment is in 
line with the central thesis of this chapter, that sensory qualities 
have been thoroughly eliminated in the formulation of scientific 
theory. Since a notion of sentient experience cannot be framed 
without appeal to phenomenal qualities, contemporary physical 
theory is no more hospitable to the notion of sentient mind 
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than was Newton’s theory of matter. Descartes’ analysis of the 
rift between mental experience and the physical world applies 
equally well to the dominant intuitions of today.
Are there not other sciences besides the physical sciences? 
Why not let the science of psychology deal with the phenomenon 
of human sentience, if physics is un-equipped for it? That 
suggestion meets a difficulty due to the unification of the sciences 
that has occurred as the specialized sciences have advanced. 
Science has effectively become a single monolithic theory, with 
physics providing all the fundamentals. Physics is aggressive. 
It does not curb the domain of its findings to accommodate 
the continuation of independent sciences. Chemistry is now 
understood to be founded upon physics, and in principle, is 
completely reducible to it. Biology is founded upon chemistry 
(and thus, upon physics) so that the problem of the origin of 
life, for example, is framed in terms of the proper conditions 
obtaining on the planet for an incubating “chemical soup.” The 
physiology of the human brain and body is likewise subsumed 
entirely in the theory of physics. Psychology winds up as the 
repository for any difficulties associated with the mind-body 
problem. In the history of its development, psychology included 
an overt strain of phenomenology, which I have presented as an 
irreducibly mental realm. However, this whole phenomenological 
strain is suspect by today’s standards of “hard science.” The 
suspicion falls on the subjective reporting of privately observed 
contents of the mind. The qualitative characteristics described 
in such reports do not admit of the objective verification that 
distinguishes the physical sciences. If one ignores the intended 
references to mental phenomena reported by a human subject, in 
favor of the verbal utterances themselves, the role of the subject 
is confined to physically defined actions, such as lip movements 
when the subject speaks. This allows the human mind to be 
treated as a system of physical mechanisms, casting psychology 
as “the science of the brain.” In this view, stimulus-and-response 
form an unbroken chain of physicalistic actions leading into, 
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round and about, and out of, the brain. Psychology then secures 
the status of hard science founded upon physics, avoiding the 
contamination of phenomenological elements such as colors 
and pains.
In practice, psychology is still eclectic, and not conducted 
uniformly under the prescriptions of a physicalistic approach. 
Similarly, in the practice of medicine, a doctor sympathizes with 
pain for reasons that cannot stem from any training in physics. Any 
science-related effort that is focused directly on the well-being 
of human individuals is bound to involve a makeshift mind-body 
dualism. Physicalism has not yet succeeded in exterminating all 
belief in mental entities. I am framing the mind-body problem as 
a rift between the domains of phenomenology on the one hand 
and physics on the other. I suggest that psychology as a science, 
insofar as it straddles both domains, can at best patch together 
an amalgam of physical and phenomenological components. It 
must suffer, in its conceptual foundations, from the very same 
incoherence that we shall deal with directly, without presupposing 
any specific psychological theory.
Turning then to the ultimate basis of the physical sciences, 
how unified is physics itself? If Einstein had succeeded in 
formulating his “Unified Field Theory” we should answer that 
physics is completely unified. For some reason physicists changed 
the name of this theoretical goal to “Grand Unified Theory,” and 
then again to “Theory of Everything.” The efforts toward that 
goal, whatever its name, have shown inexorable progress. Physics 
was reduced at some point to gravity, electro-magnetism, and 
weak and strong nuclear forces. Since then, these four have been 
consolidated to two. That means there is one “seam” remaining 
in the fabric of physics, staving off the completion of theoretical 
science. At present therefore, unification is not complete, which 
indicates that something is wrong. But it seems to be only a 
matter of time until the right mathematical twist is found 
to express physics as a seamless theory of the physical world, 
complete in its own terms. (I will offer a theory in Chapter 5 
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as a final reduction of physics to time as the sole remaining 
parameter.)
Due to the unification of the sciences under physics, it is 
evident that mainstream science today frames a conception of 
the physical world entirely in terms of geometrically ordered 
quantities. The sensory qualities considered in the previous 
chapter are excluded at the outset from having any part in the 
theory. The same exclusion of sensory qualities was a feature of 
Newton’s theory of matter in motion. While that theory has 
been drastically revised, the notion of the physical world as 
an insentient mechanism has been retained. This conventional 
summary shows that the contemporary scientific conception of 
the physical world contains no indication of any such thing as 
qualitative human experience, and though we persist in testifying 
to such experience, it is irrelevant, in the scientific view, to the 
course of physical events.
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CHAPTER 3
The Mind-Body Problem
Science culminates in a theory of particles and forces that excludes the 
qualities of sentient experience. That being the case, sentient qualities 
and sentient experience, which seem at the outset to be an integral 
part of nature, are instead relegated to a parallel existence beyond 
scientific explanation. This radical dissociation casts doubt on our 
basic concepts of “mental” and “physical,” and this is the mind-body 
problem.
The relevance of philosophy stands or falls with its ability to 
resolve the mind-problem, and success is not thought to be near at 
hand. In the meantime, society has lost interest. Harry Potter and 
the Philosopher’s Stone was changed, for the American audience, to 
Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone. The word “philosopher” was 
deemed the “kiss of death” for book sales and movie box office, 
indicating the esteem in which philosophy is held today. Yet the 
mind-body problem has points to commend it as an exciting 
read. It’s an epic story, in which the towering figures of Plato 
and Aristotle, champions of mind and matter, contend with each 
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other through the ages of western thought to forge an intelligible 
view of the world. The real-life mystery is well documented 
and dramatic. In the ending that I find compelling, Plato and 
Aristotle return to the stage as Alfred North Whitehead and 
Bertrand Russell to re-interpret the findings of modern science 
and remedy our distorted view of nature. Although there are 
elements of suspense and high stakes, the narrative concerns 
purely cognitive matters. These matters require a dispassionate 
analysis of our most fundamental concepts, and upon these, some 
logical hatchet-work to re-assemble a credible view of the world.
We have considered the fact that sensory qualities, such as 
colors, are present in experience. Indeed, there is no experience 
without such qualities. We then considered the fact that sensory 
qualities have been excluded from the framework of scientific 
theory. The joint implication of these two facts is problematic for 
the usual notion of “the natural world.” We start out thinking that 
our sensory experience is mainly composed of sensory qualities, 
which is correct, and furthermore that these sensory qualities are 
part of the physical world, which now seems to be incorrect. If 
we take science seriously, and the increased use of mathematics 
that has been crucial to its development, we glimpse the world of 
science in its bare physicality, drained of all qualitative character. 
Our sensory experience, which owes its definition to sensory 
qualities, is the leftover residue. The physical world is truncated 
of sentient experience. Sensory experience is strictly in excess to 
scientific theory. It belongs only to the mental world described 
by phenomenology. The problem then confronts us as to how the 
mental world and the physical world can join to form, as we feel 
they should, one world. 
By relying upon the sensory qualities to delineate the 
mental from the physical, we are traversing a well-worn path in 
philosophy. The problem in relating sensory qualities to physical 
entities is already in evidence in the contrast between Plato’s forms 
and Aristotle’s matter. The phrase “Platonic heaven” indicates the 
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disconnect between the world of forms apprehended by Plato 
and the earthbound matter conceived by Aristotle.
Skipping to the dawn of modern science, we come to 
the point where phenomenology and physics, in their modern 
form, take independent paths. Descartes was so important 
to both phenomenology and physics that he could rightly be 
considered the founding father of each. On the side of physics, 
he fastened upon extension in space as the defining principle of 
physical existence, and he contributed the system of Cartesian 
coordinates that paved the way for Newton to express the 
laws of motion in terms of algebraic formulas. On the side 
of phenomenology, he is best known for “I think, therefore I 
am.” Thinking cannot be characterized in terms of extension in 
physical space. Thus, an essential distinction between mental and 
physical is established. The awareness of thoughts and thinking, 
as in Descartes’ dictum, is just one category of experience that is 
described in phenomenology, and a statement that better captures 
phenomenology in its full generality is “I sense, therefore I am.”
When, on a common-sense basis, people talk of the gulf 
between mind and matter, what they really have in mind is the 
gulf between a visual or tactual percept and a “thought”  — e.g., 
a memory, a pleasure, or a volition. But this, as we have seen, is 
a division within the mental world; the percept is as mental as 
the “thought”. (HK, 228)
Since I have spent two chapters framing the dualism of mind 
and body in terms of phenomenology and physics, I simply 
credit Descartes for clearly delineating these two realms of 
study, and proceed directly to two philosophers who attempted 
to circumvent the problematic dualism of mind and body that 
Descartes had formulated.
Bishop Berkeley proposed a world comprised only of 
human minds and the mind of God. In this conception, God 
coordinates our phenomenal perceptions in just such a way 
that the presumed evidence for a physical world is accounted 
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for without need for the physical world itself. The gist of this 
can be conveyed in terms of God as a hypnotist. If a hypnotist 
could plant appropriate perceptions directly into the minds of an 
audience, he could make the audience see an elephant, and see an 
elephant disappear, without need of a real elephant. The elephant 
represents the physical world. If the sense impressions that we 
take to indicate the physical world are planted in our minds 
directly by God’s will, then the existence of the physical world 
is superfluous. Berkeley’s conception thus yields a complete 
elimination of all things physical.
That the natural world should be a mere show put on 
for the benefit of human minds strains the credulity of most 
of those minds, and Berkeley fails to convince us. However, 
Berkeley’s demarcation between self-evident phenomena and 
the inferred physical world survives today in the understanding 
that conjecture is inherent in all scientific knowledge and that 
belief in physical entities amounts to a provisional hypothesis. 
The same principle, in a religious context, is called “faith.”
Leibniz gives us a significant variation on Berkeley’s theory 
in his Monadology. I will take liberties with this view, extracting 
what seems pertinent to an eventual solution of the problem. 
Leibniz invites us to consider a swarm of fish, perceived from a 
distance. It might be mistaken for a lifeless mass. Look closer, 
and we find a multiplicity of living individuals. Use a microscope 
to examine one of the fish more closely and we find a multiplicity 
of living cells. We now know that the process of “looking closer” 
comes to an end at the quantum level. Any hopes that some 
residue of matter would be yielded by the investigation also come 
to an end. The natural world consists therefore of immaterial 
entities. Though this seems strange, there does not seem to be 
any argument about it. Leibniz supposed, even without the 
benefit of quantum theory, that the human percipient, when 
investigating the natural world, is following a trail of perceptions 
that leads to… other percipients! A percipient, or perceiving 
subject, Leibniz calls “a monad.” A human mind is an example of 
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a monad. The natural world is a system of monads. Most monads 
are presumably less sophisticated than human monads, but 
each has its own sensory experience. Monads are the ultimate 
individuals, the mentalistic “atoms” that replace the material 
particles of a physicalistic conception of the world. Descartes’ 
dualism is overcome, as with Berkeley, by restricting the world to 
mental experiences. In contrast to Berkeley, Leibniz affirms our 
intuition that the natural world consists of something beyond 
our own minds and perceptions — namely, the monads, which 
have their own minds and perceptions. The natural world is thus 
an environment that is teeming with minds and nothing else.
As we have discussed, the very notion of physical is bound 
up in the notion of physical space and what it contains. Leibniz 
avoids the assumption of physical space as a “container” for his 
monads. He does not conceive the monads to be in space, but 
instead finds the ordering principle of space in the monads. Like 
Berkeley, Leibniz accounts for the locations of physical space by 
reference to the perspectives inherent in the phenomenal visual 
fields of the individual monads. That is, we normally explain a 
visual perspective as being due to a location and orientation in 
physical space. Berkeley and Leibniz invert this, reconstruing 
physical space as a correlation of phenomenal visual fields. One 
can conceive an ordering, of the phenomenal fields-of-view 
belonging to individual monads. Each monad is endowed with 
its own perspective view. Thus, the monads are ordered among 
themselves by perspective variations of their internal visual 
experiences, without invoking either physical space or causal 
interaction among the monads.
Any thoughtful attempt to reinterpret the meaning of 
physical space is important for the mind-body problem, and we 
should note the strong and weak points of Leibniz’ interpretation. 
The virtue of his hypothesis is that space is defined in terms of 
the same geometric features that we are acquainted with in our 
visual experience. This avoids the need to postulate a physical 
space that transcends experience, which would then have to 
39
THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION
be somehow “tied back” to our sensory experience in order to 
justify the postulate with empirical consequences. We have 
noted that belief in material substance was such a postulate that 
is now discredited. Leibniz’ theory of space can be appreciated 
as an early attempt at an “operational definition” of space in 
phenomenological terms. Operational definitions are employed 
in order to nail down abstract concepts to the matter-of-fact 
sequence of steps that one takes when conducting experiments 
to demonstrate a theory. This approach minimizes questionable 
theoretical assumptions. When I measure my bedroom for a 
carpet, I go through the experience of handling and viewing a 
measuring stick, marking the landing of its endpoint, moving 
it along in steps to traverse the room, and keeping count of the 
steps. Leibniz takes this series of experiences, and others like 
it, to be the dimensions of my room. The supposedly physical 
nature of these dimensions consists in the fact that anyone who 
bothered to repeat my experiences would come up with the same 
count of steps as I do.
The weakness of Leibniz’ theory is that it gives no indication 
why the experience of one monad should bear any correlation 
whatsoever to the experience of another. The unifying space in 
his theory is a pure effect, without any significance as a causal 
factor. Space is just an outcome of all the perceptual experiences 
that all the monads happen to have. Leibniz therefore appeals to 
a “pre-established harmony,” worked out when God determined 
what the experiences of each monad would be. Once created, 
the monads are strictly isolated in the privacy of their individual 
experiences and they do not interact with one another. The spirit 
of science has been just the opposite, to find the patterns of causal 
interaction between the parts of the world. In this spirit, science 
defines a spatial location for every entity, and this location is a 
causal factor in every interaction.
We are likely to dismiss the theories of Berkeley and Leibniz 
as curious attempts to deny a physical world of insentient stuff, 
since we have come to accept the latter without qualms. How 
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could these acclaimed geniuses stray so far from commonsense 
in their beliefs? The answer is that commonsense is thoroughly 
infected with irreconcilable beliefs in minds and bodies, making 
it the truly curious theory, if it can even be called a theory. I 
don’t mean to assert that the theories of Berkeley or Leibniz 
are correct. But they are logically coherent possibilities, which 
is more than one can say for commonsense dualism. It is worth 
the imaginative effort required to suspend disbelief and conjure 
up vividly what each man, Berkeley and Leibniz, proposed. 
On the one hand, it helps to glimpse the extent to which 
phenomenological experience accounts for the world when 
physical entities are left out. On the other hand, the meaning 
of “physical entity” can appear in sharper relief by subtracting 
the purely phenomenal ingredients of the world employed by 
Berkeley and Leibniz from the hybrid sum of phenomenal-and-
physical that comprises the commonsense view.
I will venture to describe the commonsense view of 
mind and body. Bodies are stuff without any mentality or 
feeling whatsoever. Some bodies though, are alive, and do have 
mentality and feeling — human bodies specifically. Our subjective 
experience has a role in determining the physical behavior of our 
bodies, providing us with the means to control our actions. At the 
same time, our bodies and brains determine to a great extent, if 
not completely, what we experience. This two-way determination 
is so smooth and seamless that no sharp distinction can be drawn 
between mind and body
I will comment on the preceding from the point of view 
taken in this book, starting with the last sentence. The claim that 
“no sharp distinction can be drawn between mind and body” is 
denied. The first two chapters are intended to draw just such a 
distinction. Phenomenology and physics have come apart, and 
if this dissociation is likened to a divorce, physics was the party 
that filed for separation. The sensory data of mental experience 
was evicted for being incompatible with the entities championed 
by physics. Science has a de-anthropomorphizing effect with its 
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mode of explaining things, and people have a vague uneasiness 
that this mode of explanation does not stop short at human 
behavior. It does not stop short. Science thoroughly excludes 
human sentience in principle, as explained in the previous 
chapter. No one is comfortable with this and it is rude to draw 
attention to it.
Regarding the causal interaction between mind and body, 
as held by commonsense, this will be vindicated in subsequent 
chapters that deal with the solution. The smooth and seamless 
nature of this interaction will acquire a natural explanation. But 
this will demand a revised explanation of physical space, which 
is beyond the current horizon of common sense, and beyond the 
goal of this chapter. In the current context, minds and bodies 
cannot interact because body-to-body interaction is the only kind 
of interaction that physics deals with. Bodies collide with other 
bodies, not with colors. As bodies have now been reinterpreted as 
probability waves, we have instead that probabilities are calculated 
against other probabilities, not against colors. In any case, the 
entities of physics interact with others of their own kind, not 
with the kind we know as sensory qualities. Thus, physics does 
not support causal interaction between sentient experience and 
the body, and it ignores sentient experience altogether. Physics 
and commonsense therefore diverge on this point, which should 
be the source of some anxiety.
Due to the same considerations, physics does not support 
the commonsense idea that living bodies have feeling or sentience. 
Rather, physics conceives a living body to be a complex variant of 
the same entities that account for the non-living world. Trying 
to bring intention, volition, or feeling into the definition of 
biological life is called “vitalism,” which is treated as superstition 
by contemporary science. By the end of the book, we shall concur 
with commonsense that living bodies have feeling, but only as 
part of the general conclusion that all bodies, living and non-
living, consist ultimately of sentient occasions of feeling.
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I heard an interview on the radio with a woman who 
works on artificial intelligence at MIT. This woman also has a 
background in theology, which she finds relevant to her work 
with two computerized robots in the MIT laboratory. These two 
robots learn new responses through interaction with humans. 
The woman had begun to bond emotionally with the pair of 
laboratory creations, and she was nearly ready to attribute 
personhood to them. She also referred to the android character 
Data, from the Star Trek series. Data is my favorite character 
on that show, so I was pleased to find that the woman took an 
interest in him. Completely missing from the discussion was the 
question of whether Data, or the MIT robots, might have any 
feeling, or sentience. Therefore, consideration was confined to 
the intelligent aspects of mind, which Herbert Feigl has termed 
“sapience” to distinguish philosophical problems pertaining 
to intelligence from problems pertaining to sentience. I was 
amazed that theology could be brought to bear on the budding 
personhood of a robot without raising the issue of feeling. While 
I do not doubt that computerized modeling of human behavior is 
interesting and important, it is confined to physical mechanisms, 
the common ground for analyzing human behavior and computer 
behavior. How theology could be thought to pertain to beings 
without pleasure, pain, or sense of self, I have no idea.
If Data does have feelings, then we have ethical issues as to 
how he is treated. It is feelings, and only feelings, that can open 
a discussion to matters of values, morals, rights, or theology. A 
great many science fiction stories sidestep the issue of whether an 
android has feelings. You can infer that an android has a sensorium 
when a movie shows you what the android sees. You never seem 
to hear an android’s internal monologue, even though verbal 
narration is commonly employed to convey the inner thoughts of 
human characters. You just see what the android sees. Other than 
that, you must interpret the android’s facial expressions, bodily 
actions, and what it says about itself in order to judge whether 
it has sentient experience. Generally, an android is impervious 
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to pain, and displays an affect that indicates minimal emotion. 
Optional program modules are sometimes installed to outfit 
an android with further capabilities. Insofar as these upgrades 
confer further physical behavior capabilities, implementation 
via software upgrade is perfectly understandable. However, that 
digital programming should endow the android with some type 
of phenomenological experience makes no sense at all.
Nevertheless, we are entertained by the ambiguous 
personhood of Data and his kind. I think that this indicates that 
people today do have a latent interest in the mind-body problem. 
The android is a near-human, with questionable inner life. He 
simulates a person whose vitality is at low ebb, a person who is 
just “going through the motions.” We root for Data and his inner 
life because it is increasingly necessary for us, in the mechanistic 
age of science, to root for ourselves.
...
I am about finished trying to impart the mind-body 
problem to the reader. I was talking to someone recently about 
the problem. In response to my contention that qualitative color 
is not part of the scientific account of the physical world, he 
said, “The brain just interprets physical stimuli as colors.” Well-
satisfied with that, he exited the conversation. His solution made 
light work of philosophy. I wondered later whether he would 
be equally happy with a reverse formulation: “The mind just 
interprets colors as physical stimuli.”  The latter is more in accord 
with philosophy of science. Most people are barely aware of 
analytic philosophy and the difficulty in framing a systematic 
view of the world.  At the same time, philosophy has no 
satisfactory view of the world to teach, or so it is widely believed. 
Hence, our educational system imparts knowledge of specialized 
fields without any overall coherence. This lack of overview is 
not acknowledged. It would be nice if a high school education 
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culminated in a coherent view of the world, according to which 
the graduate could choose a future role in society. When it is 
suggested that one’s view of the world is not coherent, one feels 
a personal affront to one’s rationality. The affront though, is to 
mankind in general, as the history of philosophy shows.
The mind’s habitation of the body has been likened to a 
“ghost in a machine.” The ghost, which has all the experience, goes 
undetected by science, which deals only with the machine. This 
is another way of acknowledging the fracture of the world into 
irreconcilable halves — what Whitehead called the “bifurcation of 
nature.” My avenue to the mind-body problem was Whitehead’s 
Science and the Modern World, which might serve the reader where 
I have failed. It provides an account of the history of human 
thought in respect to scientific developments, with the mind-
body problem serving as the pervasive connecting thread.
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CHAPTER 4
Relations and Structure
Relations account for whatever order and structure are to be found 
in any realm of investigation. Relations and structure are among the 
phenomena presented to our sentient minds. Relations and structure 
form the basis of mathematics, and together with causal assumptions, 
the basis of physics.
In the present chapter we shall be concerned with a purely logical 
discussion which is essential as a preliminary to any further 
steps in the interpretation of science. The logical concept which 
I shall endeavor to explain is that of “structure”. (HK, 250)
Russell, in the context of his own book, is leading up to a new 
definition of “physical.” The meaning of the terms “structure” 
and “relation” must be well established in order to grasp further 
important definitions. For instance, an event is to be classified as 
“physical” if it has causal relations to other events, and space-time 
is asserted to be the causal structure of events. The terms “causal,” 
46
CAREY R. CARLSON
“relation,” and “structure” will have to shoulder an appreciable 
load of meaning, since they will be used to replace, and invalidate, 
the notion of “physical” given in Chapter 2.
We can now proceed to the formal definition of “structure.” It 
is to be observed that structure always involves relations: a mere 
class, as such, has no structure. Out of the terms of a given class 
many structures can be made, just as many different sorts of 
houses can be made out of a given heap of bricks. Every relation 
has what is called a “field,” which consists of all the terms that 
have the relation to something or to which something has the 
relation. Thus the field of “parent” is the class of parents and 
children, and the field of “husband” is the class of husbands and 
wives. Such relations have two terms, and are called “dyadic.” 
There are also relations of three terms, such as jealousy and 
“between”; these are called “triadic.” … To this series of kinds of 
relation there is no theoretical limit.
Let us in the first instance confine ourselves to dyadic relations. 
We shall say that a class alpha ordered by the relation R has 
the same structure as a class beta ordered by the relation S, if to 
every term in alpha some one term in beta corresponds, and vice 
versa, and if when two terms in alpha have the relation R, then 
the corresponding terms in beta have the relation S, and vice 
versa. ... (HK, 254)
Let’s consider an example that illustrates the definition of “same 
structure.” A class is just some definite set of entities. Let us 
define the class alpha to have as members two streets in my 
neighborhood, Central and Lowry. Let us choose intersect as a 
relation between streets. We can then write intersect (Central, 
Lowry) to state that Central and Lowry intersect, which is 
true. Next, let us define the class beta to have as members my 
two children, Aly and Andy. We’ll choose sibling as a relation 
between children, and write sibling (Aly, Andy). We now set up 
a one-to-one correspondence between the members of alpha 
and the members of beta, such that Central corresponds to Aly, 
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and Lowry to Andy. Under this correspondence, when two terms 
in alpha have the relation intersect, then the corresponding terms 
in beta have the relation sibling, and vice versa. Therefore, the 
two classes, ordered by their respective relations, have the same 
structure.
The two relations, intersect and sibling, are each symmetrical. 
That is, if Central and Lowry intersect, then Lowry and Central 
intersect. Consider the asymmetrical relation, parent. We define 
another class gamma with members Carey and Aly. If parent 
(Carey, Aly) is true, then parent (Aly, Carey) is false. Now let us test 
whether the class alpha ordered by intersect has the same structure 
as the class gamma ordered by parent. We set up a correspondence 
of Carey to Central, and Aly to Lowry. Due to the symmetry of the 
intersect relation, we have true statements in both intersect (Central, 
Lowry) and intersect(Lowry, Central). The correlative to the latter 
statement, pertaining to the class gamma, is parent (Aly, Carey), 
which is false. The test for same structure has failed. In general, 
a class ordered by a symmetrical relation does not have the same 
structure as a class ordered by an asymmetrical relation.
Suppose we augment the class of streets to contain a third 
member, Johnson, which intersects Lowry but runs parallel to 
Central. We’ll also augment the class of children to include my 
nephew, Wil. Because Wil is sibling to neither Aly nor Andy, but 
each street intersects with at least one of the other two, we find that 
no matter how we set up a one-to-one correspondence between 
the members of the two classes, the test for same structure fails.
The relations and classes we have chosen to compare do not 
lead to structural uniformities of any mathematical interest or 
importance. Nevertheless, the examples illustrate the definition of 
structure in terms of relations and relata. (The individuals connected 
by a relation are called its “relata.”) Furthermore, we have identified 
common structure in facts as disparate as intersecting streets and 
sibling-related children. Any fact includes a logical structure of 
relation and relata exhibited in that fact but exhibited also in facts 
belonging to other realms of discourse. Of special relevance to the 
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analysis of mind and body, common structure can be identified 
between facts of phenomenology and facts of physical science. 
In the commonsense view of interaction between mind and 
body, we distinguish objects in the physical environment by 
virtue of a display of colored patches in our visual experience. 
This coordination of mind and body can be specified according 
to structure that is common to both realms, even though each 
realm, as characterized in previous chapters, is composed of its 
own proprietary relations and relata that are absent from the 
other realm.
If we use “R” as a variable that stands for any relation, and if 
we use “x” and “y” as variables that stand for any relata, we get an 
expression like “R(x, y),” which shows the logical form of a class 
of rudimentary facts. Pure mathematics is concerned with such 
expressions. A “dyadic” relation connects one individual to one 
other individual. If dyadic relation R is such that R(x, y) and R(y, 
z) implies R(x, z), then R is said to be a “transitive” relation. If 
R is dyadic, asymmetrical, and transitive, then all the individuals 
that it relates to a given individual will form the type of structure 
called a “series.” Serial structure can apply to geometric entities, 
such as points which form a line, or to non-geometric entities, 
such as auditory notes ordered by higher-in-pitch to form a 
scale. The mathematical characterization of a relation, such as 
“dyadic,” “asymmetrical,” or “transitive” determines the variety of 
structure that can be formed by that relation. Two relations with 
the same mathematical properties can form the same structure 
out of dissimilar relata. In other words, common structure can be 
identified across two separate realms of entities which otherwise 
have nothing in common.
When two complexes have the same structure, every statement 
about the one, in so far as it depends only on structure, has a 
corresponding statement about the other, true if the first was 
true, and false if the first was false. … (HK, 255-256)
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Note Russell’s use of the word “complexes” above. A complex 
is a “whole,” and a whole is not just the logical sum of its parts. 
For example, you can’t build a computer from a parts list alone. 
You need a schematic to describe how the parts fit together. 
The schematic shows the structural arrangement of the parts. 
In ordinary usage, the word “structure” has two meanings that 
could produce confusion in the current discussion. On the one 
hand, a house is commonly referred to as “a structure.” On the 
other hand, in line with the meaning of relational “structure,” a 
house made of bricks may have the same structure as another 
house made of stones. Using both meanings of “structure” 
together, “the two structures have the same structure,” which 
highlights the potential confusion. I will confine the use of 
“structure” to Russell’s definition, so that any complex (or whole, 
or fact) has relational structure which specifies how the primitive 
relations and relata fit together to form a complex. With this 
usage, relations, relata, structure, and complex are four nouns with 
distinct meanings.
Pure mathematics has more general concerns than our 
actual world. It is concerned instead with the description of 
all possible structures that arise from all possible types of 
relation. This unlimited prospect could degenerate into a tedious 
catalogue of trivial variations, so it is constrained by intuitive 
criteria of elegance, beauty, and power. When some field of pure 
mathematics finds application in scientific theory, the physical 
world itself seems to manifest the elegance of the mathematics. 
To apply mathematics to the real world, one must provide 
names for specific relations and relata thought to belong to the 
real world, and these names are substituted for the variables in 
mathematical expressions in order to make logically coherent 
statements about the world. In this naming and substitution, 
the logical distinction between relations and relata must be 
systematically obeyed.
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Let us take next the relation of a district to a map of it. If 
the district is small, so that the curvature of the earth can be 
neglected, the principle is simple: east and west are represented 
by right and left, north and south by up and down, and all 
distances are reduced in the same proportion. It follows that 
from every statement about the map you can infer one about 
the district, and vice versa. … These inferences are possible 
owing to identity of structure between the map and the district.
Now take a somewhat more complicated illustration: the 
relation of a gramophone record to the music that it plays. It 
is obvious that it could not produce this music unless there 
were a certain identity of structure between it and the music, 
which can be exhibited by translating sound relations into space 
relations, or vice versa; e.g., what is nearer to the center on the 
record corresponds to what is later in time in the music. It is 
only because of the identity of structure that the record is able 
to cause the music. … (HK, 253)
In the first paragraph above, identity of structure is found in a map 
and a district, both physical entities. In the paragraph following 
it, the gramophone record is a physical entity, but “music” and 
“sound” could be interpreted as either physical patterns or 
phenomenological patterns. There is common structure with the 
gramophone record in either case. 
… A wireless set transforms electromagnetic waves into sound 
waves; a human organism transforms sound waves into auditory 
sensations. The electromagnetic waves and the sound waves 
have a certain similarity of structure, and so (we may assume) 
have the sound waves and the auditory sensations. Whenever 
one complex structure causes another, there must be much the 
same structure in the cause and in the effect, as in the case of the 
gramophone record and the music. This is plausible if we accept 
the maxim “Same cause, same effect” and its consequence, 
“Different effects, different causes.” If this principle is regarded 
as valid, we can infer from a complex sensation or series of 
sensations the structure of its physical cause, but nothing more, 
except that relations of neighborhood must be preserved; i.e., 
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neighboring causes have neighboring effects. ... (HK, 254)
Russell is bringing cause-and-effect into the discussion of 
structure, and specifically, physical causes of sensory experience. 
That is plausible until we consider that science has distilled 
its knowledge of cause-and-effect into the laws of physics. 
As ordinarily understood, the laws of physics pertain to 
quantitative energy components in the geometry of space-time, 
with no intelligible link to the sensory qualities of experience. 
Accordingly, similarity of structure between sensory experience 
and physical events constitutes a coincidence rather than a causal 
connection. This affront to common sense will be redressed in the 
next few chapters, where the causal interaction of mind and body 
is rescued, but at the expense of the conventional interpretation 
of physics.
Take, for example, the question of waves versus particles. Until 
recently it was thought that this was a substantial question: light 
must consist either of waves or of little packets called photons. 
It was regarded as unquestionable that matter consisted of 
particles. But at last it was found that the equations were the 
same if both matter and light consisted of particles, or if both 
consisted of waves. Not only were the equations the same, but 
all the verifiable consequences were the same. Either hypothesis, 
therefore, is equally legitimate, and neither can be regarded as 
having a superior claim to truth. The reason is that the physical 
world can have the same structure, and the same relation to 
experience, on the one hypothesis as on the other.
Considerations derived from the importance of structure show 
that our knowledge, especially in physics, is much more abstract 
and much more infected with logic than it used to seem. There 
is, however, a very definite limit to the process of turning physics 
into logic and mathematics; it is set by the fact that physics is an 
empirical science, depending for its credibility upon relations to 
our perceptive experiences. … (HK, 256)
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Russell and Whitehead, as a pair, are best known for their joint 
creation, Principia Mathematica, 1910-13. This work presents a 
systematic construction of mathematics in a formal system of 
symbols. The system made do with a tiny vocabulary of symbols 
representing logical notions, such as if-then, and, or, not, any, 
identity, some, all, set, and set membership. The effect was to 
collapse formal logic and mathematics into a single system of 
expression and calculation, erasing the distinction between the 
two fields of study.
It is with these credentials that Russell explains the 
fundamental role of relations in defining structure and 
mathematics. Russell and Whitehead did not collaborate 
explicitly after Principia Mathematica. Each of them turned next 
to the philosophy of science. By 1927 Russell had published The 
Analysis of Matter, and Whitehead had delivered the Harvard 
lectures which were published two years later as Process and 
Reality. To my mind, the agreement of ideas between these two 
books furnishes the solution to the mind-body problem, which 
surpasses their achievement in the foundations of mathematics. 
It seems likely that they became uniquely equipped for their later 
insight by their earlier collaboration, particularly, by fastening 
upon relations as the key to logical analysis.
While belief in relations as a fundamental sort of entity is 
especially strong in Russell and Whitehead, it is especially weak 
in most of us. We’re quick to affirm the existence of objects, 
substances, qualities, and even physical space, as “things.” But we’re 
reluctant to think of relations among things as further things. We 
would rather think of relations as projected somewhat arbitrarily 
by thought onto the intended objects of thought or perception. 
A non-committal attitude about relations serves to shield us 
from the obligation to analyze physical space into the sort of 
relations that distinguish physical space from phenomenological 
spaces, or from purely mathematical spaces. This may explain 
why Russell and Whitehead’s solution has not been widely 
recognized and heralded by the academic community.
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Belief in relations can be fortified through two 
considerations. One is the fruitfulness of naming relations 
and making use of these names. As Russell contends, this 
yields a general understanding of pure mathematics, as well 
as the application of mathematics to the real world. Another 
consideration that reinforces belief in relations is that sensory 
experience is partially constituted by relations that we directly 
perceive. To take a visual example, three colored patches spaced 
apart in a row present a self-evident type of “between” relation. 
Secondly, for a non-geometric type of between-ness relation, 
orange is between red and yellow (in the hue circle) with respect 
to the relation of color similarity. In phenomenology, in science, 
or in any field requiring logical description, there is no fruitful 
account of order or structure without the straightforward 
acknowledgment of relations as irreducible components. This 
sets the stage for an examination of space, time, and causality in 
terms of “causal relations.”
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Space-time as Causal Structure
Special Relativity eliminates instantaneous spatial relations in favor 
of time-ordering causal relations. Causal relations are definable 
without recourse to geometric notions. Time order, for physics, is 
relative position in a causal chain of events. Two events not ordered 
by a causal chain are called “contemporaries.” Spatial order is defined 
for contemporaries by the convergence of their respective causal chains 
at common causal ancestors and descendants.
In this chapter, we wish to apply the understanding of relations 
and structure covered in the previous chapter to the analysis 
of physical space. The usual understanding of physical space 
is confined to geometric features such as areas, volumes, 
points and lines. These features can be ascribed to a person’s 
visual experience, even during dreaming. Science must have a 
space that is consistent for all observers, a harmonization of 
perspectives based on waking perception, discarding the data 
of imagination and dreams. Furthermore, the space of science 
must do without color or sensory qualities in its definition. It 
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follows that we do not perceive physical space. We are restricted 
to conceiving it. The same holds true for the entities which 
populate physical space, since the whole apparatus of physics 
is refined from the commonsense belief in a world not limited 
to our sensory experiences. Though we might be conscientious 
about this distinction between perceived space and the space of 
physical theory, we unhesitatingly borrow the geometric features 
of visual space and carry them over to the space of physics, as we 
do when learning Euclidean geometry in school. The problem 
then is to distinguish pure geometry, which is mathematics, from 
the geometry of our actual world, which is physics. We shall find 
the requisite distinction in the very purpose of science, which 
is to build a predictive causal framework from our scattered 
perceptions.
… The brain is in the head, but thoughts are not — so, at least, 
philosophers assure us. This point of view is due to a confusion 
between different meanings of the word “space.” Among the 
things that I see at a given moment there are spatial relations 
which are a part of my percepts; if percepts are “mental,” as I 
should contend, then spatial relations which are ingredients of 
percepts are also “mental.” Naïve realism identifies my percepts 
with physical things; it assumes that the sun of the astronomers 
is what I see. This involves identifying the spatial relations of my 
percepts with those of physical things. Many people retain this 
aspect of naïve realism although they have rejected all the rest.
But this identification is indefensible. The spatial relations of 
physics hold between electrons, protons, neutrons, etc., which 
we do not perceive; the spatial relations of visual percepts hold 
between things that we do perceive, and in the last analysis 
between colored patches. … (HK, 201-202)
… When I am said to ‘see’ a table, what really happens is that 
I have a complex sensation which is, in certain respects, similar 
in structure to the physical table. The physical table, consisting 
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of electrons, positrons, and neutrons, is inferred, and so is the 
space in which it is located. It has long been a commonplace in 
philosophy that the physical table does not have the qualities 
of the sensational table: it has no color, it is not warm or cold 
in the sense in which we know warmth and cold by experience, 
it is not hard or soft if “hard” and “soft” mean qualities given 
in tactile sensations, and so on. All this, I say, has long been 
a commonplace, but it has a consequence that has not been 
adequately recognized: that the space in which the physical 
table is located must also be different from the space that we 
know by experience. (HK, 221-222)
The mind-body problem would not have been solved without 
the discovery of a limiting velocity in the universe. Without 
this knowledge, which required centuries of scientific progress, 
belief in an extended space enduring through time could not 
be seriously challenged. In retrospect, this absolves classical 
philosophy from its failure to solve the mind-body problem, and 
the furthering of science was the inadvertent but essential step 
to promoting a solution. It is well known that three-dimensional 
space and one-dimensional time give way in Special Relativity 
to four-dimensional spacetime. This hyphenation of “space” and 
“time” is due to Einstein, and we wish to understand in this 
chapter how causal relations emerge as the basis of spacetime 
order.
… Physical space is wholly inferential, and it is constructed by 
means of causal laws. Physics starts with a manifold of events, 
some of which can be collected into series by physical laws; for 
example, the successive events constituting the arrival of a light 
ray at successive places are bound together by the laws of the 
propagation of light. In such cases we use the denial of action at 
a distance not as a physical principle but as a means of defining 
spacetime order. That is to say, if two events are connected by a 
causal law, so that one is an effect of the other, any third event 
which is a cause of the one and an effect of the other is to be 
placed between the two in spacetime order. (HK, 222-223)
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Using Arrows to Illustrate Causal Relations
Let us use an arrow as a graphic element to represent a causal 
relation. The direction of the arrow indicates the asymmetry 
between cause and effect. The arrow will be the only graphic 
element. It is left for the reader to imagine that every arrow 
implicitly connects a causal event at the tail of the arrow to a 
causal effect at the head.
A Causal Relation Between Two Events
For the time being, let us consider causes and effects to be 
simply whatever kind of entities can consistently be understood 
to have causal relations to one another. We will use the term 
“event” by which to refer to the primitive causes and primitive 
effects at the bottom layer of causal analysis. We imagine 
therefore a causally primitive event at each end of an arrow.
We could join the head of one arrow to the tail of another. 
The undepicted event at the junction of these two arrows is an 
effect with respect to one arrow and a cause with respect to the 
other. Using letter-names for the implicit events, we have a 
situation depicted in which A causes B, which in turn causes C. 
This represents a minimal causal chain of events.
A Causal Chain of Events
Next, consider two arrows joined at their tails, suggesting 
a forking path. This represents one event that has unmediated 
causal influence upon two others. In this case, the common 
causal event is called the “causal predecessor” of the other two 
events, and these latter events are called the “causal successors” 
of the first event.
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One Event with Two Causal Successors
The other primitive formation is two arrows which meet at 
their heads, representing two events which have a combined and 
unmediated causal influence upon a third event. Here we have 
two events that are the causal predecessors of a single causal 
successor.
Two Events with One Common Causal Successor
We can now begin to imagine elaborate drawings of any 
desired complexity, using arrows that fork at their tails, and 
arrows that meet at their heads. We shall add another naming 
convention pertaining to arrow diagrams. If an event “Z” (that is, 
some particular junction of arrows) can be reached from another 
event “A” by tracing a path that consistently obeys the direction 
of arrows, then Z is a “causal descendant” of A, and A is a “causal 
ancestor” of Z. No path of arrows shall be drawn, which followed 
in the direction of its arrows, completes a circuit. This ensures 
that no event shall be its own causal ancestor or its own causal 
descendant.
We shall conflate causal order and time order, so that our 
graphs depict “the arrows of time.” Cause-and-effect order agrees 
strictly with time order. Causal relations thus have the generic 
character of before-and-after relations. There is only one kind 
of temporal succession, which is the same as causal succession. 
Accordingly, an event can have more than one temporal 
predecessor and more than one temporal successor, as shown 
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in the two previous diagrams. That will allow us to graphically 
construct the 4-D manifold and the common particles from 
temporal succession, showing that discrete time is the only 
parameter required for the theory of physics
An arrow drawing is a graphic aid to conceiving causal 
relations and causal structure. The two-dimensional page 
contributes some geometry that is irrelevant to what is being 
represented. For instance, the length of arrows and the angles 
they form at the junctions are irrelevant. Only the order of 
connection of the arrows is relevant.
We can form a new diagram from the two previous 
diagrams, which we shall call “a primitive diamond.”
The Primitive Diamond
We can replicate one primitive diamond across the width 
of a canvas to form a horizontal row of diamonds abutting at 
their left and right corners. We can then replicate the entire row 
up and down the canvas, such that the canvas becomes covered 
with a perfectly monotonous diamond pattern. This uniform 
pattern of arrows could represent a two-dimensional spacetime. 
Each interior event is at the junction of two arrows arriving and 
two arrows departing.
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A Uniform Diamond Pattern
Consider an event “E” in the uniform diamond pattern. 
Starting at this event, a path can be traced, obeying the direction 
of arrows, to arrive at various other events. The set of events 
that can be reached starting from E is the set of its causal 
descendants-- “the future of E.” Conversely, “the past of E” is the 
set of E’s causal antecedents
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The Causal Past and Causal Future of E
When the past and future of E are filled in with shading, there 
remain unshaded regions. These regions contain events called 
“the contemporaries of E.” While the contemporaries of E 
belong neither to E’s past nor to its future, they do not, contrary 
to our usual intuition of time, form a class of events simultaneous 
with E. There are many causal chains lying wholly within the 
region of E’s contemporaries, and these causal chains imply the 
passage of time, which is incompatible with simultaneity. Before 
Special Relativity, it was assumed that, with respect to any given 
momentary event, simultaneity must define a unique spatially 
extended universe. The abandonment of this assumption is called 
“the breakdown of simultaneity.” It is very difficult to let go of 
the belief that there is a momentary “now” spatially extended 
throughout the universe.
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Let us designate as “causal chain” any path of arrows that 
can be traced by obeying the direction of the arrows. In that 
case, the contemporaries of E are the events not connected to 
E by any one causal chain. In Special Relativity, causal chains 
are called “world lines,” and the relation between two events 
on a world line is said to be “time-like.” The relation between 
two contemporary events is said to be “spacelike.” The textbooks 
usually depict three out of four dimensions of space-time (two 
spatial dimensions, one dimension of time.)  In that case, the 
causal past and causal future of an event form two opposing 
cones called “light cones.” Finally, textbooks illustrate spacetime 
as continuously divisible, which is convenient mathematically 
for describing large aggregates of events.
The continuity of space-time, which is technically assumed in 
physics, has nothing in its favor except technical convenience. 
It may be that the number of space-time points is finite, and 
that space-time has a granular structure, like a heap of sand. 
Provided the structure is fine enough, there will be no observable 
phenomenon to show that there is not continuity. (HK, 291)
We will show that there is not continuity by obtaining quantum 
theory automatically from the assumption that time is the 
discrete next-to-next succession of moments. The step of time 
will be identified as the quantum. Our time diagrams will then 
constitute quantum schematics, with each arrow depicting a 
quantum.
If we want a diagram of Newton’s space and time, for 
comparison with Special Relativity, we need two graphic 
elements, one for spatial relations and another for time relations. 
An arrow serves as a time relation, indicating the asymmetry of 
before-and-after. A short line segment, without an arrowhead, 
showing no asymmetry of direction, represents a spatial relation. 
Satisfied again with depicting only two dimensions, a dashed 
line stretching horizontally represents a one-dimensional line of 
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space at one instant of time. Each line segment explicitly 
represents the relation of spatial contiguity between a point of 
space at one end and another point of space at the other. The 
spatial relations form a line of simultaneity slicing across the 
universe. Another such horizontal dashed line placed above the 
first represents space at the next moment. A vertical arrow drawn 
from the lower line to the upper line indicates the time-ordering 
relation. In this conception of space and time, the moments of 
time form a single series. This means that arrows do not form 
forking paths as they do in the Relativity diagram. Instead, all 
arrows line up head-to-tail in single-file.
Newtonian Space and Time Relations
In the Newtonian diagram, we cannot, as we can in the 
Relativity diagram, interpret the arrows to be causal relations 
adequate for defining both space and time. Newton’s physics 
located each entity by its spatial location plus its temporal location. 
The units of measure for space and time were incommensurable. 
Space relations and time relations were distinct types of relation 
used to define causal order. Space and time were conceived 
independently before a theory of cause-and-effect was framed.
We are now in position to grasp the import of Special 
Relativity for our notions of time and space, and the diagrams 
help make this clear. The uniform diamond pattern represents 
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a spacetime of causally related events, the arrows representing 
causal relations. Paths that obey the direction of arrows represent 
causal chains. Events connected by a causal chain have, in the 
terminology of Special Relativity, time-like relations to one 
another. Contemporary events, which have spacelike relations to 
one another, are connected only by pathways that do not obey 
the direction of arrows. The crucial insight to be gained is that 
we have no need for spatial relations as a primitive type. We will 
retain the term “spacelike” for the separation of contemporaries 
because their separation is entirely due to the lack of true spatial 
relations. True spatial relations form lines, surfaces, and volumes 
without any reference to time or the direction of time. We are 
eliminating true spatial relations from physics in favor of time 
relations alone. We can dispense with the term “time-like” 
because our arrows depict real time transitions, which are not 
merely like time-- they are time.
We begin to see that, with the advent of Special Relativity, 
physics can be built up from causal relations, or time relations, 
alone. I will quote from both Russell and Whitehead in this 
regard, since the point is crucial for re-interpreting the character 
of physical space, which in turn proves crucial to solving the 
mind-body problem. 
We think, for example, that it is possible to move from A to B 
or from B to A; but such a view is incompatible with the theory 
of spacetime. According to that theory, every position of a body 
has a date, and it is impossible to occupy the same position at 
another date, since the date is one of the co-ordinates of the 
position. When we travel from A to B, the date is continually 
advancing; the return journey, having different dates, does not 
cover the same route. Thus geometry and causation become 
inextricably intertwined.
… Dr A. A. Robb has laid stress upon the fact that, when two 
events have a spacelike interval, there can be no direct causal 
relation between them. This means that, given two such events 
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A and B, if any inference is possible from the one to the other, 
it must be by way of a common causal ancestor. …” (AM, 313-
314)
It is the definition of contemporary events that they happen 
in causal independence of each other. Thus two contemporary 
occasions are such that neither belongs to the past of the other. 
The two occasions are not in any direct relation to efficient 
causation. The vast causal independence of contemporary 
occasions is the preservative of the elbow-room within the 
Universe. … Nature does provide a field for independent 
activities. … (AI, 195)
In the following, Whitehead uses the word “occasion” 
where Russell would use “event.” Also, a “nexus” is any definite 
set of connected occasions.
The notion of the contiguity of occasions is important. Two 
occasions, which are not contemporary, are contiguous in 
time when there is no occasion which is antecedent to one of 
them and subsequent to the other. A purely temporal nexus of 
occasions is continuous when, with the exception of the earliest 
and the latest occasions, each occasion is contiguous with an 
earlier occasion and a later occasion. The nexus will then form 
an unbroken thread in temporal or serial order. (AI 202, 203)
The above quote describes a one-dimensional series 
of occasions. With the phrase “temporal or serial order” 
Whitehead is equating temporal order and serial order. That is 
very conventional, since time is usually conceived as strictly one-
dimensional. However, we shall depart from that convention in 
the use of the terms “time and “temporal.”  We are eliminating 
spatial relations from physics altogether, and we shall ascribe the 
term “temporal order” to any set of causally connected occasions, 
linear or not. It is clear from the graphs that the time-ordering 
relation depicted by the arrow is the only ordering relation 
employed in our reconstruction of physics.
66
CAREY R. CARLSON
In the remainder of this chapter, we shall concentrate on 
time diagrams and their interpretation. We shall account for 
the common particles as patterns of time sequence. A limiting 
velocity for the motion of bodies is a simple consequence of this 
analysis. Special Relativity is usually presented as the various 
consequences of a limiting velocity, with the velocity limit 
serving as a brute axiom. Distortions are then ascribed to space 
and time, which vary with the frame of reference used for making 
measurements. Formulas are then obtained to incorporate the 
limiting velocity (the speed of light) into all calculations of 
velocity and energy. But the distortions of space and time are 
just as mysterious as the brute axiom of a velocity limit which 
the distortions are designed to accommodate. By contrast, the 
limiting velocity is a simple consequence of the reduction of 
space-time to discrete time. Any change in space-like separation is 
a purely structural consequence of the stepping advance of time. Thus, 
“space cannot outrun time.”
The explanation for the limiting velocity is the original 
impetus for the reduction of spacetime to a causal network of 
time-ordered moments. The next two chapters will provide 
additional support for that reduction. Firstly, the reduction of 
physics to time-ordered moments makes intelligible the location 
of mental events in the physical world. Secondly, we shall follow 
Russell’s reasoning that the scientific method can at best discover 
the causal skeleton of the world.
An arrow connecting two events represents the causal influence of one 
event upon the other, while the absence of an arrow connecting two 
events implies the lack of causal influence of either event upon the 
other. Just as an event either happens or it doesn’t, we are supposing 
that any given event either has a direct causal effect upon another giv-
en event or it doesn’t. That corresponds to an arrow being drawn or 
not. In Newtonian physics, causal influence shaded off as a function of 
spatial distance without ever quite reaching zero. In Special Relativity 
however, events with spacelike separation have no causal influence at 
all upon one another. This supports an all-or-none analysis regarding 
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causal relations.
The primitive diamond represents a well-defined case 
of causal structure. The hollow diamond is easy to pick out 
visually wherever it occurs in a diagram. If quantum events are 
the primitive events of physics, susceptible to no further causal 
analysis, then it takes two or more quantum events causally 
connected to one another to form a pattern of activity that does 
have a definitive causal analysis. If such a pattern of activity is 
repeated along a causal route, we are apt to call this “a particle.” 
In the causal analysis of spacetime, there are no material particles 
as fundamental entities. There is only the relentless cause-and-
effect succession of immaterial events. Particles and bodies are 
causal patterns that recur in this process.
We have been considering the time order of events. Now 
we shall consider the measurement of a time period, or duration. 
Look at the following primitive diamond that also includes a 
vertical arrow drawn directly from bottom to top.
Frequency Ratio 2:1
There are three causal routes from the bottom event 
to the top one, and the middle route looks like a “short cut.” 
Either of the side routes involves two causal transitions with an 
intermediate event along the way. All three routes determine the 
same temporal interval, since they all begin at the same time 
and end at the same time. We can apply the term “frequency” in 
comparing these alternative routes that have the same origin and 
destination. Either side route has twice the temporal frequency 
of the middle route.
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The next diagram of alternate routes between common 
end points has two arrows forming one route and three arrows 
forming another, producing a temporal frequency ratio of 2:3.
Frequency Ratio 2:3
Diagrams exist for frequency ratios ranging through the 
rational numbers. Thus, we can assign numerical measure to 
temporal frequency ratios. The recognition that time can form 
frequency ratios is very simple. It could have been discovered by 
anyone. Yet it eluded Russell and Whitehead and it continues to 
elude the physics world. The fact that time can form frequency 
ratios, without recourse to any sort of matter-in-motion, is the 
key to reducing physics to time as the sole parameter.
Quantum theory was born when Max Planck discovered 
that atoms only emit light at discrete energy levels. The energy 
levels are proportional to the frequency values of the emitted 
light. Planck expressed the coupling of energy and frequency 
with the formula E=hf. The constant of proportionality, “h,” is 
known as Planck’s constant. We have seen that discrete time can 
form frequency ratios. By Planck’s formula, two energy values, 
E1 and E2, are equal to two frequency values, hf1 and hf2. Thus, 
E1 / E2 = f1 / f2. (Planck’s constant cancels out.) This gives 
us the opportunity to define energy ratios as frequency ratios. 
The step of time is the unit of the frequency ratios. Thus. the 
step of time is the quantum of the energy ratios. We have the 
definition of energy ratios and their quantum in terms of time 
alone. Energy is nothing else than the stepping action of time. 
The single step of time is the quantum of energy.
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The reciprocal of a temporal frequency is a measure of 
duration—the measure of a time period or time interval. For 
example, a frequency of 4 steps of time per second implies a 
duration of ¼ second for each step of time. Higher frequency 
sequences consist of shorter duration steps. The steps of time are 
formed in a full range of frequency ratios, with reciprocal ratios 
of duration. In this theory, which lacks true spatial relations 
with their own metric of spatial intervals, duration will serve not 
only as the measure of time but also as the measure of spacelike 
separation.
...
After I published the first edition of this book in 2004, I 
extracted the diagrams for physics into a booklet, “A Theory of 
Everything for Physics.” I started out with a systematic survey of 
the simplest time diagrams. There are four valid time diagrams 
that connect exactly three moments.
Time diagrams with 3 moments
From left to right, we can recognize fork, series, and 
convergence. The fourth diagram is the simplest to show 
frequency ratios. It has two pathways from “a” to “c.” One path 
takes two steps while the other path takes one step, forming a 
frequency ratio of 2:1.
The diagram on the far right is not a valid time diagram. I 
show it for that reason. Each moment in that diagram is its own 
causal ancestor, which is prohibited. No moment can be earlier 
or later than itself.
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Next, I constructed all the valid diagrams that have exactly 
4 moments. When I came to the graphs that have 5 moments, 
there were too many. I narrowed my survey to highly symmetrical 
graphs. I came to the following graph of 6 moments connected 
by 10 arrows, which I shall call the “hex cell.”
The Hex Cell
By using the hexagon shape, we can “stencil” six hex cells 
around a center one, arriving at an extendable four-dimensional 
time lattice.
Extendable 4-D Time Lattice
Each interior node is at the intersection of four arrows 
arriving and four departing, which is the hallmark of four-
dimensionality.
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The number 137, which is called “the fine structure 
constant,” is used extensively in physics to perform calculations. 
It has had, up until now, no physical interpretation. Richard 
Feynman called it “the greatest damn mystery in physics.” The 
following diagram has 137 arrows.
137 Arrows
The 59 vertical arrows, displaced to the right, show all the 
arrows that could connect pairs of vertically aligned moments 
of the 78 4-D lattice arrows on the left. To have found such a 
symmetrical graph of 137 arrows made me think that “closed 
diagrams” are extremely important. A closed diagram has a single 
earliest moment and a single latest moment. Such a diagram can 
be used in chained repetition to produce a particle-like sequence 
persisting in time. The following hex cell formations are closed 
diagrams  In chained repetition, they depict forms of neutrino 
propagation:
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Neutrino formations
The neutrino is like an electron but without electric charge. 
The hex cell can accommodate further quanta of charge and 
momentum.
Quanta of charge and momentum
The vertical arrows represent quanta of forward 
momentum. The horizontal arrows, which necessarily break 
the bi-lateral symmetry of the cell, represent charge quanta. 
With the presence of charge quanta, the hex cell serves as an 
electron cycle, which propagates in chained repetition to form 
an electron. The following set of diagrams, if charge quanta were 
shown, depict, from left to right, a free electron, two of its atomic 
cloud formations, and an encounter with a photon. 
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Graphical Account of Bohr’s Formula
We have, left to right, an electron, a hydrogen cloud, a 
helium cloud, and lastly, a hydrogen cloud disturbed by an 
incoming photon which is later emitted. Each sequence is formed 
by chained repetition of its unique characteristic cycle. Each such 
cycle has its frequency of chained repetition, labeled at the top as 
f1, f2, and f3. Each sequence has 36 hex cell components. Also, 
each sequence is scaled to reach the same height on the page as 
every other sequence. If we take the hex cell as the unit of energy, 
f1 f2 f3 f2 - f3
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then the scaling shows equal amounts of energy transpiring in 
equal amounts of time.
Bohr’s formula gives the main spectral frequency values of 
light emitted by the atomic electron clouds. Bohr’s formula for 
wavelengths is R x (1/k2 – 1/n2). (Ignore the Rydberg constant 
“R” for the moment.) If we take the wavelength of a free electron 
as 1 and its frequency as 1, then the wavelength of the hydrogen 
cloud is 4 and its frequency 1/4; the wavelength of the helium 
cloud is 9 and its frequency 1/9. Thus, the frequency of the photon 
depicted in the diagram (the inverse of its wavelength) is 1/4 – 
1/9, satisfying Bohr’s formula for wavelength. The corresponding 
formula for frequency is f2 – f3. The graphic patterns extend to 
produce Bohr’s formula along the entire atomic series, explaining 
the discrete frequency values of light emitted and absorbed by 
the atomic electron clouds.
The constant value “R” in Bohr’s formula was ignored. 
It is a product of other constants that are each reducible to 1. 
Our electron cell provides a natural unit for mass and charge—
two of the components of the Rydberg constant. Then there 
is Planck’s constant “h,” which cancelled out when we defined 
energy ratios as frequency ratios. Finally, the absolute speed of 
light “c” is commonly considered a scale factor for converting 
seconds to meters and is set to 1. That is especially appropriate 
in the reduction to time, where time measure is employed as the 
measure pf space-like separation. We are left with the diagrams 
themselves, from which all the number and structure of physics 
derives. The free electron serves as the “real-time clock” that sets 
the base frequency for the electro-magnetic spectrum.
The electron cycle is a hex cell, from which the 4-D manifold 
is also formed. Notice the redundancy among the 4-D 
manifold, the atomic cloud formations, and the forms of 
neutrino propagation, which are all composed of hex cells. 
An economical hypothesis is that the electron clouds and the 
neutrino formations together constitute all that there is of the 
4-D manifold. The manifold is made of quanta, and it need 
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not be as uniform as usually assumed. Gaps in the manifold 
delineate the locally separate electron clouds and neutrino 
formations. That would explain why neutrinos seem so elusive 
to the physicists. They are part of spacetime itself.
The account of Bohr’s formula promises other fruitful 
avenues of investigation. The inverse squares in Bohr’s formula 
are tied to the structure of electron clouds that comprise part of 
the 4-D manifold. Thus, the inverse squares in Bohr’s formula 
are likely tied to the inverse square laws for electricity and 
gravity. Secondly, the stepped-up scaling of clouds in the atomic 
sequence depicts a case of discrete time dilation. Time dilation is 
an aspect of the “curvature of space-time” in Einstein’s theory 
of gravity, the General Theory of Relativity. The discrete time 
dilation in the account of Bohr’s formula can serve as the basis 
for a discrete version of General Relativity. Solving the problem 
of quantum gravity is a top priority for physicists today.
Nuclear Structure—the 6-D Time Lattice
Attached to periodic nodes of an electron cloud sequence is a 
nuclear sequence comprised of higher frequency quanta. This 
constitutes a synchronization of the nucleus to its electron cloud, 
which assigns the nucleus its location in the 4-D manifold. The 
“attachment” of nucleus-to-cloud can only mean that the two 
discriminable sequences share periodic nodes.
The three magnetic strut models above are all assembled 
according to a single lattice principle. This lattice principle 
has widespread practical use in building design, for which 
Buckminster Fuller named it “the octet truss.” The assembly in 
76
CAREY R. CARLSON
the middle can be described as a unit octahedron (of edge length 
1) with a tetrahedron erected on each face. On the right we see a 
cuboctahedron, with 6 square faces and 8 triangle faces. “Caged 
inside the cuboctahedron” is a center ball-bearing with 12 radial 
struts connecting to the 12 outer vertices. If we erect a pyramid 
on each square face of the cuboctahedron, we get an octahedron 
of edge length 2, as shown on the left. (Its bottom pyramid is 
omitted in order to allow the assembly to stand upright.) The 
octet truss is extendable in all directions, so that the above forms 
will recur periodically in the lattice. Larger versions will be 
formed, at twice the size, three times the size, and so on.
The spatial lattice exemplified by the models becomes 
a time lattice when each strut is assigned an unambiguous 
direction, while obeying the directionality of time. We thereby 
obtain a richer structure composed entirely of time-directed 
pathways, with each strut depicting a quantum. When 
converting the spatial lattice to a time lattice, the conversion can 
be performed in such a way as to maximize the preservation of 
symmetry. Also, the conversion can be performed by choosing 
different directions through the spatial lattice. For example, 
the direction can be chosen such that the octahedron on the 
left has a first moment at the bottom and a last moment at the 
top. Alternatively, the conversion of the star-shaped form in the 
middle can be performed such that one outer point becomes 
the earliest moment and the diametrically opposed outer point 
becomes the last moment. The octahedron on the left, at three 
times the size shown, will, in chained repetition, depict a neutron.
The star-shaped model in the middle has its outer points 
spaced at the corners of a virtual cube. Thus, that model can 
be assembled with others like itself in a 2x2x2 arrangement to 
make the next larger cube. The next larger cube is formed with a 
3x3x3 arrangement. It has the perfected symmetry and number 
of quanta to model, in chained repetition, a proton.
With the cuboctahedron on the right, we have 12 struts 
radiating from the center point. After conversion to a time 
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lattice, there will be 6 arrows arriving at the center and 6 arrows 
departing. As the lattice is extended, every interior point will 
have that same context—the defining feature of 6 dimensions. 
The 4-D lattice structure of the electron clouds is distinct from 
the 6-D lattice structure of a nucleus, but the two types of lattice 
have hexagonal components in common. The octahedron model 
has six outer hexagons encircling the assembly like great circle 
routes on a globe. Such hexagonally spaced nodes are present on 
the outer surface of the proton and neutron models as well. The 
hex cells of an electron cloud can share nodes with the virtual 
hexagons on the surface of a nucleus, completing those lowest 
frequency hexagons with the hex cell quanta of the companion 
electron cloud. For more detail about the nucleus, and calculation 
of the mass-ratio of proton and neutron with respect to the 
electron, see the following paper online.
“Causal Set Theory and the Origin of Mass-ratio”
Quantum theory is reconstructed using standalone causal 
sets. The frequency ratios inherent in causal sets are used to 
define energy-ratios, implicating the causal link as the quantum 
of action. Space-time and its particle-like sequences are then 
constructed from causal links. A 4-D time-lattice structure is 
defined and then used to model neutrinos and electron clouds, 
which together constitute a 4-D manifold. A 6-D time-lattice 
is used to model the nucleons. The integration of the nucleus 
with its electron cloud affords calculation of the mass-ratio of 
the proton (or the neutron) with respect to the electron. Arrow 
diagrams, along with several ball-and-stick models, are used to 
streamline the presentation.
http://vixra.org/pdf/1006.0070v1.pdf
(Today’s causal set theory is the same as Whitehead’s 
discrete event ontology in respect to the formations that can 
arise from sheer temporal/causal succession.)
The constructions above explain what particles are, what 
mass is, and why particles have the masses they do. Particles are 
repetitious patterns of time sequence, and the mass-energy of a 
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particle is the measure of its inherent relative frequencies, which 
is a function of the number and arrangement of its constituent 
quanta. A particle sequence must in turn have a frequency 
relative to other particles, since all frequency is relative. All 
quanta of this universe are causally connected. That is what “this 
universe” means.
 The standard expectation today is to find randomness and 
chaos at the bottom of things. To explore random arrangements 
of causal links is to expect the greatest complexity of nature at its 
basis. Instead, the simplest, most symmetrical patterns of causal 
links quickly reveal the most fundamental entities and features 
of physics, which can be no accident. In retrospect, reliance on 
randomness at the foundation of physics is the most hazardous 
assumption, though it is commonly considered to be the minimal 
assumption and the safest.
 Because of the discovery of the frequency ratios, it appears 
that the “Big Bang” has been misconstrued as a singularity 
marking the beginning of time when it is more likely that our 
system of temporal succession has no beginning. As we consider 
earlier and earlier stages of the universe, we conceive a spatially 
shrinking universe, converging quite naturally according to our 
spatial intuitions to a point-like minimum of spatial extent. 
But the clarified situation involves higher frequencies, and the 
“shrinking of space” is a pure consequence of these increasingly 
higher frequencies. An issue of Discover magazine featured a 
marble-sized sphere on the cover graphic that represents the 
spatial size of the universe at t=10e-34 seconds. Yes, space 
shrinks toward zero as all frequencies increase, but clarity on 
the subject again demands that we relinquish unanalyzed spatial 
intuitions. The negative exponent in the equation is heading 
toward larger integers (higher frequencies) as we delve into 
earlier stages of the universe. Nothing in the basis of our theory 
suggests that frequencies should have an upper limit, unless we 
restrict consideration to a bounded region. Nothing suggests 
that the exponent in the equation will, with further knowledge 
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on our part, attain some satisfactorily high integer and reach a 
“glass ceiling.” Physicists of the distant future, should they be 
likewise captive to their spatial intuitions, might well conclude 
that our age was one of unbearable heat, a marble-sized universe 
suffering from excruciating proximity to a cataclysmic Big Bang.
...
It follows from the above constructions that spacetime order, 
measurable intervals, quantifiable energy, particles and their 
masses, can all be defined as structural features arising from 
causal relations among events. We have devoted no consideration 
to the intrinsic nature of events themselves, or to the intrinsic 
nature of causal relations. The events and transitions of time 
constitute “what happens” in the universe, but what are they? 
That question is addressed in the remaining chapters. In this 
chapter, we just consider events and causal relations to be 
deliberately hypothesized entities that provide a framework for 
modern physics with a minimum of assumptions.
In the light of the foregoing, let us reconsider the notion 
of the physical world described in Chapter 2. I said there that 
the meaning of “physical” amounts to an intuition of space 
and what’s in it. Special Relativity implies that determinate 
location in space-time is due to time-ordering relations alone, 
as indicated by the arrow diagrams. The theory abandons purely 
spatial relations that define space as instantaneous extension. 
Since one event can have several immediate causal predecessors 
or successors, we must conceive the course of time as branched 
into locally separated streams. For physics, spacelike structure 
is part and parcel of this richer structure of time. The notion 
of space as an extended state is abandoned. This demands a 
corresponding revision to our conception of physical entities 
as inherently spatial. That conception belongs to a provisional 
stage of science that has been overturned by the discovery of a 
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limiting velocity. The analysis of the universe into whole-and-
part now finds the parts to be immaterial events that occur in 
somewhat regular patterns of succession. These patterns account 
for physical space, energy, shape, location and motion. This 
constitutes the de-materialization of matter and the dismantling 
of physical space required by Special Relativity. The meaning of 
“physical” therefore devolves upon events, their time relations, 
and the resulting patterns.
The patterns resulting from the succession of events are 
variations of structure. The types of structure that can arise are 
due to the logically definable attributes of the time relation. 
The time relation is, by hypothesis, asymmetrical, irreflexive (no 
event is its own ancestor), and sufficiently multi-termed to relate 
several individuals asymmetrically to several others. But these 
logical attributes define a general relation for pure mathematics, 
not a relation that has specially to do with time and events. The 
mathematical expressions of physics can only pertain to the 
actual world if the time variable in those expressions refers to 
actual events and facts about their causal succession. The physical 
nature of defined structures, such as space, energy, and particles, 
derives entirely from the presumed physical nature of their 
structural ingredients-- namely, events and the causal pairing 
relations that link events together.
With the understanding that causal succession is 
equivalent to temporal succession, physics amounts to a theory 
of what comes before what. Progress in this theory has arrived at 
quantum events — discrete events which do not admit of further 
before-and-after analysis. These rudimentary events, and the 
time relation that orders them, are the quintessential physical 
entities. Our impression of the physical world as something 
substantial and immense owes to the sheer number of quantum 
events and their causal connections. If the subject of scientific 
investigation is simply the temporal sequence of events, then 
the physical world is not well characterized as “space and what’s 
in it,” but rather “time and what’s in it.” This has immediate 
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consequence for the mind-body problem, since there is little 
difficulty in assigning the time of occurrence to a mental event.
82
CHAPTER 6
The Physical Location of Mental Events
Mental events have physical location by the same criterion as physical 
events, strictly by the theory of their causes and effects. Mental events 
are between their causes and effects, and this causal positioning is the 
complete criterion and meaning of their physical location, as it is for 
events in general, mental or non-mental.
The previous chapter suggests that physical theory can be put 
into canonical form in terms of the relation of cause-and-effect 
and its relata. It is evident that the causal relation, symbolized 
by the arrow, is the fertile element providing the variations of 
structure, while the class of event-like relata is the logical residue 
remaining after causal structure is worked out. The events have 
the logical status of individuals required for the causal relation, 
but beyond that, it is difficult to know what to make of them. The 
pattern of their succession accounts for time, space, energy, and all 
things physical. Yet a single causally primitive event, considered 
in isolation, has no physical properties whatsoever. The temporal 
transitions are the quanta. They have the frequency/energy 
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values, not the events. The positing of quantum events allows 
us to conceive the physical world as patterns of concatenated 
quanta, while the intrinsic nature of the momentary events never 
becomes pertinent to physics. Physics has nothing to say about 
what a quantum event might be. 
The intuition of spatialized existence has served for ages 
to help us conceive the physical world, from “earth, air, fire and 
water” to tinker toy molecules and planetary electrons. Any 
portion of spatial existence is again spatial existence, right down 
to the imagined point of space.  The causal analysis of Chapter 
5 construes any fact about space to be a logical consequence of 
facts about time. It would contravene the analysis to revert to 
the model of spatialized existence to help conceive quantum 
events, because all space-like relations are derived solely from 
the relative placement of these events in time. Thus, Descartes’ 
conception of physical existence as characterized by spatial 
extension is undermined by the causal analysis of space-time. 
This deprives us of a traditional attribute of physical entities that 
could serve to differentiate physical events from mental events.
We’re still left with a useful distinction between mental and 
physical events — namely, that we know nothing of the intrinsic 
nature of physical events, but quite a lot about the intrinsic nature 
of mental events. When we attend to the time order within our 
experience, we glimpse the elusive fleeting moment of experience. 
There is more to describe about this moment of experience than 
how elusive it is. For example, consider the visual image presented 
by this page of text. The stable presence of black markings against 
a white background endures throughout a continuous stretch of 
many present moments. In a phenomenological description, the 
visual field presents us with a striking two-dimensional expanse, 
accompanied by a somewhat feeble dimension of depth. This 
geometry of the visual field does not flicker or fade as we narrow 
attention to a minimal time slice of experience. Rather, the space 
of the visual field pervades the present moment and is a part 
of it. From the standpoint of phenomenology, there are spatial 
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relations that order the distinct regions of visual space into an 
ordered whole that is presented all-at-once, in a single moment 
of experience. This is in marked contrast to the space-time of 
physics, which is rid of instantaneous spatial relations. This 
highlights the difference between the visual space of experience 
and the causal space-time of physics, which can help us avoid 
mistaking one for the other.
Not only does a mental event provide a full-fledged visual 
space, it provides further ingredients not subject to the spatial 
relations of the visual field, such as itches, odors, and sounds. 
Let us define a “mental event” explicitly as “the full cluster of 
phenomena, culled from all the senses and modes of awareness, 
that co-exist simultaneously in one moment of experience.” A 
person’s enduring sentient experience can then be considered a 
temporal succession of such mental events. This prepares us to 
examine the time correlation of mental events and physical events.
As we examine time relations between mental events 
and physical events, it is difficult to avoid the topic of causal 
interaction between the two. The main objection against such 
causal interaction is two-fold. First, mental events are essentially 
composed of sensory qualities, while physical events are distilled 
by causal analysis from a scientific legacy of theoretical entities 
not thought to possess any sensory qualities. Thus, mental events 
and physical events would seem to be so dissimilar as to make 
their causal interaction unintelligible. Secondly, physical entities 
such as particles and electromagnetic fields are all “carved out 
of space,” co-defined with respect to one another to give them 
coherent roles of interaction, while mental events are not defined 
with any spatial shape that would allow them to be congruent 
with physical entities. The latter objection loses its force when 
causal analysis is carried through to completion, since we then 
arrive at events that have no inherent spatial properties. That 
leaves only the first objection, which represents a reluctance to 
introduce sensory qualities into physics only to satisfy the rare 
85
THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION
occurrence of mental phenomena in a predominantly non-
mental universe.
But although physics as a self-contained logical system does 
not need to mention sensations, it is only through sensations 
that physics can be verified. It is an empirical law that light of 
a certain wavelength causes a visual sensation of a certain kind, 
and it is only when such laws are added to those of physics that 
the total becomes a verifiable system. (HK, 261)
Russell seems to suggest a two-tiered theory to forestall 
the objection to introducing sensory qualities into physical 
theory. We have a skeletal theory of cause-and-effect, depicted 
by arrow diagrams, which describes the physical world without 
mention of sensory qualities. But this theory provides no means 
of verification for the sentient observer, who observes nothing 
but sensory qualities. Therefore, we could form an auxiliary 
theory that includes mental events, in order to account for the 
verification of the skeletal theory by sensory observation. The 
auxiliary theory incorporates the skeletal theory in its entirety 
and adds the postulate that physical events have causal influence 
upon mental events, or at least the class of mental events that 
Russell calls “percepts.” This allows us to describe the role of 
sensory observation in experimental science, while maintaining 
a clear distinction between mental events and “physics as a self-
contained logical system.”
The theory that perceiving depends upon a chain of physical 
causation is apt to be supplemented by a belief that to every state 
of the brain a certain state of the mind “corresponds,” and vice 
versa, so that given either the state of the brain or the state of the 
mind, the other could be inferred by a person who sufficiently 
understood the correspondence. If it is held that there is no causal 
interaction between mind and brain, this is merely a new form 
of the pre-established harmony. But if causation is regarded — as 
it usually is by empiricists — as nothing but invariable sequence 
or concomitance, then the supposed correspondence of brain 
and mind tautologically involves causal interaction. The whole 
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question of the dependence of mind on body or body on mind 
has been involved in quite needless obscurity owing to the 
emotions involved. The facts are quite plain. Certain observable 
occurrences are commonly called “physical,” certain others 
“mental”; sometimes “physical” occurrences appear as causes of 
“mental” ones, sometimes vice versa. A blow causes me to feel 
pain; a volition causes me to move my arm. There is no reason 
to question either of these causal connections, or at any rate no 
reason which does not apply to all causal connections equally. 
(HK, 196-197)
We might try to express the notion of time without 
presupposing causality by saying “events just happen.” But 
events happen with some predictability, which leads us to believe 
that past events influence future events. Thus, time order is 
enmeshed with causal order. The arrow diagrams of Chapter 5 
are interpreted as representing either time order or causal order, 
if one wishes to maintain a distinction between the two. In any 
case, the order of succession of events accounts for the spacelike 
order of contemporary events in space-time. Since mental events 
and physical events are interspersed in a common time ordering, 
the spatial location of mental events with respect to physical 
events is assured. Under Special Relativity, the facts of time 
sequence determine spacelike relations, regardless of whether 
the time-ordered events are mental, physical, or a mix of the two.
Now we may consider the experimental means by which 
the space-time location of human mental events is determined. 
It will come as no great surprise to find them located in the 
vicinity of the human head. The method is called a psycho-
physical experiment. I shall be the imaginary subject of such 
experiments, for the purpose of discussion. I submit to having 
my skull cap removed and micro-electrodes planted in my 
cortex. An electroencephalogram, or EEG, records evidence of a 
concert of electrical activity at the surface of my cortex. There are 
electrodes for sensing electrical activity, and other electrodes for 
inducing electrical currents. In the first experiment, an electrode 
is used to stimulate a pinpointed region of my visual cortex. I 
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see a flash of light in my visual field. Whether my eyes are open 
or closed, I see a flash of light whenever the stimulus is applied. 
The electrical event apparently causes me to see the flash. I then 
report that the flashes I am seeing are moving progressively to 
the left in my visual field, which elicits a murmur of approval 
among the scientists. It turns out that an electrode was being 
progressively repositioned along a line running across my visual 
cortex. The spatial geometry of my visual field can be “mapped 
out” to correspond to the surface region of my brain called the 
“primary visual cortical projection area.”
Next, a series of stimuli is applied to some spot on my 
visual cortex at a rate of one per second. I see a series of flashes 
occurring at this same rate. The rate is gradually increased, until 
I report that the intermittent flashes have fused into a steady, 
stable point of light occupying my visual field continuously. This 
fusion occurs when the rate of excitation exceeds 10-per-second.
Suddenly I hear an unexpected sound. The electrode has 
been applied to a point on my auditory cortex. After further 
eliciting of sounds, and sound sequences elicited at varying rates, 
the stimulus phase of this experimental session is over.
For the final experiment, I am to practice meditation. I 
close my eyes, calm my thoughts, and I reach a relaxed but alert 
state of awareness. I remain in this condition for a few minutes. 
Wires are then unhooked, my skull cap replaced, and I’m shown 
the EEG record produced during my meditation period. I 
have produced a nice train of alpha wave patterns on the EEG 
recording. These are synchronous oscillations at a steady rate of 
ten-per-second.
Consider first the clues offered by the experiment regarding 
the time period of a mental event. The fusion of light flashes into a 
steady spot in my visual field occurred when the electrical stimuli 
surpassed a rate of ten-per-second. The same thing happened 
with sounds. Experiments suggest that a human mental event, 
as we have defined it from a purely phenomenological point of 
view, can be assigned a time period of roughly one tenth of a 
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second. We cannot discriminate stimuli that occur at a higher 
rate than this. There is therefore no point in supposing that it 
takes a succession of more than ten mental states to account 
for a person’s sentient awareness over the span of one second. 
We do not experience more changes of state than ten-per-
second. It is unwarranted to ascribe any finer discrimination 
of time than this to human awareness. Secondly, a meditating 
subject can reach alpha, a phenomenological condition of calm 
alertness corresponding to a pronounced synchronization of 
EEG oscillations at a rate of ten-per-second. Since the concert 
of brainwave activity recorded by an EEG is the closest known 
physiological correlate to a person’s mental state, a rate of ten-
per-second for human mental events has further experimental 
support. Without evidence to the contrary, this seems like a 
reasonable number if any temporal rate is to be assigned to the 
succession of human mental events. Periodicities in the human 
brain likely account for the characteristic form of perceptual 
experience shared by humans. This calls for a compatible 
periodic rate of mental events, rather than a haphazard rate, or 
no rate at all. We shall therefore proceed under the assumption 
that experience transpires in “drops” of roughly one tenth of a 
second duration.
A rate of 10-per-second for human moments is also 
appropriate to the delays involved in the
conduction of efferent nerve signals from the brain to the 
muscles, and in the reverse direction, the conduction of afferent 
signals from the sense receptors to the brain. Reaction time, to 
avert a driving collision for example, is not reducible to less than 
one tenth of a second. Reliable motor control of the body requires 
patience for the feedback, which is subject to the propagation 
delays of neural transmission. The human series is well qualified 
for central control of the human body, equipped at 10 Hz with 
the ideal frequency for the job.
Strobe lights at 10 Hz bother people, and epileptics are 
prone to seizure when they see such strobe lights. All in all, given 
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that we are seeking a finite frequency for the human series, a 
regular frequency of 10 Hz seems to be it. We are not aware 
of this frequency by introspection. It is ascertained only in the 
laboratory, by reference to scientific hypotheses concerning a 
world that lies beyond the reach of anyone’s introspective powers.
Our sentient experience of time seems to be smooth and 
without breaks. The best we can do to account for that smoothness, 
using discrete time analysis, is to model the human series as an 
unbroken alternation of moment, transition, moment, transition. 
We then have a typical discrete time series, constituted by 
moments and transitional quanta, which we shall term “human 
moments” and “human quanta.” Thus, a human series consists of 
human moments connected by human quanta.
Putting a number to a moment of human experience, 
with dimensions in seconds, establishes a commensurability 
of mental events and physical events. Regarding the physical 
location of mental events, we have the electrical events induced 
by probes at the surface of the cortex as the closest known causal 
predecessors to effects in the sensorium. Unless there are further 
psycho-physical experiments that can indicate an even closer 
time relationship between physical excitatory events and what 
I see and hear and feel, we have mental events “sandwiched” 
between known physical events to the highest precision afforded 
by experimental means. The electrical excitations at my cortex 
which elicited the visual and auditory sensations in my experience 
are the physical events contiguous in time to my mental events.
Let’s confine discussion for the moment to the sense of 
vision. With eyes open, light from the surrounding environment 
is focused by the lens to fall upon the retina, exciting the rods and 
cones in a pattern that reproduces a scene from the surrounding 
environment similarly to the way film is exposed in a camera. 
We may call this pattern of excitation on the retina a “virtual 
image.” The excitations at the retina result in the propagation of 
neural signals along routes through the optic nerve bundle. If 
someone snipped my optic nerves, the scene would be lost from 
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my experienced visual field. With optic nerves intact, the virtual 
image at the retina is transmitted to the optical cortex to be 
reproduced there. This reproduction relies mainly on two features 
of the nerve signal propagation. First, individual pathways 
constitute “point-to-point wiring,” connecting individual rods 
and cones of the retina to individual sites on the visual cortex. 
Secondly, a greater intensity of excitation at an individual rod 
or cone results in a higher frequency of nerve cell discharges 
along the respective path of transmission. Thus, light intensity 
is “encoded” in the frequency of nerve cell discharge, and spatial 
patterns are preserved by point-to-point wiring of retinal sites 
to sites on the optical cortex. Therefore, when I am viewing a 
painting, I am enjoying its color and composition due to the 
timing and spatial arrangement of electrical discharges of nerve 
cells at my optical cortex. The time course of events leading up to 
activity at my cortex is once-removed, or twice-removed, or even 
more remote, from the external causes of my visual experiences.
What is known about the other human senses, such as 
sound and touch, involves similar stories of cause-and-effect, 
with nerve pathways and the frequency coding of nerve cell 
discharges leading to activity levels at the cortical surface of 
the brain as the closest concomitant in time to the features 
experienced in a mental event. There is nothing controversial in 
this causal theory of perception, which is of a piece with the 
scientific account of physical events in general, whether inside 
or outside the human body. The point to be emphasized here is 
that the order of cause-and-effect, when applied to the mixed 
domain of physical events and mental events, while situating 
mental events earlier and later than certain physical events, 
pertains to a specific class of physical events that are spatially 
located at the cortex of the brain. Thus, a human mental event, by 
being adjacent in time to a class of physical events at the cortical 
surface of the brain, has its causal location narrowed by psycho-
physical experiment to that brain location.
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From the viewpoint adopted in this chapter, in which 
physical events and mental events are kept distinct, human 
mental events might seem to be strange interlopers among the 
tissues and electro-chemical events of the science and physiology 
of the brain. We tend to think that the inter-relations of physical 
parts of the brain are open to inspection, and that the physical 
location of any of these parts with respect to others is a matter 
of direct perception. By contrast, the mental events interspersed 
with brain activity are only privately experienced by the subject 
of the experiments. It is only by interpreting the subject’s verbal 
reports that the experimenter can infer the occurrence of mental 
events, which can then be correlated with physical events. Thus, 
it seems that mental events have only “second-hand” physical 
location, borrowed from the concomitant physical events of the 
brain, while these latter events establish physical location in the 
primary sense.
While it is true that inference is required to attribute mental 
events to the human subject of an experiment, similar inference is 
required to attribute a brain to this same subject. The experimenter 
presumably has his or her own brain, which is also subject to 
the causal theory of perception, even when it is not the focus of 
an experiment. According to physical theory, the experimenter 
infers the entire physical environment, including the subject’s 
brain tissues, from events in his own cortex. Furthermore, if the 
experimenter is like you or me, his primary data does not seem 
to come in the form of cortical events at all, but rather in the 
form of qualitative sensory data, such as colored patches, sounds, 
touch, and pressure. At this point, our presumed familiarity with 
physical objects is threatened, and we’re likely to take an abrupt 
defensive tactic. The burden of a train of inferences involved in 
the perception of physical objects is thrown out the window, and 
percepts in the mind of the physiologist are mistaken for the 
brain that is being experimented upon.
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Then, again, there is the argument about brain and mind. When 
a physiologist examines a brain, he does not see thoughts; 
therefore, the brain is one thing and the mind which thinks 
is another. The fallacy in this argument consists in supposing 
that a man can see matter. Not even the ablest physiologist 
can perform this feat. His percept when he looks at a brain is 
an event in his own mind, and it has only a causal connection 
with the brain that he fancies he is seeing. When, in a powerful 
telescope, he sees a tiny luminous dot, and interprets it as a vast 
nebula existing a million years ago, he realizes that what he sees 
is different from what he infers. The difference from the case of 
a brain looked at through a microscope is only one of degree: 
there is exactly the same need of inference, by means of the laws 
of physics, from the visual datum to its physical cause. And just 
as no one supposes that the nebula has any close resemblance to 
a luminous dot, so no one should suppose that the brain has any 
close resemblance to what the physiologist sees. (HK, 228, 229)
It is true that for many purposes we can forget the causal 
theory of perception and pretend that we have the power to 
behold physical objects directly. However, if we don’t overcome 
this habit when we try to understand the relation of mind 
and brain, we go around and around in a circle of confusion 
regarding mental and physical. Our instinctive habit is to project 
the sensory data of our direct acquaintance onto the world 
outside our brains. That fosters the illusion that we have direct 
acquaintance with, and direct perception of, physical objects 
such as brains. We can’t afford this illusion if we’re to accomplish 
the business of this chapter.
What I know without inference when I have the experience 
called “seeing the sun” is not the sun but a mental event in me. 
I am not immediately aware of tables and chairs, but only of 
certain effects that they have on me. The objects of perception 
which I take to be “external” to me, such as colored surfaces that 
I see, are only “external” in my private space, which ceases to 
exist when I die; indeed my private visual space ceases to exist 
whenever I am in the dark or shut my eyes. And they are not 
“external” to “me”, if “me” means the sum total of my mental 
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events; on the contrary, they are among the mental events that 
constitute me. … (HK, 225)
If we are to avoid going around in circles, we shall have 
to take science seriously. The notion that physical objects are 
made of matter was an assumption that took science a long 
way before running its course. We are now working under the 
hypothesis that physical objects are made of immaterial events. 
In the transition from one theory to the next, the role of sensory 
data in confirming theoretical conjecture is unchanged. We can’t 
decide between a theory of matter versus a theory of immaterial 
events by direct inspection of the physical world. The theory of 
events is superior because it reduces the foundation physics to 
temporal succession as the sole hypothesis, while providing a role 
for sentient events and sensory data in the observation phase of 
experiments. To remain consistent, the hypothesis that a physical 
brain is a system of causally related quantum events cannot be 
mixed with assumptions that make the brain seem simpler, more 
familiar, or easier to perceive. This pertains likewise to tables 
and chairs. If we are unfamiliar with quantum events, then we 
are unfamiliar with tables and chairs, which are no more or less 
mysterious than black holes or what goes on inside the atom. 
What is familiar about tables and chairs, as Russell says above, is 
various effects they have on us. These familiar effects are among 
the sensory data that constitute our mental events.
In considering a chair, there is the physical chair made of 
quantum events on the one hand, and on the other hand, there 
are the familiar effects of the physical chair upon a person’s 
experience. These effects make up what may be called “the 
phenomenal chair.” On the physical side, there is no duplication 
of the chair into a “macro object” versus the chair as a system 
of “micro events.” There is one consistent causal structure of 
quantum events, with no micro or macro about it. To harbor the 
notion that the physical chair includes some “overlay” of macro 
properties beyond the causal ordering of quantum events is to 
forfeit the consistency of the causal analysis. The physical chair 
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has only two types of elemental constituents — quantum events, 
and the causal relations which order them. In that sense, the 
physical chair is extremely simple. Those elemental constituents 
establish layer upon layer of causal structure, according to the 
physics of nuclear, electromagnetic, and gravitational energies. 
In that sense, the physical chair is extremely complex. This 
pairing of simple and complex illustrates the limitless structural 
possibilities definable from a single relation. Our knowledge 
of the physical chair is confined to the theory of that chair as 
a causal structure of events. Turning to the phenomenal chair, 
our knowledge of it consists of our acquaintance with sensory 
effects presumably caused by the physical chair. Compared to 
the physical chair, the phenomenal chair has a richer variety of 
elemental constituents, including colors, the spatial relations 
belonging to our visual and tactile experiences, sounds, smells, 
and sensed time relations among these. With respect to number 
of elemental constituents therefore, the phenomenal chair is 
more complex than the physical chair. On the other hand, the 
structure of the phenomenal chair, which is due to phenomenal 
relations native to the sensory data, does not approach the 
structural complexity of the physical chair. Nevertheless, we piece 
together the theory of an extremely complex physical chair from 
the modest complexity of the structure of our sensory data. The 
extravagance of this inference is offset by the wide domain of the 
resulting theory, wherein the physics of virtually everything in 
the universe is exemplified in the physics of the chair.
Location of the human series in the brain sequence 
The standard conception of a brain is one of instantaneous 
extension in space, with no earlier-and-later involved in its 
composition. That is a brain without quanta. Such a brain has 
no place in our physics. Taking Special Relativity into account, 
the cortical surface is a set of contemporaries— “causal cousins” 
related only by their causal ancestry. Such contemporaries are 
also poised to beget common causal descendants. The location 
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of the mind in the brain is resolved by tracing the causal lineage 
of human mental events to and from the homuncular regions of 
the cortex. These are the key causal locators of human mental 
events.
Brain scientists have mapped out a set of functional 
locations on the cortex called projection areas. These serve to 
pinpoint the location of the human series in the brain. The 
first two projection areas to consider are depicted by the motor 
homunculus and the sensory homunculus, which represent 
human-like forms that were first mapped out by Wilder Penfield. 
The topology of the human body is preserved in these forms, but 
geometric distortions in the drawing of the “little man” give him 
the appearance of a malformed fetus.
You can stimulate the motor homunculus with a probe and 
get the corresponding part of the body to twitch into action, like 
operating a puppet. You can stimulate the sensory homunculus to 
shortcut the more remote stimulus that is normally needed on the 
surface of the body to achieve the same sensation. Each moment 
of a human series of occasions has additional predecessors and 
successors that belong to the brain but not to the human series. 
Forking and convergence connect the human series to other 
cycles of the brain. Quanta that fork off from the human series 
to the motor homunculus provide control of bodily movement. 
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Quanta from the sensory homunculus converge upon the human 
series, updating the body-image of somatic awareness. At cycles 
of ten-per-second, the sequence of cause-and-effect is as follows:
1. One human moment forks off via efferent quanta to 
many moments of the motor homunculus.
2. Effects are propagated along efferent nerve routes to 
the muscles.
3. Muscle action causes feedback signals along afferent 
nerve routes to the sensory homunculus.
4. Many moments of the sensory homunculus converge 
via afferent quanta upon the next moment of the 
human series.
During the tenth of a second between the two bounding 
moments of the above cycle, one human quantum also transpires, 
propagating the human series. 
Other projection areas on the cortex have also been 
mapped out, which correspond to other sensory fields of 
human phenomenology. Patterns of excitation at the retina are 
reproduced at the visual projection area. Auditory experience 
also has a patch of cortical surface devoted to it. A mental event 
typically involves all the sensory modes at once. The distinct 
phenomenal sensory modes correspond to the distinct patches of 
cortex devoted to the organs of sight, sound and touch. As with 
the sensory homunculus, the visual and auditory projection areas 
are home to causal predecessors of the human series. From those 
cortical sites, the afferent system converges to a human percept, 
at which point the efferent phase of causal sequence is renewed.
Let us consider visual experience and its patch of cortex. In 
phenomenal vision, we have a spatially extended field of colored 
patches. The colorful visual field is part of a human mental event. 
As is the case with color, the inherent geometry of the visual 
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field is given to the subject of experience. We can judge with 
remarkable precision the size and shape of colored patches given 
in our visual experience. A good example is the extraordinary 
precision by which we can judge a rectangle to have the 
pleasing height-width proportions of the golden mean. This is 
pure phenomenology. The ancients could judge with the same 
accuracy. Such judgment owes nothing to science. It is a judgment 
of ratio measurement that involves no scientific conceptions or 
assumptions. The visual projection area has a space-time metric 
based on the second as the standard unit of duration. Supposing 
the patch of visual cortex to be roughly circular and one inch in 
diameter, its space-like extent is approximately one-tenth of a 
nanosecond. The full spread of the subject’s phenomenal visual 
field correlates to the full diameter of the cortical patch, so that 
half the visual field corresponds to half the cortical patch, or one-
twentieth of a nanosecond. Proportionate size in the visual field 
is thus correlated to the metric unit of physics. This correlation is 
critical for an epistemological account of physical measurement, 
which requires sentient mental events in the laboratory, and 
sensory data that is phenomenally given to them. The correlation 
of phenomenal measure to the nanosecond span of this or that 
cortical projection area is reliant on psycho-physical experiments. 
Perceivable sensory fields are correlated to the unperceivable 
domain of physics. In the case of hearing, it is phenomenal pitch 
that correlates to the nanosecond span across the auditory cortex. 
We do not expand the domain of the perceivable by arriving 
at such correlations. Such results are obtained in the field of 
psychophysics, which correlates the qualitative data of subjective 
experience to the conjectural model of theoretical physics.
The human series has direct access to vision, hearing, and 
tactile information at the cortical projection areas. Such direct 
access to information is unambiguous in our theory of physics. It 
means that select moments of the projection areas are immediate 
causal predecessors of a human moment. Each such predecessor 
connects to the human moment by a single quantum. Conversely, 
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direct action by a human moment upon some moment in the 
region of the motor homunculus means that a single quantum 
connects the human moment to the homuncular moment. The 
homunculi are situated on the cortical surface as if to provide 
convenient test points for a technician to troubleshoot the sensory 
and motor systems. In normal operation, the cortical projection 
regions serve as staging areas for perception and control by the 
human series.
The stable brain is a propagation of synchronized time 
cycles, featuring a great range of frequencies and no doubt a great 
variety of cycle topologies. The stability of human experience and 
its dependence on the brain means that the human series must 
be embedded in supportive cycles of 10 Hz frequency. These 
cycles provide a base of causal routine for the human series, and 
they connect the human series at 10 Hz to the ladder of higher 
frequencies involved in brain function.
To conclude this chapter, we consider once more the 
laboratory setting of the psycho-physical experiment. We 
conceive the physical setting to be a system of causally ordered 
quantum events, accounting for the space of the laboratory 
and all the physical entities in it. In addition, we attribute 
phenomenological mental events to each of the people in the 
laboratory. The experiments indicate that the immediate causal 
predecessors of human mental events are physical events 
distributed across the cortical surfaces of human brains. This 
establishes the causal location of human mental events with 
respect to physical events. Thus, we rely upon prior knowledge 
of the purely physical configuration of the laboratory in order 
to discover the location of mental events. That prior knowledge, 
though routine and taken for granted, must itself be inferred 
from the sensory data presented to the sentient observers in the 
laboratory. That is, we rely on the phenomenal spatial relations 
of our own mental events to infer the causal location of physical 
events that make up the physical environment. The location of 
physical events is therefore defined in terms of causal order and 
99
THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION
known by inference, which is precisely the case for the location 
of mental events. Once physics is developed in sufficient detail 
to give a working knowledge of the brain, we are able to infer 
the causal location of our mental events with respect to physical 
events according to psycho-physical experiments. We must learn 
the location of physical events in some detail before we can 
learn the location of mental events, but that process of learning 
employs a single method and establishes physical location by a 
single criterion. The conjecture of causal order, in the service of 
predicting our sensory data, is the single means by which we know 
the physical location of either mental events or physical events. 
Historically, it has always been assumed that a conscious 
mind and a physical body are each situated in time, but that 
a mind cannot be intelligibly conceived to occupy space as 
a physical body does. But space and its bodies must now be 
conceived as “strung out in time” according to the dictates 
of Special Relativity. The non-serial structure traditionally 
associated with causal order must be conferred upon time itself. 
Instantaneous spatial relations in physics, conceived according 
to the model of spatial relations in the visual field, are discarded. 
Spatially extended bodies are reduced to patterns of time-ordered 
events. This altered framework of science provides a meaning 
for the physical location of human mental events, and a basis 
for discovering that location by experiment. The overall effect 
is to make mental events seem more “physical.” The distinction 
between mental and physical now hinges upon the assumption 
that mental events are characterized by sensory qualities, while 
physical events are not.
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CHAPTER 7
Scientific Knowledge Characterized
Physical science constructs a causal model of the world for better 
predicting the patterns of qualities witnessed in human mental 
experience. The scientist has no privileged capacity to escape the 
confines of his mind to investigate the physical world directly. 
A predictive model is framed, tested, and refined solely based on 
phenomena witnessed in mental events. Scientific knowledge resides 
entirely in such models.
Some classical philosophers characterized matter as the unknown 
cause of sensation. Once we include spacetime (or a 4-D time 
manifold) among the theoretical constructs of physics, we can 
characterize the entire world beyond our sensory data as the 
unknown cause of sensation. We cannot start with incontrovertible 
evidence and proceed by logical deduction to crank out scientific 
knowledge. We need to supplement individual pieces of evidence 
with hypotheses and generalizations that surpass the evidence, in 
order to obtain theories that are useful for designing experiments 
and predicting their outcomes. Such generalities are drawn from 
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a predisposition to believe that various observed regularities will 
continue to be observed.
Broadly speaking, scientific method consists in inventing 
hypotheses which fit the data, which are as simple as is 
compatible with this requirement, and which make it possible 
to draw inferences subsequently confirmed by observation. … 
(HK, 311)
The invented hypotheses to which Russell refers may be 
difficult to recognize as such. In hindsight, it is easier to judge that 
belief in matter as a substance was a hypothesis, since that belief 
has been discredited by science. The notion of a homogenous 
substance called “matter” is an example of the difficulty in 
recognizing the hypothetical status of beliefs we grow up with. 
Belief in matter has a strong grip on the imagination. Russell 
has said that people preserve their belief in matter as something 
“bumpable into.” If I bump into a table in a dream, and remember 
that dream upon waking, I can grasp that the sensory experience 
of “bumping” does not in every case require an existing physical 
object. This helps me discriminate the sensory experience of 
bumping from “physical bumping.” Furthermore, I can play with 
two sufficiently strong bar magnets and find that, with their poles 
oriented to repel, I cannot clap them together. The two magnets 
“bump” without making contact. This behavior of magnets can 
serve as a bridge to understanding how it is that science can 
possibly dispense with “hard matter”. Ordinary objects are 
made of atoms. The nuclei of these atoms avoid contact with 
one another. They are shielded from one another by clouds 
of electrons. When two objects collide, their contact is better 
conceived as an electromagnetic bounce, like the bar magnets 
that bump without making contact. Turning to the sub-atomic 
particles, it is likewise intelligible that their mutual interactions 
can be described by nuclear forces without assuming that tiny 
material particles come into contact. Thus, a slight familiarity 
with magnets can go a long way toward an acceptance of the 
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scientific demise of matter as a simple substance. Physicists are 
trained through common sense, and they remain realists in their 
attitudes regarding the physical world. They have not got rid 
of homogeneous matter without finding a suitable substitute. 
Russell and Whitehead have this same realism in their outlook 
on the physical world. Thus, in the analysis of the physical 
world into events and causal relations, those two types of entity 
are meant to bear the full load of commonsense belief in the 
existence of the physical world, a belief that is no longer well-
served by the notion of a substance called “matter.”
If you do manage to rid yourself of belief in material 
substance, you still face the mirage of empty space, which is an 
even greater obstacle to our understanding. Empty space is the 
receptacle for intangible magnetic fields, gravitational fields, and 
nuclear forces. It does not seem that you could relinquish belief 
in this static receptacle of space and still preserve a meaning for 
physical existence. Again, as in the case of matter, science does 
not divest itself of three-dimensional space without supplying a 
more adequate replacement. In this case, the concept of a space 
that exists “all at once” is abandoned in favor of a procession 
of intersecting time sequences, which accounts for a limiting 
velocity in the universe. Physical location becomes a matter of 
relative position in a causal sequence of events. The previous 
chapter explained how physical location is assigned to mental 
events in accord with this view of science. This chapter looks at 
the same situation from the standpoint of the mental events. 
Rather than inserting mental events into a given system of 
physical events, we consider mental events to be the known base 
of scientific observation, and the rest of the world a “scaffold” 
of cause-and-effect constructed around the mental events by 
systematic conjecture. From this perspective, mental events serve 
as the known origin for the causal location of physical events, and 
the contention of the previous chapter, that mental events have 
physical location, is a circumlocution and a foregone conclusion. 
This does not detract from the validity of the previous chapter, 
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but rather lends reinforcement to it. Whether we assume the 
validity of modern scientific theory and subsequently find a 
place for mental events within that theory, or whether we start 
with the sensory data of our mental events and explain scientific 
knowledge as an extrapolation from this data to a wider causal 
setting, we come full circle to a consistent analysis of scientific 
knowledge and the method of its acquisition.
Before science could come full circle, it had to start 
somewhere. It did not start by investigating how our sensory 
organs work, a project which could not get off the ground without 
considerable developments in the understanding of chemistry 
and electricity.
Our perceptive apparatus, as studied by the physiologist, can 
to some extent be ignored by the physicist, because it can be 
treated as approximately constant. It is not, of course, really 
constant. By squinting I can see two suns, but I do not imagine 
that I have performed an astronomical miracle. (HK, 208)
An understanding of sense receptors, nerves, and brain 
could be postponed to a late stage of science since these organs 
function well without drawing attention to themselves. The early 
focus was on simple machines, such as levers, pulleys, and wedges, 
which give a mechanical advantage. Although the understanding 
of cause-and-effect would inevitably extend to the workings of 
human perception, it was first applied to the relations of external 
physical objects to one another. This focus on the mechanics of 
external bodies carried science to a sophisticated stage without 
shedding much light on human perception. Phenomenological 
data, such as colors, became marginalized in the scientific picture 
when it became apparent that they were superfluous to the 
mechanistic model. Unwittingly, this marginalized the sentient 
human being in the scientific view. With full confidence in the 
mechanistic model, investigating the role of the sentient human 
observer in science could even be put off indefinitely, since the 
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observer is presumably just one more mechanism, of modest 
energy levels, on the backroads of physics.
A theory of physical mechanisms is fine and dandy, but 
if it finds no place for the sensory qualities we experience, then 
it offers the sentient observer no reason for believing it. Thus, 
we have suggested a perfectly good location in space-time for 
mental events in the preceding chapter, which fits the view of 
science as a theory of cause-and-effect. As Russell says, this is 
required if science is to be understood as an empirical study 
rather than an exercise in pure mathematics. From the vantage 
point of epistemology, which is concerned with how we know 
what we think we know, mental events of our sentient perceptual 
experience are the only events that must be included in a theory 
of space-time. Our mental events provide the proving ground 
for the conjecture of further events lying beyond human 
experience. For that reason, we deny that empirical science can 
omit mention of mental events, and explicitly adopt a view of 
science that incorporates mental events at the foundation of the 
theory. In order to integrate mental events into physical science, 
we can define “physical event” as “any event that is either a cause 
or an effect.” This recognizes the fundamental role of cause-and-
effect in the construction of scientific theory. Together with the 
understanding that mental events are the given effects for which 
a theory of causal explanation is constructed in the first place, we 
hereby induct mental events into the set of physical events.
Percepts, considered causally, are between events in afferent 
nerves (stimulus) and events in efferent nerves (reaction); their 
location in causal chains is the same as that of certain events in 
the brain. Percepts as a source of knowledge of physical objects 
can only serve their purpose in so far as there are separable, more 
or less independent, causal chains in the physical world. This 
only happens approximately, and therefore the inference from 
percepts to physical objects cannot be precise. Science consists 
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largely of devices for overcoming this initial lack of precision on 
the assumption that perception gives a first approximation to 
the truth. (HK, 209-210)
A “percept,” as Russell uses the term, is the sort of mental 
event involved in perception of the external world. There are other 
sorts of mental events, such as in daydreaming, which do not 
involve an intent to perceive the physical environment. Percepts 
are of primary interest here as the mental events required for 
establishing knowledge of the wider physical world. In order to 
furnish scientific theory with the sensory evidence required for 
corroboration, we regard percepts as physical events crucial to 
the theory.
If the percept is to be a source of knowledge of the object, it 
must be possible to infer the cause from the effect, or at least 
to infer some characteristics of the cause. In this backward 
inference from effect to cause, I shall for the present assume the 
laws of physics.
If percepts are to allow inferences to objects, the physical world 
must contain more or less separable causal chains. I can see at 
the present moment various things — sheets of paper, books, 
trees, walls, and clouds. If the separateness of these things in my 
visual field is to correspond to a physical separateness, each of 
them must start its own causal chain, arriving at my eye without 
much interference from the others. The theory of light assures 
us that this is the case. Light waves emanating from a source 
will, in suitable circumstances, pursue their course practically 
unaffected by other light waves in the same region. (HK, 206)
I wish to make further use of the arrow diagrams as a 
graphic depiction of the scientific view of the world. Let us 
confine discussion to a single grand diagram which represents 
the entire physical universe, “the arrow diagram of the universe.” 
This diagram is made up entirely of arrows which connect to one 
another. Every junction of arrows represents an individual event. 
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Nothing happens in the universe but these individual events 
and the transitions that connect them. The arrows indicate 
the order in which the events happen. Some of the events in 
the diagram are the human mental events which comprise our 
phenomenological experience. Some of those events are percepts 
situated in the causal sequences described by the causal theory 
of perception.
A given mental event, without regard to its causal relations 
to other events, consists of a variety of sensory qualities organized 
into a unity of momentary experience. Some of the sensory 
qualities are relations, such as spatial relations among colored 
regions in the visual field. These relations provide the mental 
event with internal structure which affords analysis of the mental 
event into component parts. The arrow diagram represents the 
time relations of events dissected to the granular level implied 
by quantum theory. Since an individual mental event admits of 
logical analysis into whole and part, how can a mental event be 
represented in the arrow diagram as utterly simple and incapable 
of further analysis? The arrow represents the specific relation of 
temporal succession. The events located at the arrow junctions are 
irreducible with respect to temporal relations specifically, which 
means those events are not subject to further breakdown into 
parts that come before and after. The human mental event, as we 
have defined it, is reduced to a temporal moment, such that all 
component sights, sounds and feelings are simultaneous in one 
person’s sentient experience, and no part comes before or after 
any other part  For example, the spatial relations presented in the 
visual field are instantaneous and irreducibly spatial — we cannot 
reduce them to time relations as we have done for the space-
like relations of physics. Since a mental event is a momentary 
composite of sensory qualities, it is appropriately represented as 
a temporally irreducible unit at the junction of arrows in the 
arrow diagram of physics.
Since we also identify the arrow as the causal successor 
relation, events connected by the relation are causally primitive. 
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They are irresolvable by further cause-and-effect analysis. The 
proof is in the constructions of chapter 5. The limit of causal 
analysis has been reached. The final breakdown into physical units 
(moments and transitions) has been obtained for the coherent 
foundation of physics. Therefore, a mental event is individual in 
two ways. For itself it has the unity of sentient awareness. For 
physics it has causal individuality, as a unit of cause and as a unit 
of effect.
Our arrow diagram of the universe is meant to serve the 
imagination as a graphic depiction of the causal structure of 
our physical world. Russell contends that scientific knowledge 
is limited specifically to knowledge of causal structure, and 
secondly, that such knowledge rests upon conjecture. By contrast, 
our knowledge of sensory data, as pursued in phenomenology, 
is confined to that with which we have direct acquaintance. 
Phenomenology suspends judgment about the validity of any 
scheme of conjecture, causal or otherwise, that purports to 
provide a wider context for the realm of appearances. Hence, 
phenomenology does not set foot into the domain of science, and 
there is no overlap between phenomenological knowledge and 
scientific knowledge. There is, however, a crucial sense in which 
phenomenological knowledge, which Russell calls “knowledge 
by acquaintance,” takes precedence over scientific knowledge. 
The descriptive use of language can only gain a foothold where 
we have acquaintance with recognizable entities that we can 
name. This is the case with phenomenological description, but 
it is not the case with physical description. We have no direct 
acquaintance with any scientifically defined entities. In general, 
we can only legitimately denote a scientific entity as “that which 
bears some conjectured causal relation to sensory data.” If it is 
granted that science supplies the authoritative account of all 
physical bodies, then we do not have direct acquaintance with 
any physical body, contrary to our practical habits of thought 
and speech. According to science, knowledge of our physical 
surroundings is without exception mediated by neural signals. We 
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distinguish a physical blow from an odor, or a flash of light from 
a roll of thunder, solely determined by which neural pathways are 
engaged in which firing frequencies. This uniform encoding of 
information is the source of all our opinions about the physical 
world. There is no bypassing this neural source of information —
 no alternate means of corroborating what our nerve signals 
tell us. One cannot adhere to science while rejecting this well-
established doctrine of the human perceptual apparatus. Science 
began under the assumption that physical objects are directly 
perceived, and science has effectively disproved that assumption 
by establishing the role of neural transmission as the sole source 
of our perceptual information. If you hold a purely physicalistic 
doctrine of what exists, you are stuck in a paradox as to how 
perception happens at all, since a nerve cell is no more perceivable 
than any other physical entity. When this state of affairs is fully 
appreciated, one adopts a more conservative estimate of what 
can be known about the physical world. One is then amenable 
to the interpretation of science as a doctrine of causal structure 
inferred from the phenomenology of our mental percepts.
Here is the method that has governed the development of 
scientific knowledge:
1. Invent a hypothesis that predicts resultant events on the 
basis of control events. 
2. Arrange for the control events to occur in a controlled 
experiment.
3. Observe whether the predicted results occur.
4. A successful result must be repeatable by independent 
teams of scientists.
In the first step, an initial hypothesis is required. This hypothesis 
must be formulated as a generalization which entails that certain 
events will follow upon certain others. The prediction might 
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specify only a statistical outcome of many trials or cases. The 
merits of various hypotheses are judged by their predictive power. 
Successful hypotheses developed through initially independent 
sciences have now been distilled (with the constructions of 
chapter five) into the hypothesis that the temporal/causal 
succession of events is all there is to physics.
Secondly, it is presumed that we can intervene in the causal 
order to ensure that a configuration of events under our control 
will occur. Occasionally we must wait for nature to bring about 
the conditions which will decide the truth of a prediction, as 
when an eclipse of the sun was used to confirm a prediction 
of General Relativity. More often we must actively bring about 
foreseeable events to serve as a controlled experiment, as when 
the first atomic bomb confirmed the conversion of mass to energy.
Thirdly, the outcome of an experiment must issue in 
an observation which decides the success or failure of the 
prediction. As Whitehead points out, every such observation 
is itself an event. In the terminology we are employing, the 
observational event is a mental percept situated in the wider 
purported causal order of events. In the case of an experiment 
in particle physics, the collisions induced by an accelerator leave 
artifacts on photographic film. After the film is developed, 
someone views the film and experiences visual percepts which 
are used to infer the outcome of the experiment. In this example, 
the elaborate chain of events between the particle collisions and 
the subsequent observation make it commonplace to say that 
elementary particles are not directly perceived but are inferred 
by means of theory. This wisdom generally evaporates when the 
observation of ordinary physical objects is considered, though 
scientific theory clearly implies that neural events and delays 
intrude between ordinary objects and our perception of them.
Finally, there is a demand for repeatability of experimental 
results. This requires of the physical world an intricate fabric of 
extremely dependable causal patterns. Causal patterns have been 
pursued to a level of detail that discloses irresolvable quantum 
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events. There, where science runs out of pattern and predictability, 
it reaches a boundary to its knowledge.
The view of science proposed here, which is hopefully 
becoming clear, furnishes a new perspective to the contention of 
Chapter 2 that physics omits all sensory qualities from its theory. 
The scientific method equips physics to discover patterns of 
cause-and-effect that predict the sensory effects we experience. 
The results of this method have distilled the physical realm into 
units of occurrence which we are calling “events.” If, as we should 
expect, physics adheres to its method, it can only deal with a 
mental event as a unit in a scheme of causal structure. The method 
provides no tool with which to delve into a causally simple event. 
As an example, consider the quality of redness. I can recognize 
what I call “redness,” and I can verbally report its presence in my 
experience. The redness that I experience is logically simple — it 
has no analysis into parts. There does not seem to be any way 
of knowing whether the quality that I call “redness” is the same 
quality that you call “redness.” Because redness is logically 
simple, neither of us can suggest any structural breakdown by 
which we might communicate a similarity or difference between 
the redness I see and the redness you see. Thus, for the purposes 
of science, which requires intersubjective agreement, a logically 
simple quality such as redness is completely useless. My verbal 
reporting of a red sensation, as a consistent response to consistent 
stimuli, is a different matter. Unlike the quality that I denote by 
it, the word itself, whether written or spoken, is a well-structured 
causal pattern, and as such, is fodder for scientific investigation.
Because our sensory data includes relations that bind other 
sensory items into structured wholes, we are acquainted with 
things that are not logically simple, such as the human visual 
field. This allows us to correlate the mathematical structure of a 
presented visual field with the conjectured structure of cause-and-
effect in the physical world. This correlation is so intuitive that we 
initially assume that the visual field is a faithful representation of 
the physical environment. Science first modified this assumption 
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by characterizing the physical environment as a spatial structure 
without sensory qualities. The representation of the colorless 
physical environment by the colorful visual field is therefore less 
faithful than was initially assumed. The next great modification 
to initial assumptions is the reduction of physical space to a 
structure of time-ordering relations. This means that the all-at-
once spatial pattern of the visual field does not correlate to an all-
at-once pattern of spatial relations in the physical environment. 
After these correctives from scientific theory are taken into 
account, what legitimately remains of the initial assumption 
that the visual field we experience is a faithful representation 
of our physical surroundings? Our intuitive projection of the 
visual field onto the physical environment is valid only to the 
extent that mathematical structure due to phenomenal relations 
of the visual field matches some mathematical structure due to 
causal relations among physical events in the environment. More 
generally, the structure disclosed in the full phenomenology of 
our senses furnishes the entire basis by which we articulate the 
scientific theory of causal structure.
The thesis of this chapter holds that science is restricted to 
conjectural knowledge of causal structure. The basic idea is that 
without conjecture, we are limited, as far as knowledge of the 
temporal world is concerned, to the phenomenology of sensory 
qualities. We depend upon conjecture for the rest. There is no 
shortage of conjectural material to work with. Before we engage 
in logical analysis or scientific discipline, we find ourselves firmly 
committed to various beliefs that go well beyond the sensory 
evidence. Santayana called such belief “animal faith.” Today we 
are more likely to say that we are “hard-wired” for such belief. 
In any case, critical reflection exposes the conjectural nature of 
our dearest beliefs, including belief in other minds and belief in 
the existence of the physical world. In the light of this, we can 
abandon such belief and restrict ourselves to phenomenology 
and mathematics, or we can accept the non-demonstrable nature 
of our basic beliefs as final and inescapable. Opting for the latter, 
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our aim is a consistent, coherent account of human minds in 
a physical environment. Science has already accomplished the 
difficult part. All that’s needed is a judicious interpretation of 
current scientific knowledge.
In support of Russell’s view that science gives us nothing 
but knowledge of causal structure, we can pursue a “positive” line 
of argument or a “negative” one. The positive line is constructive, 
building up current scientific theory from the single formal 
postulate of causal relations. The negative argument concerns the 
lack of any reasonable alternative. I will start with the negative.
I think it’s fair to characterize the standard view of science 
by reference to the phrase “spatial-temporal causal framework,” 
which Herbert Feigl has called the “the frame principle of 
science.” The phrase begins with an homage to Special Relativity 
by its reference to space-time, which is commendable. We then 
come to the word “causal,” which is crucial to Russell’s point of 
view. Finally, we have the word “framework” to round out the 
phrase. Since no part of the phrase is inconsistent with the thesis 
of this book, what’s the problem? The problem is redundancy, 
which though logically harmless, is symptomatic of the failure to 
make a conceptual breakthrough. We have the habit of conceiving 
the physical world as “space and what’s in it.” We are forced by 
scientific progress to modify that formula to “spacetime and 
what’s in it.” The concept of the physical world as an irreducibly 
spatial form of existence has a hold on the imagination, so that 
spacetime is conceived as a set of Newtonian-like spaces, one for 
each possible direction and speed. This is to rescue spatialized 
objects as the paradigm of physical existence. This is too complex, 
like the theory of epicycles, which tried to rescue the notion of a 
stationary earth by assigning highly peculiar orbits to the remaining 
planets. In place of “spatial-temporal causal framework” as the 
frame principle of science, I suggest “the causal order of events.” 
What science requires from spacetime is its order, and the type 
of order it requires is causal order. Spacetime is not something 
over and above the causal order of events, and we should not let 
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a redundant concatenation of terms obscure this. Furthermore, 
the term “framework,” which is also redundant, connotes a 
physical world that is something substantial, or even material. 
This is exactly what is not needed. The world is a succession of 
discrete immaterial events. To summarize, the conventional view 
of science cannot dispense with the causal relations that suffice 
as the lone assumption in Russell’s account. What distinguishes 
the conventional view is the determination to conceive even the 
most primitive physical entities as having geometric form, like 
the points of space or the particles of matter in Newton’s physics. 
This compromises the straightforward interpretation of Special 
Relativity given in Chapter 5, which reduces space-time to a 
structure formed of purely temporal relations. There is a high 
cost involved in preserving geometric form for the fundamental 
entities of physics. Special Relativity must be reined in at small 
scales of distance, introducing difficulties at the boundaries of its 
domain. More importantly, there is the perpetuation of mystery 
regarding sensory qualities for the foundations of science and the 
mind-body problem. Thus, I contend that the standard view of 
science, as just described, is unnecessarily awkward and not likely 
valid. Greater rewards come from framing theoretical physics in 
accord with Russell’s view that scientific knowledge can at best 
discover the “causal skeleton” of the world.
The constructive argument for the view that science 
describes only the causal order of events was initiated in Chapter 
5, with the arrow diagrams provided to illustrate causal structure. 
I explained in the next chapter how physical location consists 
of relative position in the causal order, and in this chapter, how 
human perceptual events furnish the phenomenal evidence by 
which the causal order of any and all events is inferred. We shall 
now summarize and extend the interpretation of science in terms 
of causal order.
We hold fast to a standpoint that recognizes sensory 
qualities as the fabric of our direct experience. From a skeptical 
point of view, the sensory qualities are evidence of nothing but 
114
CAREY R. CARLSON
themselves. Phenomenology recognizes that limitation and 
explores its subject matter within that confinement. Accordingly, 
we recognize that conjecture is required to interpret sensory 
qualities as indicators of a physical world beyond the senses. In 
reviewing Newtonian science, we find that its material substance 
has been discarded, and only its structural characterizations 
survive as valid science. Special Relativity suggests that physical 
space itself is a structural pattern of the causal succession 
of events. Science employs various types of logical structure 
provided by mathematics to progressively “branch out” the 
structure of causality. At every stage of this scientific progress, 
sensory experience provides the predicted effects which alone 
can verify theory. Therefore, no matter what mathematical form 
a completed theory of physics might take, the mathematical 
expression of the theory can only designate a proposed causal 
structure of the world. The theory will imply a multiplicity of 
individuals related to one another by cause-and-effect. The 
individuals, which we have been calling “events,” are only 
characterized by science as placeholders in a causal structure. Our 
mental percepts are among the events in any theory, since they 
are the only effects for which causes are sought in the first place. 
The scientific method gives no clue as to the intrinsic nature of 
events, and no clue as to the nature of the causal influence that 
one event can have upon another.
I conclude that while mental events and their qualities can be 
known without inference, physical events are known only as 
regards their space-time structure. The qualities that compose 
such events are unknown — so completely unknown that we 
cannot say either that they are or that they are not different 
from the qualities that we know as belonging to mental events. 
(HK, 231)
An “ontology” is a logical description of what exists. 
The view of Russell and Whitehead has been called an “event 
ontology.” With this label, the relations that connect events are 
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left unmentioned. This is a symptom of the general reluctance 
to admit the irreducible role of relations in the logical analysis 
of anything. In Russell and Whitehead, the causal relation is 
as important as the event. In any case, we now wish to explore 
the adequacy of the event ontology for the formulation of 
scientific theory.
In the mathematical expression of physical theory, the world 
is reduced to number and order. To correlate the mathematics to 
the actual world, numbers must pertain to numbers of actual 
entities, and order must pertain to the ordering of actual entities. 
In our ontology, we have the causal ordering of discrete events as 
the basis of physical order, and we have the number of events, the 
number of causal transitions, and the frequency ratios formed, 
from which to derive further numbers that have physical 
significance. The general idea is to frame scientific theory as far 
as possible without positing further types of entity. Toward that 
end, we have constructed a 4-D time manifold and the common 
particles from the causal order of events, deriving the known 
mass-ratios of the particles from their graphs. We’ve found the 
fine structure constant in a diagram of 137 arrows. We’ve found 
the ratios inherent in time diagrams, together with constructions 
of the common particles, to suffice for the measure of space, time, 
energy, mass, charge. Even the “second” is an arbitrary unit of 
measure, since duration only has meaning in ratio comparison to 
other durations. It’s reasonable to conclude that all the number 
and structure of theoretical physics is derivable from “the arrows 
of time.” It can hardly be an accident that the simplest and 
most symmetrical patterns that time can make reveal the most 
pervasive entities and features of physics.
Some years ago, I came across the book QED The Strange 
Theory of Light and Matter, by the physicist Richard Feynman. 
In that book he explains, for a non-technical audience, quantum 
electro-dynamics. That is the theory of electromagnetism 
harmonized with quantum theory. Mr. Feynman was a primary 
contributor to that theory and to the theory of nuclear particle 
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physics as well. Upon re-reading Mr. Feynman’s book, I see that 
it inspired me to use arrow diagrams in this book. Mr. Feynman 
used diagrams to explain the quantum interaction of light and 
electrons, using distinct graphic symbols for light and electrons. 
He explained that such diagrams are not merely a concession 
to the modest technical background of his intended audience. 
Rather, diagrams of that type form the basis for mathematical 
calculations that constitute the rigorous exposition of the theory. 
Graduate students spend years learning mathematical “tricks” 
by which to comb general results from the welter of quantum 
actions represented by structural combinations of the two 
graphic symbols. Mr. Feynman explained that mathematics plays 
a crucial but auxiliary role. He expressed hope that the lay reader 
might understand the theory better than his graduate students! 
A true grasp of the theory comes from considering the very 
simple actions that make up the physical situation, while the 
intense use of mathematics applied to these actions is peripheral 
to a genuine understanding. Furthermore, Mr. Feynman finishes 
his book by giving his opinion that the rest of physics will follow 
suit with quantum electrodynamics in the general characteristics 
revealed by his diagrams. He suggested that the theory of 
electromagnetism is unified in one scheme of diagrams, while 
a similar scheme would depict the behavior of nuclear particles.
Because we have seen the electron constructed from the 
arrows of time, there is no need to use a separate graphic symbol 
for the electron, as in Feynman diagrams. Furthermore, a single 
system of arrows suffices for electronic structure and nuclear 
structure. Nuclear structure is more compact than electronic 
structure because it is of higher frequency. Also, a 6-D lattice 
arrangement is needed for the nucleus, while a 4-D lattice 
principle suffices for electron and neutrino formations. Thus, the 
arrow suffices as the only graphic element, it depicts a quantum, 
and everything in physics is built from quanta.
Our mental events are quantum events. This clashes with 
our preconception that quantum events are “tiny,” either in size 
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or causal efficacy. But since these tiny events comprise the whole 
universe, let us consider the significance of a single quantum 
event more carefully. Regarding spatial size, we can estimate 
the sphere of influence of a quantum event by multiplying its 
time period by the speed of light. For a period of one-tenth of a 
second we get about eighteen thousand miles — plenty of range 
for a human sentient event to gather concurrent influences from 
the surface of a cortex.
The causal efficacy of a quantum event owes more to 
its location in the causal order than to its individual energy 
assignment. The human organism consists of many cells and 
organs going about their provincial business of staying alive. In 
that sense, the human being is a society. Its structure includes 
the nervous system as the organ of control and feedback which 
governs the gross behavior of the organism. If there is any one 
causal position in the whole animal that is the seat of control, 
it is where information from all the senses is gathered and 
where a unitary influence on the voluntary muscle system can be 
exercised. This causal locus is the surface of the cortex, which is 
also the locus of brainwave activity.
Descartes made use of a piece of wax in order to bring his 
notion of physical existence into stark focus. I have a rock in 
front of me right now, which fits nicely in the palm of my hand. 
As a physical object, it will serve just as well as Descartes’ piece 
of wax. My rock is made of quanta. The constituent quanta of 
the highest frequencies connect to form protons and neutrons, 
which combine to form nuclei. The nuclei combine with electron 
clouds to form complete atoms, which in turn combine to form 
molecules. The molecular patterns connect to form the rock. 
An arrow diagram of my rock would show how all its quanta 
are connected into a single elaborate sequence. The quanta are 
not undefined. Each quantum is an irresolvable step of time 
sequence. My rock is a propagating time sequence, made of 
temporal transitions connecting the moments to one another. 
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As it is with the rock, so it is with my hand that holds the rock, 
my body, physical objects in general, and the universe at large.
 The typical physicist today is under the innocent 
impression that he knows the essential nature of a rock in his 
hand from direct sensory perception without having made any 
conjecture at all. That innocent impression gives the physicalist 
a head-start in his pursuit of understanding the physical world. 
He is pre-equipped with the certainty that geometric shape and 
size are primary features of physical existence. But he is pre-
equipped with the wrong topology, and his certainty is only 
psychological. He gets the wrong topology—spatial topology—
from his own sensory data, which he cannot distinguish from 
the physical world, which he thinks he perceives. Thus, he is 
stuck with a spatial conception of the world. It will take the 
dramatic and incontrovertible collapse of spatial states and spatial 
configurations in the theory of physics to make him rethink his 
assumptions about what is perceivable and what is not.
At this point, Russell declares the mind-body problem to 
be solved. I will not quibble with that conclusion. Nevertheless, 
I will use one more chapter to take issue with Russell’s non-
committal attitude regarding the nature of events that are not 
human mental events.
Russell lamented that he could not communicate his 
solution to many people, especially philosophers. He attributed 
this to the ingrained habit of mistaking sensory data for a direct 
presentation of the physical world. An “imaginative leap” is 
required to overcome the habit. In my own case, several years of 
devoted study had produced no imaginative leap. When I came 
upon the two passages in Human Knowledge that I quoted near 
the end of Chapter 6, I was suddenly struck by the realization 
that my whole acquaintance with the physical world, including 
whatever sense I might have of my own body, is causally hemmed 
in by neural events to some region of my brain. With that, I 
suddenly let go of the spatially conceived world. In its place 
was a world of sheer temporal advance, of which my sentient 
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experience formed a natural part. I’ve tried to place Russell’s 
passages in a context that facilitates the same imaginative leap 
for the reader. In the final chapter, Whitehead may prove to be 
of further assistance.
Up until now the term “causal relation” has mainly been 
employed as a logical term needed to analyze causal structure, 
with events serving as the required relata. The final chapter will 
flesh out an interpretation of causal relations and events.
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CHAPTER 8
The Solution
Science delivers only the bare causal pattern of events. Among these 
events are sentient occasions of human perception, which provide 
science with its observational data. When the remaining events 
required for the causal pattern are considered sentient occasions also, 
a coherent view of the world is obtained.
The final chapter belongs to Whitehead. Russell and Whitehead 
agree in the major structural feature of the solution to the mind-
body problem, which is the analysis of the physical world into 
causal relations among physically featureless events, some of 
which are human phenomenological events. Experience lends 
itself to phenomenological description, while space-time does 
not. Hence, the sensory qualities of human experience are 
fundamental in the ontologies of both Russell and Whitehead. 
These qualities are implicated in contingent facts of the temporal 
world as ingredients of human mental events. Both Russell and 
Whitehead are devoted to belief in the existence of unperceivable 
theoretical entities of physics. They trim such scientific realism 
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to belief in two kinds of entity — causal relations and events. 
The virtue of that specific form of conjecture is that it frames 
scientific knowledge with the fewest assumptions, and sensory 
experience assumes an appropriate role as the source of evidence 
by which theory is verified.
Russell maintains a strict agnosticism regarding the 
intrinsic nature of events that are not human mental events. 
At the same time, he makes it clear that sentient experience is 
the only sort of temporal existence we can hope to conceive. 
Supposing there to be some other kind of event than a sentient 
occasion of experience, it could only be conceived in the negative, 
as “not experience.”
I hold … that the physical world is only known as regards certain 
abstract features of its space-time structure — features which, 
because of their abstractness, do not suffice to show whether 
the physical world is or is not different in intrinsic character 
from the world of mind. (HK, 224)
The unstated assumption underlying a typical discussion 
of “consciousness and the brain” is that the brain is the “known 
quantity,” submitting nicely to scientific techniques, while 
consciousness remains a holdout against these techniques, 
presenting a mystery. From the viewpoint of this book, 
consciousness is the part of the brain we’re familiar with, and 
the mysterious part is the rest of it. It is true that there is a great 
deal of well-established theory regarding the causal structure of 
brain events. That theory, along with the rest of science, amounts 
to an elaborate hypothesis regarding the causal order of events. 
What those events are, with the exception of our own mental 
events, is perfectly unknown, and the greater mystery falls upon 
those other events, rather than upon human consciousness. 
Consciousness is a complex instance of sentient experience. The 
complexity involves language and representation, volition and 
memory, and a causal order of brain events that is difficult to 
ascertain. While these complexities pose interesting problems, 
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it is sentience in its bare simplicity that lends an air of mystery 
and misgivings to a physicalistic approach to the study of 
consciousness. As described in Chapter 2, sentience, or feeling, 
depends upon sensory qualities, and these qualities have been 
excluded from the scientific account since the advent of a purely 
geometric model of the physical world. In relation to that 
model, any sentience — even the simplest feeling — is a complete 
mystery. The geometric model turns out to be “all form and no 
content.” The only source of content for scientific theory is the 
phenomenology of our sentient experience. Once that is fully 
appreciated, the geometric model is readily interpreted as the 
specification of a causal structure of events that improves the 
systematic prediction of our sensory percepts. 
The outcome of our considerations is a very simple 
conception of the world. The fundamental temporal entities we 
have called “events.” The class of events can be divided into our 
own mental events on the one hand, and other quantum events. 
We refer to the recognizable components of our own mental 
events as “sensory qualities.” We have not offered any hypothesis 
about the components of other events, events which might be 
utterly simple and without any components at all. Last but not 
least, we require relations, which we have called “causal relations.” 
These ordering relations form the causal structure of events, the 
ascertainment of which is the function of science.
As previously explained, if we choose to wait upon further 
scientific developments for information about the intrinsic 
nature of quantum events, we shall wait forever. For the purpose 
of forming a general conception of the physical world, we 
already have all the pertinent information we shall ever have. 
The options for a worldview are limited. We may regard other 
quantum events as occasions of experience analogous to our 
own; we may regard quantum events as an unknowable type of 
existence; or we may suspend judgment indefinitely.
The moment it struck me that I had been under the spell 
of what Russell calls “a presumed familiarity with the physical 
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world,” I automatically assumed that sentient events supply the 
content that is missing from the purely structural specifications 
of science. I was most likely preset for this response by my 
previous reading of Whitehead.
For example, let the working hypothesis be that the ultimate 
realities are the events in their process of origination. Then 
each event, viewed in its separate individuality, is a passage 
between two ideal termini, namely, its components in their 
ideal disjunctive diversity passing into these same components 
in their concrete togetherness. There are two current doctrines 
as to this process. One is that of the external Creator, eliciting 
this final togetherness out of nothing. The other doctrine is that 
it is a metaphysical principle belonging to the nature of things, 
that there is nothing in the Universe other than instances of 
this passage and components of these instances. Let this latter 
doctrine be adopted. (AI, 235-236)
Whitehead picks up where Russell leaves off. He supposes 
that the basic events required by scientific theory are, like human 
occasions, unities of sentient feeling. Such a view fits the label 
“panpsychism,” since it implies that mentality of a sort pervades 
all physical existence. In this case, the sort of mentality involved 
is sentience — the sort of temporal existence that involves 
component sensory qualities. Whitehead’s view could thus be 
called “pansentience.” Panpsychism in some form has probably 
been around forever. It is usually denigrated as superstition by 
champions of the scientific point of view. Panpsychism can foster a 
mode of too-easy explanation, such as “falling objects fall because 
they want to fall.” This can distract us from the pursuit of better 
explanations, such as Newton’s theory of gravity. Because of this 
history of obstruction to the progress of science, panpsychism 
arouses ridicule and rabid reactions. Nevertheless, Whitehead’s 
view is rooted in modern science. Russell, who doesn’t generally 
mince words, acknowledges Whitehead’s view with courtesy 
and respect. Those who denigrate panpsychism in the name of 
science are captive to the outlook described in Chapter 2, and 
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they have not come to grips with the interpretation of science 
established by Russell and Whitehead.
Whitehead devotes little effort to justify his point of 
departure from Russell’s agnosticism regarding the intrinsic 
nature of events that are not human mental events. Before all 
the pieces fell into place for Whitehead, he had already railed 
against the belief in what he termed “vacuous actuality”  — that 
the physical world is an insentient mechanism. He had been 
influenced by Henri Bergson, who protested the “spatialization 
of nature,” and by F. H. Bradley, who also stressed the primacy of 
sentience in the composition of the physical world. Whitehead’s 
intuition of panpsychism is evident in Science and the Modern 
World, but it took two more years to hit upon the interpretation 
of Special Relativity that transforms “spatialized nature” into a 
purely temporal succession of events. That development allowed 
Whitehead to translate his intuition of panpsychism into a 
logically rigorous conception of the world. He adduces the 
following principle in support of the sentient nature of all events:
In framing a philosophic scheme, each metaphysical notion 
should be given the widest extension of which it seems capable. 
It is only in this way that the true adjustment of ideas can 
be explored. More important even than Occam’s doctrine of 
parsimony — if it be not another aspect of the same — is this 
doctrine that the scope of a metaphysical principle should not 
be limited otherwise than by the necessity of its meaning. (AI, 
237)
The above principle is invoked to settle the issue of the 
intrinsic nature of quantum events. These events are the ultimate 
realities turned up by scientific investigation. They form the 
basis for temporal existence. Sentient experience is one form of 
temporal existence — the only example we know by immediate 
acquaintance. To inhibit generalization from the known case 
to the unknown case is to complicate our understanding of 
the world for no reason. Therefore, it is prudent to adopt the 
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simplest hypothesis available that suffices for the justification of 
our beliefs and the correlative interpretation of our sensory data.
It has been a standing argument against mind-like entities 
that they are unlike the spatial entities of physics, so that causal 
interaction between the two is unintelligible. But now ‘the shoe is 
on the other foot.’ A time series of human moments is well suited 
to instantiate the causal order, while the remaining moments of 
physical theory have no specified attributes whatsoever. It is these 
latter moments that now stand in need of causal compatibility 
with mind.
The arguments offered may seem slight in view of the 
enormity of the consequences. If the arguments hold, the 
physical world is an interplay of sentient experiences. If not, it 
is a throng of abstract theoretical objects. The latter conception 
has the force of habit in its favor, since it has dominated the 
scientific outlook for three hundred years. However, if Chapter 5 
is correct, the meaning of Special Relativity has not yet worked 
its full transformation on the scientific outlook. The superstition 
of our time is that the causal order of events provides a refuge 
for the spatially conceived entities of Newton’s time. Unless 
arbitrary limitations are imposed upon Special Relativity, any 
entity previously defined with spatial characteristics must now be 
defined as a pattern produced by a temporal succession of other 
entities. These latter entities are subject to the same redefinition, 
and the process ends with quantum events that have no spatial 
characteristics. We wind up with a universe of pure activity, 
which Whitehead calls “process.” The notion of a physical entity 
as an instantaneous spatial configuration has no place in modern 
science. Once that is accepted, one can search in vain for some 
criterion bearing on the intrinsic nature of quantum events to 
weigh against the principle adduced by Whitehead in favor of 
nominating all events as “occasions of experience.” This secures a 
strong argument for panpsychism. Further support comes when 
we adopt this result as a provisional hypothesis and employ it in 
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the coherent interpretation of our sensory experience and our 
scientific beliefs.
At this point, we shall assume the sentient nature of all 
events, and proceed to the consequent interpretation of nature as 
a causal order of sentient events.
Our consciousness of the self-identity pervading our life-thread 
of occasions, is nothing other than knowledge of a special strand 
of unity within the general unity of nature. It is a locus within 
the whole, marked out by its own peculiarities, but otherwise 
exhibiting the general principle which guides the constitution 
of the whole. This general principle is the object-to-subject 
structure of experience. It can be otherwise stated as the vector-
structure of nature. Or otherwise, it can be conceived as the 
doctrine of the immanence of the past energizing in the present. 
(AI 187,188)
In this passage, Whitehead refers to one person’s sentient 
experience as a “life-thread of occasions.” An occasion is a 
sentient event, and a life-thread is a time-ordered chain of 
sentient events. One person’s experience is thus an integral part 
of the causal order of events that constitutes nature. We have 
employed “causal relation” as a primitive term in the formulation 
of scientific theory. For a duration of human awareness, the 
causal relation orders the moments of a person’s experience 
into a temporal stream of experience. The view that a person 
takes of cause-and-effect in this case bears on the possibility 
of meaningful human choice and action. At the same time, the 
character of cause-and-effect in connecting human occasions 
of experience will bear on physical causation in general, since 
all quantum events, according to our current assumption, are 
sentient occasions of experience analogous to our own.
Above, Whitehead offers three alternative wordings to 
describe the same general fact of causation as the relation that 
orders individual occasions to form a structured universe. These 
are: “the object-to-subject structure of experience,” “the vector-
structure of nature,” and “the immanence of the past energizing in 
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the present.” The first of these appeals to phenomenology and the 
discernment of object-versus-subject within human experience. 
The second appeals to the directedness of time and the temporal 
propagation of events in scientific theory. The third refers to the 
influence of the past upon the present, which applies equally well 
to human subjective experience and the progression of physical 
events in general. By declaring the three principles equivalent, 
Whitehead shows that he is pursuing a general conception of 
cause-and-effect that underlies both the dynamics of human 
experience and the wider dynamics of the physical world.
Whitehead is forthright about his belief that human 
existence, as well as physical existence in general, is emotional 
and purposeful. We are not accustomed to hearing such talk 
from a scholar of modern science. We are inculcated with the 
idea that scientific investigation discloses nature as a mix of 
random and automatic actions that do not admit of explanation 
in terms of purpose. Of course, if “sentience” is written out of 
the scientific lexicon, as it was in the Newtonian framework of 
matter-in-motion, purpose finds no place in scientific dialog. If, 
on the other hand, sentient occasions of experience form the 
basis of physical existence, it is no longer necessary to dismiss 
out-of-hand the discussion of purpose in a scientific context.
Whitehead says that physical science is an abstraction 
derived from more concrete fact. Mr. Gustav Bergmann has 
suggested that the word “abstract” should be avoided altogether 
in the context of logical analysis, and I have for the most part 
taken his suggestion to heart. The word has become an “escape 
valve” that is used to avoid coming to terms with relations and 
logical structure. We can restate the proposition that “physical 
science is an abstraction derived from more concrete fact” as 
follows: “The mathematical expression of physical theory refers 
to the logical structure of physical events as ordered by temporal-
causal relations.” If Richard Feynman is correct, the abstractions 
of physical theory can be specified in the form of diagrams, 
which depict nothing but logical structure. To construe an arrow 
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diagram as a representation of the actual world, we require a 
correspondence between the junction points and arrows of a 
diagram with individuals and relations thought to comprise 
“concrete fact.” This has led us to conceive sentient events and 
the manner of their effect upon one another as the elemental 
components of concrete fact. For the moment, let us suspend 
interest in causal connections to focus on the individuality of a 
sentient occasion.
Individuality.  The individual immediacy of an occasion is the 
final unity of subjective form, which is the occasion as an absolute 
reality. This immediacy is its moment of sheer individuality, 
bounded on either side by essential relativity. The occasion 
arises from relevant objects and perishes into the status of an 
object for other occasions. But it enjoys its decisive moment of 
absolute self-attainment when it stands out as for itself alone, 
with its own affective self-enjoyment. The term ‘monad’ also 
expresses this essential unity at the decisive moment, which 
stands between its birth and its perishing. The creativity of the 
world is the throbbing emotion of the past hurling itself into a 
new transcendent fact. It is the flying dart, of which Lucretius 
speaks, hurled beyond the bounds of the world. (AI, 177)
For Whitehead, the individuality of an event is an 
individuality of subjectivity and feeling. This is also how common 
sense conceives the basic individuality of one person’s mind. 
For physics on the other hand, the individual event is defined 
entirely by its relations to other events, since events only serve 
physics as the bare individuals required for causal structure. The 
individuals of physics are “bare” because the scientific method 
offers no clue as to their interpretation. Whitehead proposes an 
interpretation of physical individuals that is most similar in the 
philosophical tradition to Leibniz’ Monadology. Monads, as the 
elemental entities, have the individuality of subjective feeling 
commonly ascribed to a human mind. For both Leibnitz and 
Whitehead, this subjectivity is the mode of individuation by 
which the temporal world is split into a multiplicity of entities. 
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This way of conceiving individuation supplants spatial extension 
as the basis for analyzing the world into whole-and-part. It is 
then possible for Leibniz and Whitehead, each in his own way, 
to explain without circular reasoning, physical space as a system 
of relationships among sentient individuals. For Leibniz, this 
system of relationships is a correspondence between monads with 
respect to the variations in their constituent sensory qualities. 
This correspondence is implemented by God when he created the 
monads at the beginning of time. For Whitehead, the constituent 
properties of a monad only become determinate as a response 
to the causal influences of other freshly completed monads 
constituting the immediate past. Creation is thus distributed 
among the individual acts of individual moments, rather than 
consolidated in one act which determines the entire course of 
events. Whitehead is accounting for the causal independence of 
contemporary events implied by Special Relativity and Quantum 
Theory. Leibniz was adhering to the scientific determinism of his 
day — a determinism which did imply a pre-established course 
of events and did restrict the efficacy of purpose to a one-time 
act of creation. Given the constraints of scientific determinism, 
it is uncanny that Leibniz conceived a monadology so much 
like Whitehead’s. They are brought into congruence when the 
causal agency that is attributed by Leibniz to a single divine act 
of creation is disseminated among events as the causal agents of 
their own immediate progeny. This casts the universe as a process 
of stepwise, piecemeal creation. Each transition is an instance of 
causal relation connecting event to event, and the causal order of 
nature is the pattern laid down by these transitions.
The actualities of the Universe are processes of experience, each 
process an individual fact. The whole Universe is the advancing 
assemblage of these processes. …
… Any set of occasions, conceived as thus combined into a 
unity, will be termed a nexus. … When the unity of the nexus 
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is of dominating importance, nexus of different types emerge, 
which may be respectively termed Regions, Societies, Persons, 
Enduring Objects, Corporal Substances, Living Organisms, 
Events, with other analogous terms for the various shades of 
complexity of which Nature is capable. … 
The causal independence of contemporary occasions is the 
ground for the freedom within the Universe. The novelties 
which face the contemporary world are solved in isolation by 
the contemporary occasions. There is complete contemporary 
freedom. It is not true that whatever happens is immediately 
a condition laid upon everything else. Such a conception of 
complete mutual determination is an exaggeration of the 
community of the Universe. The notions of ‘sporadic occurrences’ 
and of ‘mutual irrelevance’ have a real application to the nature 
of things. (AI 197, 198)
Regarding the various shades of complexity of which 
Nature is capable, I wish to emphasize that such complexity 
is uniformly analyzable as variations of structure arising from 
sequential causal relations between events. For Whitehead, such 
events are, without exception, “occasions of experience,” or just 
“occasions.” An occasion is momentary, arising and perishing in 
its fixed location in the causal order. An occasion is a moment 
that neither endures nor recurs. As we consider various structural 
formations with reference to their common names, such as 
“persons,” “societies,” and “living organisms,” we should bear in 
mind the uniform analysis of these assemblages into discrete 
units of experience. Otherwise, the analysis “goes soft.”
We are using a single moment of one person’s sentient 
awareness as the prototype for all events. It serves as the source 
of meaning for “the intrinsic nature of quantum events.” One 
person’s sentient experience over time, considered in isolation 
from other events comprising that person’s brain and body, is 
commonly called a “stream of consciousness.” It is, according 
to many religions, what survives the death of the body to host 
the pleasures or pains of an afterlife. It is a domain of feeling, 
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variegated by qualitative features that furnish the subject 
matter of phenomenological description. Whether the feeling 
is rudimentary, as when awareness dwindles to a fog with the 
onset of an anesthetic, or whether the feeling is complex and 
sophisticated, as when a person considers the meaning of a 
proposition expressed in language, the ingredient objects of 
awareness are what we have referred to as “sensory qualities.”
It is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate, via introspection, 
a “present moment” of experience. The “now” is like a moving 
target. On the other hand, it seems we cannot escape the present 
moment to target anything else. Earlier, when we “quantized” 
personal experience into discrete “drops” of roughly one-tenth 
of a second duration, we relied on psycho-physical experiment, 
which made the analysis dependent upon the conjectural basis 
of science. Furthermore, we adduced the phenomenological 
experience of judging earlier-versus-later as a basis for equating 
personal experience with a time-series of momentary experiences. 
That pleasing result has an air of construction and inference 
about it. It appears that through introspection alone personal 
experience cannot be sorted into component time relations 
versus momentary events. Even if that could be done, the time 
order established by that method could only account for private 
threads of experience causally isolated from one another. In 
that case it is advisable to regard “the causal relation” as strictly 
hypothetical, even as applied to the connectivity of one person’s 
experiences over time. Recall Whitehead’s doctrine that “each 
metaphysical notion should be given the widest extension of 
which it seems capable.” In this case, the metaphysical notion is 
the causal relation, which represents the whole conjectural basis 
of scientific knowledge in distilled form. If we forego any special 
exemption regarding the conjectural status of the causal relation, 
even when it is invoked as the ordering principle of one person’s 
stream of experience, then we place knowledge of one’s personal 
continuity over time on the same footing as scientific knowledge. 
As Russell was quoted earlier, the scientific determination of 
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causal order is based upon the phenomenological judgment of 
earlier-versus-later, but only as a first approximation to the truth. 
The initial judgment may be amended by scientific theory and 
measurement. The subjective judgment of time order — even the 
time order of one’s private train of thoughts — is tainted with 
inference and subject to error. We do not know any instance of 
the causal relation the way we know a sensory quality. That takes 
proper account of the historical discussion of sensory qualities 
that led to the skeptical conclusions of David Hume. Hume 
found that he could logically deny any interpretation of sensory 
data that served to establish either the self, other persons, or a 
physical world. This skepticism reduced sensory experience to 
“solipsism of the present moment.” The lesson to be taken from 
Hume is that any practical interpretation of sensory data relies 
upon one or more tenets of belief that are not logically entailed 
by the available evidence. The fact that routine interpretation 
of our sensory data is crucial to the meaning of our lives 
does nothing to change this. It is essential that the subjective 
privacy of feeling, which characterizes the individuality of one 
occasion, be connected to other occasions by a relation that 
does not compromise the principle of individuation. The logical 
distinction between individual occasions and the causal relation 
which orders them is what obliges us to posit the causal relation.
The Human Body.  But this analogy of physical nature to human 
experience is limited by the fact of the linear seriality of 
human occasions within any one personality and of the many-
dimensional seriality of the occasions in physical Space-Time.
In order to prove that this discrepancy is only superficial, it now 
remains for discussion whether the human experience of direct 
inheritance provides any analogy to this many-dimensional 
character of space. If human occasions of experience essentially 
inherit in one-dimensional personal order, there is a gap 
between human occasions and the physical occasions of nature.
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The peculiar status of the human body at once presents itself 
as negating this notion of strict personal order for human 
inheritance. Our dominant inheritance from our immediately 
past occasion is broken into by innumerable inheritances through 
other avenues. Sensitive nerves, the functioning of our viscera, 
disturbances in the composition of our blood, break in upon 
the dominant line of inheritance. In this way, emotions, hopes, 
fears, inhibitions, sense-perceptions arise, which physiologists 
confidently ascribe to the bodily functionings. So intimately 
obvious is this bodily inheritance that common speech does not 
discriminate the human body from the human person. Soul and 
body are fused together. … (AI, 189)
The above passage is dealing with the fact that a person’s 
stream of experience is not a causally autonomous series of 
occasions but is causally engaged with a confluence of non-
human occasions at the surface of the cortex. These latter 
occasions contribute to the structure of the human organism, 
but do not belong to the human series of occasions that 
constitutes our inimitable experience. Each member of a human 
series has direct causal influence upon its successor, forming the 
dominant line of inheritance. Without further causal influences 
impinging on the members of a human series, the series would 
be autonomous, and the human sentient mind would be causally 
disengaged from the body. That is not compatible with an 
account of scientific knowledge that relies on human percepts 
for its empirical confirmation. 
I used the following quote previously in connection with 
the phenomenology of time. I think it’s worth repeating in the 
current context with a view to making sense of causal relations. 
Non-Sensuous Perception.  … Gaze at a patch of red. In itself 
as an object, and apart from other factors of concern, this patch 
of red, as the mere object of that present act of perception, is 
silent as to the past or the future. How it originates, how it will 
vanish, whether indeed there was a past, and whether there will 
be a future, are not disclosed by its own nature. No material for 
the interpretation of sensa is provided by the sensa themselves, 
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as they stand starkly, barely, present and immediate. We do 
interpret them, but no thanks for the feat is due to them. …
In human experience, the most compelling example of non-
sensuous perception is our knowledge of our own immediate 
past. I am not referring to our memories of a day past, or of an 
hour past, or of a minute past. Such memories are blurred and 
confused by the intervening occasions of our personal existence. 
But our immediate past is constituted by that occasion, or by 
that group of fused occasions, which enters into experience 
devoid of any perceptible medium intervening between it and 
the present immediate fact. Roughly speaking, it is that portion 
of our past lying between a tenth of a second and half a second 
ago. It is gone, and yet it is here. It is our indubitable self, the 
foundation of our present existence. Yet the present occasion 
while claiming self-identity, while sharing the very nature of 
the bygone occasion in all its living activities, nevertheless is 
engaged in modifying it, in adjusting it to other influences, in 
completing it with other values, in deflecting it to other purposes. 
The present moment is constituted by the influx of the other into 
that self-identity which is the continued life of the immediate 
past within the immediacy of the present. (AI, 180, 181)
The first paragraph could have come from the writings 
of David Hume, summarizing as it does the requirement for 
interpretation in order to break out of a solipsism of the present 
moment. The second paragraph expands the account with a 
healthy dose of such interpretation. Most people will have no 
trouble with Whitehead’s interpretation of the immediate past 
as an influence upon the present, since it is a straightforward 
description of the purposeful manner in which we all conduct 
our daily lives. The description would even be trivial if it did 
not contradict the prevalent doctrine of scientific explanation 
that excludes purpose as a factor in determining the course of 
physical events. This doctrine was consolidated with Newton’s 
deterministic scheme of matter in motion. As that scheme has 
given way to the indeterminism of quantum events, the burden 
of scientific explanation has shifted to the workings of random 
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chance. The exclusion of sensory qualities from the physical 
scheme has remained intact, in which case it makes no sense to 
consider “purpose” as playing a role in the insentient activities of 
nature. On this view of nature, we can either interpret human 
action as a product of random chance, or we can attempt to 
construe purposeful human action as an exception to scientific 
explanation. On the other hand, Whitehead supposes that every 
action of nature arises from, and issues in, sentient experience. 
On this view, the efficacy of purpose that we claim for our 
own personal actions is, without reason to think otherwise, 
fundamental to all causal action. A person is just one causal 
thread of sentient occasions among others that comprise nature, 
and a person’s activity is representative, in fundamental respects, 
of any causal process.
The order of exposition that I have chosen began by setting 
forth a problem in terms of the dissociation of sensory qualities 
from the scientific outlook. This was then remedied by construing 
science as the ascertainment of a causal order of events that best 
predicts our sensory percepts. With Russell at the helm, the 
primary emphasis was on phenomenological percepts as effects, 
with the external world providing the causes. That much is certain 
if scientific theory is to be susceptible of empirical verification. 
Once we have established a coherent role for sensory qualities in 
the physical world, we can then attribute sentience and feeling 
to the physical world without scientific misgivings. This in turn 
makes it reasonable to suppose that efficacy of purpose is a causal 
factor in determining the course of physical events. Since science 
teaches that an individual quantum event is not entirely the 
resultant of external causal factors, and since we are supposing 
that any such event is a sentient occasion of experience, it is 
reasonable to speculate that each sentient occasion includes a 
component of self-determination based on purposive feeling. In 
that case, each occasion is not just a sentient entity, but also a 
sentient entelechy, engaged in its own formation and fulfillment. 
This is Whitehead’s view.
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Objects.  — The process of experiencing is constituted by the 
reception of entities, whose being is antecedent to that process, 
into the complex fact which is that process itself. These 
antecedent entities, thus received as factors into the process of 
experiencing, are termed ‘objects’ for that experiential occasion. 
Thus primarily the term ‘object’ expresses the relation of the 
entity, thus denoted, to one or more occasions of experiencing. 
Two conditions must be fulfilled in order that an entity may 
function as an object in a process of experiencing: (1) the entity 
must be antecedent, and (2) the entity must be experienced in 
virtue of its antecedence; it must be given. Thus an object must 
be a thing received, and must not be either a mode of reception 
or a thing generated in that occasion. Thus the process of 
experiencing is constituted by the reception of objects into the 
unity of that complex occasion which is the process itself. The 
process creates itself, but it does not create the objects which it 
receives as factors in its own nature.
‘Objects’ for an occasion can also be termed the ‘data’ for that 
occasion. The choice of terms entirely depends on the metaphor 
which you prefer. One word carries the literal meaning of ‘lying 
in the way of ’, and the other word carries the literal meaning 
of ‘being given to’. But both words suffer from the defect of 
suggesting that an occasion of experiencing arises out of a 
passive situation which is a mere welter of many data.
Creativity. — The exact contrary is the case. The initial situation 
includes a factor of activity which is the reason for the origin of 
that occasion of experience. This factor of activity is what I have 
called ‘Creativity’. The initial situation with its creativity can be 
termed the initial phase of the new occasion. It can equally well 
be termed the ‘actual world’ relative to that occasion. It has a 
certain unity of its own, expressive of its capacity for providing 
the objects requisite for a new occasion, and also expressive of 
its conjoint activity whereby it is essentially the primary phase 
of a new occasion. It can thus be termed a ‘real potentiality’. 
The ‘potentiality’ refers to the passive capacity, the term ‘real’ 
refers to the creative activity, where the Platonic definition of 
‘real’ in the Sophist is referred to. This basic situation, this actual 
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world, this primary phase, this real potentiality — however you 
characterize it — as a whole is active with its inherent creativity, 
but in its details it provides the passive objects which derive their 
activity from the creativity of the whole. The creativity is the 
actualization of potentiality, and the process of actualization is 
an occasion of experiencing. Thus viewed in abstraction objects 
are passive, but viewed in conjunction they carry the creativity 
which drives the world. The process of creation is the form of 
unity of the Universe. (AI 178, 179)
We are exploring the idea that the universe is a causal 
process individuated into discrete temporal transitions from one 
or more sentient occasions to one or more other sentient 
occasions that are next in causal order. A complete arrow diagram 
of the universe would represent the detailed structure of 
spacetime as a concatenation of discrete steps of temporal 
transition. We wish to better understand the causal relations 
represented by the individual arrows themselves. To that end, we 
may focus our attention on the rudimentary case of causal 
structure depicted in the following diagram.
Causal X
The diagram helps to crystallize an overview of the 
component ideas of this book. Each arrow stands for a discrete 
causal/temporal transition from one sentient occasion of 
experience to another. Quantum theory dictates that the 
transitions be discrete. Special Relativity requires the joining and 
splitting of separable time sequences. Without additional arrows 
to connect this diagram into a wider context of space-time, the 
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five occasions involved in the diagram might equally well be part 
of a star, a piece of dust, or a human brain. The diagram depicts an 
ample fragment of space-time to illustrate Whitehead’s remarks 
about “Objects” and “Creativity.”
The occasion at the center of the diagram, which we 
may call “the central occasion,” is, from a strictly physicalistic 
point of view, a typical uninterpreted individual at the base of 
all existence—a causally primitive event. Postulation of such 
individuals is adequate for the construction of a predictive model 
of cause-and-effect sequences. By relying on uninterpreted 
individuals, the physicalistic scheme provides primitive entities 
that are unknown and unimaginable. But we have found that 
our own mental events serve very appropriately as individuals of 
this causal structure, with mental percepts providing the theory 
of physics with testimony of empirical verification. We then 
found reason to believe that all the individuals are occasions of 
feeling , generalizing from our own mental events. This provides 
physics with an intelligible interpretation. Physicalism is a valid 
approach to scientific discipline in regard to the purely structural 
import of scientific claims. It oversteps with two unwarranted 
assumptions: firstly, that “physical” means something more than 
“cause-and-effect”; and secondly, that causes and effects must be 
something other than mental events.
If we consider the above diagram in isolation, it serves 
as a touchstone to the elemental facts of time and causation. 
An arrow represents the before-and-after pairing relation. The 
central occasion represents a “now” of momentary experience. 
The temporal “now” belongs to each occasion in its essential 
individuality. (The “now” is not a relation that defines a “same 
moment of time” for two or more occasions. There is no such 
relation according to Special Relativity, and no two quantum 
events happen at the same time. That is the “breakdown of 
simultaneity.”)
The two arrows leading to the central occasion represent 
the combined influence of the past upon the determination 
139
THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION
of the central occasion. The entire causal past of this central 
occasion is mediated, as a formative influence, by just two 
occasions. Whatever “data” those two occasions provide to the 
experience of their mutual successor exhausts what Whitehead 
calls “the immanence of the past” in the central occasion. What 
is the nature of the data provided? The only sort of data we know 
is the qualitative phenomena ingredient in our own experience. 
Hence, we surmise that the phenomenological constitution of 
completed occasions becomes available as data to the arising 
experience of their immediate successors. This constitutes a 
breach in the privacy of individual occasions. This breach is 
depicted by an arrow, and we now have a conception of primitive 
causal relations wherein the phenomenological constituency of 
each completed occasion is rendered for appropriation by its 
immediate successors
Any causal arrow depicts a case of “direct immanence.” 
One may then define a transitive version of immanence such 
that any occasion is not only directly immanent in its immediate 
successors but generally immanent in the successors of its 
successors, and so on. Space-like relations are then defined for 
two contemporary occasions by reference to other occasions that 
are immanent in both of them — that is, by reference to other 
occasions sufficiently ancestral as to be in the common past of 
both contemporaries. Thus, the theory of spatial order is reduced 
to the structural consequences of immanence.
In the formation of each occasion of actuality the swing over 
from re-enaction to anticipation is due to the intervening touch 
of mentality. Whether the ideas thus introduced by the novel 
conceptual prehensions be old or new, they have this decisive 
result, that the occasion arises as an effect facing its past and 
ends as a cause facing its future. In between there lies the 
teleology of the Universe.
If the mental activity involves no introduction of ideal novelty, 
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the data of the conceptual feelings are merely eternal objects 
already illustrated in the initial phase of re-enaction. In 
that case, the re-integration with the primary phase merely 
converts the initial conformal reception into the anticipation of 
preservation of types of order and of patterns of feeling already 
dominant in the inheritance. There is a reign of acquiescence. 
In this way, a region of such occasions assumes the aspect of 
passive submission to imposed laws of nature. But when there 
is conceptual novelty made effective by its re-iteration and by 
the added emphasis on it throughout a chain of coordinated 
occasions, we have the aspect of an enduring person with a 
sustained purpose originated by that person and made effective 
in that person’s environment. Thus in this case the anticipation 
of kinship with the future assumes the form of purpose to 
transform concept into fact. In either case, whether or no there 
be conceptual novelty, the subjective forms of the conceptual 
prehensions constitute the drive of the Universe, whereby each 
occasion precipitates itself into the future. (AI 193, 194)
In respect to the above passage, Whitehead uses the terms 
“prehensions” and “eternal objects.” A “prehension” is a relation 
by which an occasion-in-process appropriates phenomenological 
data that will characterize its completed constitution. It is a grab 
for ingredients by the creative process in forming an individual 
occasion. The discernible ingredients of experience are what 
we have been calling “sensory qualities” or “phenomenological 
data.” Whitehead calls them “eternal objects,” alluding to Plato’s 
conception of a timeless realm of possibilities implicated in the 
contingent facts of the temporal world. Individual occasions 
serve in our ontology as irreducible “particulars.” The subjectivity 
of these particulars requires correlative objects. All occasions are 
alike in their basic subjectivity, so whatever intrinsic differences 
there might be between two occasions owes to a discrepancy 
in their respective objects. The sort of objects that account for 
qualitative similarities and dissimilarities are commonly called 
“universals.” Each completed occasion is a fact consisting of 
a “particular” qualified by “universals,” and more specifically, a 
subjectivity qualified by phenomenological data. Unless time is 
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thought to create phenomenological data out of nothing, it is 
qualitative data, as potential for experience, that is prerequisite 
for time. The view that temporal process establishes contingent 
facts presupposes a wider range of unactualized possibilities. 
Sensory qualities participate in the temporal process as objects 
for actual occasions of experience. As a “universal,” a quality is 
instantiated in some occasion, which gives that quality a definite 
location in spacetime. Just as red and green are mutually exclusive 
in the coloration of some patch of your visual field, any instance 
of a quality excludes various alternatives in the opportunity of 
that moment. A quality that is never experienced has no location 
in time, and the same holds true for any structured complex 
of qualities that is never experienced. Hence, unactualized 
possibilities have no location in time. That explains the term 
“eternal objects.” The domain of eternal objects involves facts 
about the differentiation of objects among themselves and facts 
of structure due to relations that are native to the domain of 
objects. The color solid discussed in Chapter 1 is a good example. 
Several facts about the color solid were discussed — for example, 
that yellow is “fenced off ” from blue in the hue circle by red and 
green. Such a fact pertains strictly to relations between colors 
and involves no essential reference to time. The color solid in 
its entirety is a complex eternal object. Enough is known about 
the finite complexity of human phenomenological experience to 
conclude that a person cannot experience all the colors of the 
color solid at one time. Since time is a succession of sentient 
occasions, and a phenomenal object has location in time by 
being ingredient in some occasion, then unless there are color-
sensing occasions that outperform human beings, the color solid 
as a whole is an object without location in time. Yet we can piece 
together the facts about the color solid, and graphic artists make 
routine use of its organization in the process of selecting colors. 
This example is intended to remove any mystery or confusion 
about Whitehead’s term “eternal object.” Human understanding 
is not exclusively devoted to ascertaining contingent facts of time. 
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Another example is pure mathematics, in which the vicissitudes 
of time are again beside the point. Mathematics delineates 
possibilities of structure, or what one might call “facts of form.” 
The applicability of mathematics to the actual world, while crucial 
to science, is incidental to pure mathematics. Here we have a 
body of knowledge that has grown so large as to be beyond the 
ken of any one person. It has even been proved infinite in a way 
that cannot be systematically completed. Therefore, the logically 
conjoined object of mathematical investigation has no location 
in time. It is in this sense that the object of mathematical inquiry, 
like the color solid, can be considered “out of time,” “timeless,” 
or “eternal.” 
Now we resume the analysis of temporal process in terms 
of the prehension of eternal objects by sentient occasions. 
The temporal process is quantized into steps, just as sentient 
experience is quantized into occasions. We see a duplication 
in terminology at this point, such that “temporal process” and 
“sentient experience” have come to mean the same thing. The 
common referent is the actual world, analyzable into momentary, 
transitory individuals. The qualitative nature of the actual world 
is provided by the diversity of eternal objects — the potential 
objects of experience. If an object is appropriated by an occasion 
from one of its immediate causal predecessors, this appropriation 
is termed a “physical prehension.” Physical prehensions are 
depicted by our causal arrows, the primitive relations responsible 
for causal order. If the data is a temporal novelty, prehended simply 
by virtue of its being a possibility, the appropriation is termed a 
“conceptual prehension.” The latter is named after the conceptual 
facility of human mental experience, which seems to range more 
freely among the possible objects of thought than previous 
experience alone would explain. The generalized hypothesis is 
that an occasion in process of formation is conditioned first and 
foremost by its past via physical prehensions of its immediate 
predecessors, and optionally, by a kinship of the immediate past 
to related untried possibilities via conceptual prehensions.
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The provisional definition of prehensions may be expanded 
by proposing positive and negative prehensions, which include 
or exclude an eternal object, respectively. Consider the arising 
moment of the central occasion reacting to its two immediate 
predecessor occasions. It is engaged in modifying them, in 
adjusting them to other influences, in completing them with 
other values, in deflecting them to other purposes, as Whitehead 
says. This involves selective inclusion and exclusion of the objects 
inherent in the causal parents. If the same distinction between 
positive and negative is applied to conceptual prehensions, then 
all possibilities are prehended by each occasion, either positively 
or negatively, since the inclusion of some involves the exclusion 
of the rest. With this expanded formulation, selection by an 
occasion from unlimited conceptual possibilities becomes more 
intelligible. Previous selections, prehended from the past, are 
connected to the entire realm of eternal objects by relations native 
to that realm, relations of similarity and contrast, for example. 
These native relations order the realm of possibilities according 
to what is more closely related, versus what is less closely related, 
to the accessible constituents of the causal parent occasions. This 
provides a principle of limitation that narrows selection from the 
overwhelming variety of all possibilities. It also seems to describe 
the workings of human imagination. A suitable metaphor 
suggests itself, that the temporal world has a foothold in the 
limitless territory of possibility, and that the creative process of 
which Whitehead speaks is engaged in progressive exploration 
of that territory.
If we now shift the focus of our attention away from the 
central occasion of the diagram, and outward to its wider causal 
context, we envisage the structural possibilities afforded by iterated 
causal relations, which returns us to the theory of spacetime and 
physical science. The structural possibilities are only broadly 
restricted by the rules of arrow concatenation — rules which only 
codify the notion that time is an accretion of irrevocable events. 
Chapter 5 shows that a unified physical theory can be based on 
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“the arrow diagram of the universe.” Symmetry was the only 
organizing principle that governed the initial constructions. Thus, 
symmetry has assumed the role of “force” in physics, explaining 
the regularities of “law.” But it is doubtful that the variety of 
biological lifeforms comes from symmetry alone. Why should 
select patterns of temporal succession prevail and not others? 
Why should there be any events or causal patterns at all? Such 
questions arise from the frustrations and satisfactions of sentient 
beings, so it is no mystery that a mathematical representation of 
causal structure cannot give the answers. If an event is conceived 
to be an insentient occurrence or held to the status of an 
uninterpreted mathematical construct, there can be no intrinsic 
reason for it, and it is absurd to ask why it occurred. The same 
holds true for cause-and-effect relations and the patterns built 
up from them. An interpretation of scientific knowledge that 
incorporates sentient beings is required for a concept of nature 
that supports reasons for things. We are presently engaged in such 
an interpretation, wherein nature is a community of sentient 
occasions — the “concrete reality” of which the causal structure 
is specified by diagrams. This fuller conception of the physical 
world provides “reasons why.” To begin with, each individual 
event, being an instance of subjectivity and feeling, is something 
for itself — something for its own sake. Its measure of satisfaction 
constitutes, in the most ordinary sense, a reason for its existence. 
Beyond that, we might ask why events form peculiar patterns 
of causal succession. Whitehead provides an answer in terms of 
“societies.”
We now pass on to the general notion of a Society. …
A Society is a nexus which ‘illustrates’ or ‘shares in’, some type 
of ‘Social Order’. ‘Social Order’ can be defined as follows: 
-- ‘A nexus enjoys “social order” when (i) there is a common 
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element of form illustrated in the definiteness of each of its 
included actual entities, and (ii) this common element of form 
arises in each member of the nexus by reason of the conditions 
imposed upon it by its prehensions of some other members of 
the nexus, and (iii) these prehensions impose that condition of 
reproduction by reason of their inclusion of positive feelings 
involving that common form. Such a nexus is called a “society”, 
and the common form is the “defining characteristic” of that 
society’.
… Thus a society is more than a set of [actual] entities to which 
the same class-name applies: that is to say, it involves more 
than a merely mathematical conception of ‘order’. To constitute 
a society, the class-name has got to apply to each member, by 
reason of genetic derivation from other members of that same 
society. The members of the society are alike because, by reason 
of their common character, they impose on other members of 
the society, the conditions which lead to that likeness.
It is evident from this description of the notion of a ‘Society’, as 
here employed, that a set of mutually contemporary occasions 
cannot form a complete society. For the genetic condition 
cannot be satisfied by such a set of contemporaries. Of course a 
set of contemporaries may belong to a society. But the society, 
as such, must involve antecedents and subsequents. In other 
words, a society must exhibit the peculiar quality of endurance. 
The real actual things that endure are all societies. They are not 
actual occasions. It is the mistake that has thwarted European 
metaphysics from the time of the Greeks, namely, to confuse 
societies with the completely real things which are the actual 
occasions. A society has an essential character, whereby it is the 
society that it is, and it has also accidental qualities which vary 
as circumstances alter. Thus a society, as a complete existence 
and as retaining the same metaphysical status, enjoys a history 
expressing its changing reactions to changing circumstances. 
But an actual occasion has no such history. It never changes. 
It only becomes and perishes. Its perishing is its assumption 
of a new metaphysical function in the creative advance of the 
universe. (AI, 203, 204)
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The definition of “social order” in the above passage 
makes essential reference to “a common element of form” in the 
occasions of the society, and to “positive feelings” regarding that 
form. The “common element of form” does not refer to causal 
structure, but rather to a phenomenal feature that is ingredient 
in each occasion of the society. Likewise, the “positive feelings” 
involving that common element of form belong to the individual 
occasions. A society is not another entelechy with a subjective 
individuality of its own. Only individual occasions have feelings. 
The occasion is the only unit of experience. Whitehead’s definition 
of “society” presupposes the phenomenological experience of 
each occasion in the causal order. Since an arrow diagram depicts 
only causal structure, it gives no indication that individual events 
have qualitative constituents. Thus, components essential to the 
definition of a society are not represented in the diagrams. The 
interpretation of arrow junctions as sentient occasions is required, 
as well as interpretation of the arrows themselves as prehensions 
of the phenomenal constituents of occasions by their immediate 
successors. A pattern of arrows may depict the causal structure 
of a society, but that society is only a society because every 
member inherits the defining phenomenal characteristics of that 
society from other members. The basic idea of a society is that 
it reinforces the satisfaction, or positive feelings, of its members. 
The reason for what is otherwise a meaningless pattern of arrows 
thus derives from the reason for the occurrence of individual 
events, which is individual satisfaction.
The simplest example of a society in which the successive 
nexus of its progressive realization have a common extensive 
pattern is when each such nexus is purely temporal and con-
tinuous. The society, in each stage of realization, then consists 
of a set of contiguous occasions in serial order. A man, defined 
as an enduring percipient, is such a society. This definition of a 
man is exactly what Descartes means by a thinking substance. 
It will be remembered that in his Principles of Philosophy 
[Part I, Principle XXI; also Meditation III] Descartes states 
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that endurance is nothing else than successive re-creation by 
God. Thus the Cartesian conception of the human soul and 
that here put forward differ only in the function assigned to 
God. Both conceptions involve a succession of occasions, 
each with its measure of immediate completeness.
Societies of the general type, that their realized nexus are 
purely temporal and continuous, will be termed ‘personal’. 
Any society of this type may be termed a ‘person’. Thus, as 
defined above, a man is a person.
But a man is more than a serial succession of occasions of 
experience. Such a definition may satisfy philosophers —
 Descartes, for example. It is not the ordinary meaning of the 
term ‘man’. There are animal bodies as well as animal minds; 
and in our experience such minds always occur incorporated. 
Now an animal body is a society involving a vast number of 
occasions, spatially and temporally coordinated. It follows that 
a ‘man’, in the full sense of ordinary usage, is not a ‘person’ as 
here defined. He has the unity of a wider society, in which the 
social coordination is a dominant factor in the behaviors of the 
various parts.
Also, when we survey the living world, animal and vegetable, 
there are bodies of all types. Each living body is a society, which 
is not personal. But most of the animals, including all the 
vertebrates, seem to have their social system dominated by a 
subordinate society which is ‘personal’. This subordinate society 
is of the same type as ‘man’, according to the personal definition 
given above, though of course the mental poles in the occasions 
of the dominant personal society do not rise to the height of 
human mentality. Thus in one sense a dog is a ‘person’, and in 
another sense he is a non-personal society. But the lower forms 
of animal life, and all vegetation, seem to lack the dominance 
of any included personal society. A tree is a democracy. Thus 
living bodies are not to be identified with living bodies under 
personal dominance. There is no necessary connection between 
‘life’ and ‘personality’. A ‘personal’ society need not be ‘living’, in 
the general sense of the term; and a ‘living’ society need not be 
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‘personal’. (AI, 205, 206)
The human sentient mind is one subsociety threaded into 
the causal structure of the living human organism. A typical 
conscious purpose arises from some bodily need, persists through 
a phase of pertinent goal-seeking bodily behavior, and subsides 
in a phase of fulfillment and satisfaction, with further benefits 
accruing to other bodily subsocieties in the process. The ultimate 
beneficiaries are always component individual occasions, since 
“feeling” and “well-being” apply only to such individuals. In 
the case of life processes of the body, the component occasions 
of each organ or suborganism profit from their associations 
with occasions of other organs in symbiotic fashion. The 
“associations” are traceable in principle to causal chains that 
lead from some member of one subsociety to some member of 
another. Conceivably, a single occasion could belong to more 
than one society, forming a causal conduit between societies. In 
any case, each causal transition is the unmediated influence of 
some completed occasion upon some other occasion in process 
of formation. Without some limiting factor, such as conflict 
of purpose between occasions, one would expect the world to 
rapidly arrive at an optimal structure in which harmony reigns 
and all occasions profit by the maximum synergy of their sharing 
arrangements. Whitehead accounts for the limitation of harmony 
by recognizing “negative prehensions,” which are disagreeable 
relations between occasions. Prehensions are raw, intimate 
relations. In visceral terms, instances of negative prehensions 
might involve pain, disgust or repulsion. With prehensions as 
the basis of causal structure, we have a teleology of positive and 
negative feelings, which conforms to the traditional concept 
of “final causation.” This contrasts with “efficient causation” as 
described by the purely structural formulations of physics. In 
the manner that structure presupposes component relations, 
efficient causation presupposes final causation, according to the 
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hypothesis we are exploring. Efficient causation depends on the 
patterns of temporal sequence created by final causation.
It is one thing to reconcile efficient causation and final 
causation in a very general way, but this does not of itself yield 
any practical knowledge regarding cause-and-effect. Of specific 
concern to human beings is human psychology, where we cannot 
with any confidence sort out final causation from efficient 
causation. A psychological theory such as Freud’s, which is 
framed in terms of purposeful agencies, employs a mode of 
explanation that is genuinely psychological. On the other hand, 
much of psychology is taken up with the chemistry and physics 
of the brain, which relies on a mode of explanation that is not 
psychological in the least. The two modes of explanation differ in 
the characterization of those occasions that do not belong to our 
conscious experience but are thought to constitute its immediate 
causes and effects.
In terms of efficient causation, the unknown causal 
agencies that interact with the conscious mind are generic 
quantum events, causally contiguous to our own sentient 
events in the cortical region of the brain. It is likely that those 
unknown brain events are close in temporal frequency to the 
human sentient events with which they interact. To physical 
science, no further conceptualizing is necessary. It is now 
entirely a matter of determining the temporal sequencing of the 
quantum-electrodynamics of the brain — that is, the causal order 
of quantum events, at electronic energy levels, in the cortical 
region of the brain. This describes psychology as “brain science” 
 — a special case of physics, employing the scientific method.
In Freud’s psychology, purposeful agencies are in conflict, 
resulting in the repression of some agencies to the unconscious. 
Here they remain active causal agents, using subversive tactics to 
achieve their purposes without arousing the conscious mind. Is 
this sort of theory in conflict with brain science?
With the assumption that individual events are inherently 
sentient and purposive, we should expect causal interaction with 
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the human series at close quarters to be generally psychological 
in nature. It may well be that the dominant strand of human 
consciousness is one among many that vie for control of the 
body’s resources, and that a great many of the unknown quantum 
events of the brain are organized into what Freud called “the 
unconscious.” There is no inevitable clash between inherently 
psychological theories and the physicalistic theory of brain 
activity. A theory of the former type ventures an interpretation 
as to the intrinsic nature of events, while the physicalistic 
conception is free from such interpretation.
The Universe achieves its values by reason of its coordination 
into societies of societies, and in societies of societies of 
societies. Thus an army is a society of regiments, and regiments 
are societies of men, and men are societies of cells, and of blood, 
and of bones, together with the dominant society of personal 
human experience, and cells are societies of small physical 
entities such as protons, and so on, and so on. (AI 206)
Science today thinks in terms of “big and “small.” Galaxies 
are big and quanta are small. These are designations of spatial 
extent. They constitute a nasty distortion of the facts. Physical 
size and measure pertain to quanta. Quanta have greater or less 
duration, which means they are relatively slow or quick. The 
quicker quantum has greater energy. The slower quantum has 
a greater time span. In a vast closed region, a single quantum 
could connect the earliest moment to the latest, spanning an eon 
of time. Such a quantum has feeble energy, but to think of that 
quantum as “small” is to miss the fact that it spans a galaxy.
The electrons and photons, the rock, the brain, the planets, 
the galaxies-- all these have their quanta and their mass-
energy. None of it has spatial extension because the chaining of 
temporal transitions is the only type of extension for physics—
temporal extension. There is no such thing as a physical state of 
instantaneous organization. What exists all-at-once is only each 
individual moment. Since each moment (for physics) is generic 
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and primitive, there is no specification of its state. To refer to a 
physical state, such as a “brain state,” is to “freeze out time” and 
indulge in the illusion of instantaneous spatial extension.
We are apt to take a parochial view of our own native 
frequency as “just right” for the enjoyment of sane, coherent 
experience. We have trouble granting experience to the 
moments that comprise an electron or a proton because of their 
nanosecond quickness. But that pace is strictly relative to other 
frequencies. There is no absolute measure of duration. The pace 
of experience is “just right” for the constituent occasions of any 
sequence, regardless of its frequency ratio to other sequences.
Nature is a complex of enduring objects, functioning as 
subordinate elements in a larger spatial-physical society. This 
larger society is for us the natural universe. There is however no 
reason to identify it with the boundless totality of actual things.
Also each of these enduring objects, such as tables, animal bodies, 
and stars, is itself a subordinate universe including subordinate 
enduring objects. The only strictly personal society of which we 
have direct discriminative intuition is the society of our own 
personal experiences. We also have a direct, though vaguer, 
intuition of our derivation of experience from the antecedent 
functioning of our bodies, and a still vaguer intuition of our 
bodily derivation from external nature.
Nature suggests for our observation gaps, and then as it were 
withdraws them upon challenge. …
Another gap is that between lifeless bodies and living bodies. Yet 
the living bodies can be pursued down to the edge of lifelessness. 
Also the functionings of inorganic matter remain intact amid 
the functionings of living matter. It seems that, in bodies that 
are obviously living, a coordination has been achieved that raises 
into prominence some functionings inherent in the ultimate 
occasions. For lifeless matter these functionings thwart each 
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other, and average out so as to produce a negligible total effect. 
In the case of living bodies the coordination intervenes, and the 
average effect of these intimate functionings has to be taken 
into account. …
Life may characterize a set of occasions diffused throughout a 
society, though not necessarily including all, or even a majority 
of, the occasions of that society. The common element of 
purpose which characterizes these various occasions must be 
reckoned as one element of the determining characteristics of 
the society. It is evident that according to this definition no 
single occasion can be called living. Life is the coordination of 
the mental spontaneities throughout the occasions of a society. 
(AI 206 207)
Life cannot be attributed to an individual occasion. Life 
only arises as a feature of societal organizations of occasions. 
Similarly, a single occasion is not intelligent. The momentary act 
of a single occasion is all intuition and feeling. Occasions do vary 
however, in the complexity of their internal phenomenological 
structure. The complexity of constituent occasions may be crucial 
to the intelligence level of their society, which is in turn needed to 
sustain a degree of complexity in the members. We humans can 
gauge the complexity of our own phenomenology directly. The 
complexity of our percepts prompts us to infer a corresponding 
complexity in the immediate external causes of those percepts. In 
general, when we progress in some particular domain of scientific 
investigation to the detailed level of individual events, we can 
imagine the qualitative richness of the constituent occasions to 
be commensurate with the number of causal relations impinging 
on each occasion according to the theory of its embedding causal 
structure.
To summarize this chapter, we start with a causal order of 
events as the basis of scientific theory. We then obtain a fitting 
interpretation for events and their ordering relations in “sentient 
occasions” and “prehensions.” A “society” of occasions can then 
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be defined, which supplies an explanation for certain persistent 
causal patterns. This interpretive scheme is then applied to the 
consideration of living and non-living processes of nature and 
the human organism in particular. Special care has been taken 
throughout to remain consistent with the causal analysis of the 
world into whole-and-part as depicted by the arrow diagrams, so 
that the interpretive scheme, and the purely structural import of 
scientific knowledge, reinforce and complete one another.
A primary objective for this chapter was to flesh out an 
interpretation of “causal relation.” This comes down to an 
intuition of time and temporal passage. Whitehead can have the 
final word.
[Plato] wrote in the Sophist, not-being is itself a form of being. 
He only applied this doctrine to his eternal forms. He should 
have applied the same doctrine to the things that perish. He 
would then have illustrated another aspect of the method of 
philosophic generalization. When a general idea has been 
obtained, it should not be arbitrarily limited to the topic of its 
origination.
Thus we should balance Aristotle’s — or, more rightly, Plato’s —
 doctrine of becoming by a doctrine of perishing. When they 
perish, occasions pass from the immediacy of being into the 
not-being of immediacy. But that does not mean that they are 
nothing. They remain ‘stubborn fact’….
The common expressions of mankind fashion the past for 
us in three aspects-- Causation, Memory, and our active 
transformation of our immediate past experience into the basis of 
our present modification of it. Thus ‘perishing’ is the assumption 
of a role in a transcendent future. The not-being of occasions 
is their ‘objective immortality’. A pure physical prehension is 
how an occasion in its immediacy of being absorbs another 
occasion which has passed into the objective immortality of its 
not-being. It is how the past lives in the present. It is causation. 
It is memory. It is perception of derivation. It is emotional 
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conformation to a given situation, an emotional continuity of 
past with present. It is a basic element from which springs the 
self-creation of each temporal occasion. Thus perishing is the 
initiation of becoming. How the past perishes is how the future 
becomes. (AI, 237, 238)
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